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ABSTRACT 
Ever since the end of the Cold War, regionalism is on the rise. However, the 
regional organizations formed in various parts of the world look markedly different. 
Existing Comparative Regionalism literature largely neglects the way in which regional 
norms contribute to the reproduction of these differences. Against this background, my 
thesis aims to identify the social conditions and the political mechanisms that cause 
regional organizations to develop along divergent pathways. Using concepts and 
arguments from the English School, social constructivism and institutionalism, I 
develop an approach to the analysis of change in regional organizations that takes into 
account their connection to a regionally specific normative context. I argue that actors 
talk about regional governance on two levels: that of abstract norms (‘primary 
institutions’) and that of concrete rules and procedures (‘secondary institutions’). A 
historical comparison of decolonization, regionalization and enlargement processes in 
the EU and ASEAN as well as their respective predecessors demonstrates that pathways 
in the development of regional organizations depend on how actors connect these 
primary and secondary institutional levels in the discourse about regional governance. 
The analysis illustrates that the normative context of regional organization-building is 
often malleable and ambiguous, and that decision-makers use different strategies to 
translate this dynamic framework into concrete rules and procedures. 
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1 Introduction: organizations in regional international societies 
We live in a world of regions (Katzenstein 2005). Since at least the end of the 
Second World War, regionalism has spread across the globe in several waves 
(Mansfield et al. 1999; Söderbaum 2016; Väyrynen 2003). Wars, power shifts, 
economic globalization and the spread of new ideas about political order have led to the 
emergence and growth of trans- and supranational spaces as well as a demand for new 
forms of governance beyond the nation-state (Buzan and Wæver 2010; Lake and 
Morgan 1997; Telò 2014a; Wunderlich 2007: 45–47). One of the most far-reaching 
effects of these developments was the proliferation of regional organizations. As 
existing organizations have grown in membership and new ones have been created, 
there is now hardly a state in the world that is not a member of at least one regional 
organization. Besides this increase in sheer numbers and geographic coverage, however, 
regional organizations have also taken on new tasks and assumed more authority in 
relation to its member states (Acharya 2014: 84–93; Börzel and Risse 2016). 
1.1 The research question: differences between regional organizations 
Two parts of the world have been particularly successful in widening and 
deepening the institutionalization of their relations, notwithstanding various and sundry 
crises: post-Cold War Europe saw the successful transformation of the European 
Communities (EC) into the European Union (EU), the expansion of EU membership to 
the East and South, and the reform of its institutions by means of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) gradually incorporated Vietnam, 
Laos, Burma and Cambodia and strengthened its institutional foundations with the 
ASEAN Charter of 2007. These general developments in the institutional set-up of the 
two regional organizations are supplemented by the progressive establishment and 
refinement of governance mechanisms in various policy fields. Both the EU and 
ASEAN have made progress in economic and financial integration, and both have 
strengthened their respective human rights regimes – the EU by signing a Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, ASEAN by calling into being the ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights and adopting the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. 
Despite such common dynamics, important differences between regional 
organizations persist and no single institutional template, EU-style or otherwise, is 
emerging. Instead, one finds that while different regions have undergone similar macro-
Regional Organizations in International Society 
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processes, such as decolonization, regionalization and enlargement, they have 
developed unique institutional rules and procedures which prove resistant to 
assimilation (Higgott 2014). For instance, while the ASEAN member states have been 
influenced by the EU when reforming their own regional organization (Jetschke 2009), 
they continue to be highly sceptical about institutional arrangements that centralize 
decision-making and compromise state sovereignty (Pettman 2010; Yeo 2010). Against 
the background of this ‘double finding’ (Börzel and van Hüllen 2015c: 10) of limited 
convergence and persistent difference in the institutional features and policies of 
regional organizations, the research question of this study reads as follows: how can we 
understand the development of divergent rules and procedures in regional 
organizations? 
1.2 Core arguments, goals and case selection 
Questions like the above are a main concern of Comparative Regionalism, a 
relatively new sub-field of the International Relations (IR) discipline. Authors working 
within the paradigm have produced some important arguments to explain the persistent 
differences between regional organizations. They point to power-political factors such 
as the hegemonial influence of major states, domestic factors such as the preference 
structures of ruling coalitions, functional demands such as economic interdependence, 
historical factors such as institutional inertia, as well as the localized adaption of 
diffusing organizational models and the emergence of distinct regional identities (see 
Section 2.2). 
All of these approaches have their merits. However, Comparative Regionalism 
in its current form has major weaknesses when it comes to accounting for fundamental 
regional norms and how they put regional organizations on specific institutional 
pathways. While some Comparative Regionalism authors have pointed out that regional 
organizations are embedded in a deeper layer of social structure (Acharya and Johnston 
2007a: 17–19; Katzenstein 2005; Wunderlich 2007), they remain unclear about how 
exactly this translates into specific institutional features of regional organizations and 
what happens in instances of change. 
In order to fill this gap, this thesis develops the argument that regional 
organizations display persistent differences because their rules and procedures – what 
the English School of IR calls ‘secondary institutions’ – are developed in regionally 
Introduction 
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specific contexts of fundamental norms about international conduct, or ‘primary 
institutions’. These contexts are malleable and subject to change, but they set certain 
limits to the shape regional secondary institutions can take. The argument is based on 
the assumption that actors talk about regional governance on two levels of abstraction. 
Thus, when engaging in arguments about the creation or reform of regional 
organizations, they simultaneously reshape the normative context of institution-
building. By means of a historical comparison of decolonization, regionalization and 
enlargement processes in the regional organizations of Europe and Southeast Asia, I 
demonstrate that the trajectories of the secondary institutions of regional organizations 
depend on how actors connect them to regional primary institutions in the discourse 
about regional governance. 
The study pursues two main goals. The first is to develop an analytical 
framework to examine the historical pathways of the secondary institutions of regional 
organizations in the deeper social context of regional primary institutions. I do so by 
drawing on concepts and arguments from the English School of IR and social 
constructivism. I argue that the English School offers an alternative and innovative 
approach towards regional organizations because its theoretical framework focuses on 
the social deep structure of international relations and takes historical dynamics into 
account. On such a basis, it promises a deeper understanding of 
 the mechanisms through which regional organizations are reproduced and 
the path dependencies that result from these processes; 
 how particular normative contexts shape the rules and procedures of different 
regional organizations; 
 how normative change can result in change in the organizations of a region; 
 and how this normative context is in turn influenced by changes in regional 
organizations. 
The second research goal is to apply this theoretical apparatus in a comparative research 
design, which examines processes of change in the secondary institutions of the main 
regional organizations of Europe and Southeast Asia, including the European 
Communities and the EU on the one side, and ASEAN as well as its predecessors on the 
Regional Organizations in International Society 
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other side. I specifically focus on three episodes of change that are characteristic of the 
historical development of contemporary regionalism: decolonization, regionalization 
and enlargement. Such cross-regional comparison can illuminate that, rather than 
following a general logic, the pathways of the secondary institutions of regional 
organizations unfold in historically contingent ways, depending on the primary 
institutional context and how regional actors translate it into concrete organizational 
forms.  
There are two main reasons for focusing the inquiry on Europe and Southeast 
Asia. First, while the relation between the EU and ASEAN is sometimes described as an 
exemplary instance of inter-regional diffusion (Börzel and Risse 2009; Jetschke 2010), 
meaning that ASEAN copies institutional features and policies from the EU, it has also 
repeatedly been noted that ASEAN decision-makers do not adopt EU-style institutions 
wholeheartedly (Jetschke and Rüland 2009; Wong 2012). To the contrary, many 
observers argue that ASEANʼs organizational development follows a unique model, the 
‘ASEAN Way’, which consists of more informal and consensual forms of cooperation 
than in the EU case (Acharya 1997: 320; Haacke 2009; Higgott 2014; Narine 2002: 31–
33). In light of these empirical findings, explaining the persistent divergence between 
European and Southeast Asian models of regional organization becomes particularly 
salient (Acharya and Johnston 2007a: 11–12). 
Second, to legitimize their respective mode of regional cooperation, actors in 
both regions have repeatedly invoked the existence of regional identities, values and 
norms (Murray 2010: 311, 2015: 22–23). The notion of a European identity, based on a 
common cultural heritage and a particular commitment to individual rights, has been 
used to justify the launching, widening and deepening of the integration process in 
Europe (Wæver 2005). For example, Schimmelfennig (2005a) argues that the admission 
or rejection of membership candidates in the EU enlargement process was influenced by 
the common, liberal-democratic values of EU member states. In the same vein, the 
ASEAN Way is a term coined to refer to a mode of interstate cooperation informed by 
distinct regional norms (Acharya 1997: 320; Katzenstein 2005: 78–81). This suggests 
that choices in rules and procedures are linked to a context of regionally specific social 
‘deep structure’, and that the relation between the two levels needs to be analyzed if we 
want to better understand the origins of the institutional architectures. 
Introduction 
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1.3 Structure of the study 
The thesis consists of three main parts, which are each subdivided into several 
chapters. Part I relates to the first research goal stated above, as it fleshes out the 
theoretical and methodological framework for the comparison of regional organizations. 
Chapter 2 reviews the Comparative Regionalism literature with a particular focus on 
how it explains differences between regional organizations. I argue that existing 
scholarship has provided valuable insights but fails to acknowledge that regional 
organizations have developed over time in a broader, regionally specific context of 
understandings about the rightful conduct of international relations. Considering this 
shortcoming, I suggest that the English School of IR can provide a more historically and 
sociologically informed picture of regional institutional configurations. 
Chapter 3 builds on this idea by developing a theoretical model of how change 
and stability in regional organizations are embedded in a dynamic normative context. 
The framework is based on the English Schoolʼs distinction between primary 
institutions – the general principles and norms of an international society – and 
secondary institutions – the rules and procedures of international organizations, regimes 
and networks. Engaging this conceptual apparatus with constructivist and institutionalist 
ideas, I argue that primary and secondary institutions are the result of distinct 
institutionalization practices of international actors. As these practices are in turn 
constituted by primary and secondary institutions, the resulting model is two-layered 
and incorporates structurationist ideas about the mutual constitution of agency and 
structure: primary institutions, such as understandings about sovereignty and 
territoriality, form a constitutive context for the institutionalization of secondary 
institutions, such as regional organizations, and vice versa. These linkages render the 
institutional configuration of a regional international society relatively stable against 
discursive challenges. However, change is always possible if oppositional actors 
manage to mobilize pressure on established institutions and disturb the reproductive 
mechanisms of institutionalization and constitution. 
The methodology chapter (4) then discusses how this model can be applied to 
study continuity and change in regional governance structures. I develop a research 
design in which the trajectory of institutional configurations is explained by examining 
the constitutive mechanisms and discursive processes surrounding their reproduction. 
Regional Organizations in International Society 
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The main method employed is discourse tracing, which is a variant of discourse analysis 
that emphasizes the chronological ordering of discursive processes (LeGreco and Tracy 
2009). 
Part II of the thesis then puts the theoretical and methodological considerations 
into practice in pursuit of the second research goal, the empirical application of the 
framework to the EU, ASEAN and their respective predecessors. In three chapters, it 
compares episodes of change in the secondary institutions of regional organizations in 
Europe and Southeast Asia, taking into account how the accompanying discourses were 
shaped by, and in turn shaped, changes in the regional primary institutions. Chapter 5 
asks how the building of regional organizations was connected to the demise of colonial 
primary institutions after the Second World War. In Chapter 6, I use the example of 
legal integration to show how actors (re-)constructed existing regional institutions to 
promote regionalization. Chapter 7 on enlargement illuminates that the redefinition of 
the two regionsʼ boundaries was accompanied by the parallel construction of specific 
‘standards of membership’, i.e. ideas about the eligibility of accession candidates. 
Finally, Part III summarizes the findings of the empirical comparison (Chapter 
8), reviews the theoretical contribution and discusses practical implications (Chapter 9). 
The comparative framework shows that, while certain general dynamics can be found in 
different regional organizations, how they play out is subject to the specific regional 
normative context, as well as the agency of regional actors. The development of 
regional organizations is largely driven by path-dependent dynamics, which provide a 
counterbalance to homogenizing forces such as diffusion. The study thus provides 
insights that go beyond existing Comparative Regionalism, especially by inquiring into 
the normative conditions for institutional stability and change, and emphasizing the role 
of normative ambiguity. 
  
PART I: CHANGING NORMS AND REGIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS – A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
Regional Organizations in International Society 
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2 The state of research 
This chapter provides an overview of the literature on Comparative Regionalism 
and how it accounts for differences in regional organizations. I briefly summarize how a 
comparative research agenda emerged out of the rich tradition of Regionalism in the 
academic discipline of IR before reviewing different perspectives on variance in the 
shape of regional organizations in the recent scholarly debates. Based on this overview, 
I carve out two main shortcomings of existing accounts: first, their neglect of historical 
factors, and second, the unclear status of norms. The chapter concludes by presenting 
the analytical lens of the English School as a viable perspective for overcoming these 
weaknesses. 
2.1 The genesis of Comparative Regionalism 
Regional organizations have early on been a subject of interest in IR, and a 
distinct sub-field of Regionalism began to form even before the Second World War. 
Subsequently, the development of Regionalist scholarship unfolded in waves that 
roughly coincided with the waxing and waning of regionalism as an empirical 
phenomenon. Accordingly, researchers today distinguish between Early, Old and New 
Regionalism (Söderbaum 2016; Telò 2014b). Despite this longstanding tradition, 
differences between regional organizations received little attention for a long time. Old 
Regionalism emerged in response to the founding of the European Communities in the 
1950s. Although often formulated in general terms that were supposed to be applicable 
to cases beyond Europe (Nye 1970; Schmitter 1970), the theoretical concepts and 
assumptions of Old Regionalism – especially in its neo-functionalist variant – were 
usually drawn from the case of European integration and based on the belief that Europe 
represented a general logic of integration that could be replicated more or less 
straightforwardly in other regions (Haas 1958, 1961). 
Contrary to these expectations, however, non-European regionalist projects 
mostly failed to gain traction. This, in conjunction with a stalled integration process in 
Europe itself, led to an intellectual crisis (Haas 1975) and the eventual demise of Old 
Regionalism (Breslin et al. 2002: 3; De Lombaerde et al. 2010: 733; Diez and Whitman 
2002b: 1). Genuinely regionalist approaches retreated, giving way to systemic theories 
(Waltz 1979) and a new focus on global interdependences (Keohane 1984; Keohane and 
Nye 1977). 
The state of research 
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In the late 1980s, regionalism regained momentum in Europe and elsewhere, 
sparking renewed scholarly interest. Drawing on innovations in IR theory such as neo-
liberal institutionalism and constructivism, this New Regionalism was characterized by 
a greater theoretical heterogeneity than its predecessor, which had been marked by the 
dichotomous divide between neo-functionalists and intergovernmentalists. Researchers 
also adopted new analytical perspectives, supplementing the ‘old’ focus on endogenous 
drivers of regionalism with an interest in exogenous factors, such as the influence of 
developments on the global level of international order (Söderbaum 2003: 1, 12). In this 
view, regionalism was interpreted as an attempt to either regulate and mitigate the 
effects of globalization on the nation-states (Falk 2003; Hettne 2003) or facilitate their 
integration into global markets (Bowles 2002; Higgott 2014). While this research was 
generally more attentive to the particularities of regionalism in non-Western settings 
and acknowledged that there is not a singular model of region-building (Hettne 2003: 
24), truly comparative studies which would analyze and explain differences between 
regional organizations were the exception (Grieco 1997; Mattli 1999) and idiographic 
surveys of singular cases the rule (Hettne and Söderbaum 2002: 37). 
This lacuna drew increasing criticism and calls for a new research agenda of 
Comparative Regionalism became more and more pronounced (Acharya 2012; Börzel 
2011; Sbragia 2008; Sbragia and Söderbaum 2010: 567–658). In response to this 
challenge, scholars have turned towards more systematic comparison between regions 
(Söderbaum 2016). This does not mean that single case studies have come completely 
out of fashion but they are usually presented in the context of other regions within 
edited volumes or special issues, sometimes by using a joint broad analytical framework 
(Acharya and Johnston 2007b; Börzel et al. 2012). 
Within this emerging sub-field, four main points of interest can be discerned. 
First, researchers are inquiring into the causes or drivers of regionalism in different parts 
of the world (Brennan and Murray 2015a; Telò 2014b). Second, they try to explain 
similarities and differences in the shape of regionalism, and regional organizations in 
particular (Acharya and Johnston 2007b; Lenz and Marks 2016). Third, they examine 
how regional organizations affect the politics and institutions of member states (Börzel 
and van Hüllen 2015a; Pevehouse 2005). And fourth, they analyze how different 
regions assume ‘actorness’ and increasingly shape the institutional forms and outcomes 
of global governance (Hulse 2014; Murau and Spandler 2015; Wunderlich 2012). As 
Regional Organizations in International Society 
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the research focusing on institutional differences between regional organizations is the 
most relevant for the purpose of my thesis, I will focus my review of different 
comparative approaches on this second strand of research. However, if regionalism is 
conceptualized as a gradual process, the relative strength of the driving factors 
examined by the first strand can also be used to explain differences between high and 
low institutionalization of regional organizations. Such approaches are also taken into 
account here. 
2.2 Explanatory approaches to differences between regional organizations 
Generally, the theoretical pluralism of the New Regionalism has infused the 
emerging subfield of Comparative Regionalism. Scholars approach the subject from 
different angles and often combine insights from a number of different approaches. This 
makes it hard to systematize the scholarship into different camps. For this reason, I will 
highlight the main explanatory patterns found in the literature on differences between 
regional organizations rather than distinguish separate strands or schools. The overview 
focuses on empirical applications to Europe and Asia but also takes into account 
relevant studies of other regions. 
Power-political factors 
The importance of power-political factors in shaping the form of regional 
organizations is widely acknowledged (see already Grieco 1997). A major concern of 
these approaches, which are rooted in (neo-)realist thinking, is the role of major powers 
in shaping regionalism. Comparative studies of Europe and Asia emphasize the role of 
the U.S. as an external hegemonic power and its different policies in the two regions. 
Whereas the U.S. actively supported integration in Europe, they were more reluctant to 
do so in Asia and favoured the establishment of a ‘hub-and-spokes’ system of bilateral 
alliances with states like Japan, the Philippines and South Korea. This has contributed to 
what many see as a weakly institutionalized regionalism in Asia as opposed to the 
strong regional organizations in Europe (Beeson 2005; Eliassen and Árnadóttir 2014: 
236; Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002; Katzenstein 2005). 
The argument about U.S. hegemony also points to the global power-political 
context as an explanatory factor. Higgot (2014: 108) argues that if “the Cold War in 
Europe was centripetal, in East Asia it was centrifugal”, implying that the logic of 
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superpower competition impacted differently on regional security politics as it spurred 
integration in (Western) Europe while dividing East Asia along ideological lines (see 
also Jetschke and Katada 2016: 231). On the other hand, regionalism may also form in 
resistance to hegemony, as Acharya (2012, 2014: 81–84) notes. 
Others focus on the role of the intra-regional power configuration. They point 
out that regionalism often relies on active and willing leadership by one or several 
regional powers (Fawcett 2015: 46–47; Pedersen 2002). Whereas the Franco-German 
tandem assumed this role for the European integration process after the Second World 
War, Indonesia – a potential regional leader in Southeast Asia – was more reluctant to 
spearhead integration so as not to elicit fears of domination in its neighbours (Anwar 
2006; Guérot 2006). On the other hand, if power disparities are too big, subordinate 
states may be unwilling to agree to far-reaching integration out of fear that inequalities 
would be exacerbated. Accordingly, Webber (2006) contends that an intermediate 
distribution of power is most conducive to regional integration, and that this condition 
was much more clearly fulfilled in Europe than in East Asia. 
Domestic factors 
Opening the black-box of the member states of regions and regional 
organizations was one of the main achievements of the New Regionalism (Mattli 1999; 
Moravcsik 1998), and one that also left a mark on some recent comparative studies. 
According to these approaches, domestic institutions, politics or policy preferences can 
explain differences in the degree of formal regional cooperation, and specific forms of 
regionalism may be an attempt by member states to reconcile the demands of competing 
interest groups, e.g. those promoting the internationalization of national economies and 
those demanding protectionism (Jetschke and Katada 2016). Solingen (2008) analyzes 
the preferences of dominant interest groups in order to account for the emergence, 
design and effects of regional organizations in East Asia and the Middle East, arguing 
that informal arrangements are valued for their flexibility and desired especially when 
the long-term effects of cooperation are unclear. According to her, the low degree of 
formalization found in ASEAN and the ARF is a consequence of two coinciding 
factors: first, the export-led growth strategies of ruling coalitions in Southeast Asian 
states and the ensuing desire to reduce instability and uncertainty through regional 
cooperation; and second, the stark variance in development and domestic economic and 
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political institutional arrangements among the states of the region. This contrasts with a 
greater homogeneity in Europe (Eliassen and Árnadóttir 2014: 236–237; Katzenstein 
2005: 220). Nesadurai and Khong (2007) argue that the ASEAN Way increases the 
external and internal regime security of Southeast Asian states because it allows 
national governments to pursue national security interests through regional cooperation 
while at the same time retaining authority over the allocation of social and political 
rights and economic resources. 
The domestic level can also be a factor when national institutional characteristics 
of the member states are translated to the regional level. Duina (2006) demonstrates this 
with respect to legal traditions. He argues that countries with a civil law tradition are 
more likely to form free trade agreements with strong dispute settlement mechanisms 
than those hosting common law institutions. In a similar fashion, Acharya (2014: 95–
96) and Katzenstein (2005: 220–223) both contrast the economic and political 
consolidation of the European nation-states and their strong Weberian legal traditions of 
the ‘rule of law’ with a political and legal culture informed by the notion of ‘rule by 
law’ and high degree of regime diversity of Asian states, which need to be 
accommodated in specific regional organizational forms. 
Functional demands 
Building on liberal institutionalist ideas (Keohane 1984), scholars of 
Comparative Regionalism have pointed out that regional organizations are built to 
respond to specific cooperation problems. Consequently, how they look is informed by 
the functional demands that emanate from the specific problem at hand (Goltermann et 
al. 2012: 6). Some scholars claim that regional solutions are especially sought after if 
global organizations fail to provide the collective goods they were meant to deliver. For 
example, the relatively robust provisions for collective security in African regional 
organizations can be seen as a response to the deficiencies of the UN system (Herz 
2014). Crises are important in this view because they make apparent the deficiencies of 
both regional and global institutions and spur organizational reform. The Asian 
financial crisis made apparent the potentially exacerbating effects of slow or 
counterproductive responses by global financial institutions such as the IMF, while 
Europe has more recently experienced its own financial crisis and pressure towards 
deepening integration in the economic realm (Gillespie 2015). 
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Monitoring and compliance mechanisms will be created when the risk of 
defection by members of the regional organization is high (Acharya and Johnston 
2007a: 16–17). Kanthak (2012) argues that the differences between ASEAN’s flexible 
set-up and the legalistic ‘institutional design’ of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) emanate from the different ‘vulnerabilities’ of the member states: 
whereas ASEAN members have faced uncertainty about external factors, NAFTA states 
have been more concerned with internal uncertainty. However, Korte (2012) takes a 
different view, arguing that functionalist accounts may well apply to NAFTA but cannot 
explain why ASEAN set up dispute settlement mechanisms. 
This ties in with a frequently observed puzzle functionalist arguments face: 
while high levels of economic interdependence are supposed to create a strong demand 
for corresponding regional arrangements, there are also cases of arguably strong 
regional organizations despite low intra-regional economic activity (Lenz and Marks 
2016: 518–519) and arguably weak regional organizations despite a high degree of 
interdependence, as in Asia (Jetschke and Katada 2016). In sum, researchers have 
convincingly argued that regional organizations are supposed to fulfil certain functions, 
yet it seems that some functionalist arguments work well in some cases but less so in 
others. 
Institutional history 
While the functional argument declares that regionalism is supposed to provide 
effective and efficient solutions to specific problems, a number of authors have stressed 
that regional organizations cannot simply be created and adapted perfectly at all times. 
Taking inspiration from historical institutionalism and its critique of European 
integration theory (Pierson 1998), they point out that regional organizations may 
develop a ‘life of their own’ (Moxon-Browne 2015: 69). Institutional intertia and 
increasing returns for regional actors benefitting from a certain institutional set-up may 
constrain the opportunities for change (Acharya and Johnston 2007a: 21). It is for this 
reason, Nesadurai and Khong (2007) argue, that institutional idiosyncrasies like the 
ASEAN Way may persist despite perceived deficiencies and widespread calls for 
reform. 
However, not all researchers concerned with institutional history emphasize 
stasis. Some argue that initial organization-building may in fact spur further integration. 
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While this has already been noted by classical integration theory and its notion of 
spillover from one area of cooperation to another (see more recently Langenhove 
2011: 97–126), recent scholarship has focused on the agency of organizational bodies 
with a certain degree of independence, such as the Committees of Permanent 
Representatives of the EU and ASEAN. While such organizational agents may act as 
promoters of integration, the extent to which they will be successful depends on 
regionally specific background conditions, such as functional demands and regional 
leadership. This may explain differences between the EU and ASEAN (Moxon-Browne 
2015). 
Diffusion 
Apart from such endogenous institutional dynamics, regional organizations can 
also be influenced by other organizations. The idea of inter-organizational 
interdependence lies at the heart of the diffusion literature, which traces how norms, 
organizational characteristics and policies travel across regional spaces (Jetschke and 
Lenz 2013). Diffusion can happen through various mechanisms such as coercion, the 
alteration of preference structures, socialization, persuasion, emulation and mimicry 
(Börzel and Risse 2012). In many of these studies, the EU is seen as the source of such 
diffusion, which seeks to export its model of regional integration through active 
promotion or is seen as a model or reference point for other regions, including ASEAN 
(Alter 2012; Börzel and Risse 2009; De Lombaerde and Schulz 2009b; Jetschke and 
Murray 2011). 
Diffusion does not only occur through such interregional channels but can also 
be the result of developments on the global level of international governance. According 
to the contributors to Börzel and Van Hüllen’s (2015a) edited volume on ‘Governance 
Transfer by Regional Organizations’, regional actors increasingly write and apply a 
‘global script’, which prescribes certain common standards and instruments of good 
governance (see also Jupille et al. 2013). Alter (2012) argues that differences between 
regional dispute settlement mechanisms exist because some regions emulate the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) while others adopt rules and procedures 
modelled on the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
While such diffusion processes tend to spread certain ideas about best practices 
and institutional models, it is obvious that they do not result in isomorphism between 
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regional organizations (Acharya 2014: 99–100). To explain the persistent differences, 
researchers have argued that regional actors selectively draw on those features from 
global scripts that fit their regional circumstances (Börzel and van Hüllen 2015b) and 
‘localize’ them according to regional predispositions (Acharya 2009; Alter 2012; Risse 
2016) – although a detailed account of how such local conditions come into being in the 
first place is usually missing. Diffusion is also imperfect because the EU’s effectiveness 
in promoting itself as a model is limited (De Lombaerde and Schulz 2009a: 288; Lenz 
2013) or because regional actors copy organizational forms but do not adopt the 
corresponding practices. For example, Jetschke (2009; see also Jones and Smith 2007) 
argues that ASEAN actors have mimicked some of the EU’s organizational features in 
order to gain international legitimacy but in fact remain dedicated to a more network-
style form of regionalism.  
Ideational factors 
A lot of studies which put their focus on one or several of the above factors also 
use ideational factors to supplement and specify their arguments. For example, the 
policies of hegemonic powers and their leaders may be influenced by feelings of kinship 
or foreignness, which explains the different attitude of the U.S. to European and Asian 
regionalism (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002). Adopting a different perspective, Higgott 
(2014) argues that the Asian Financial Crisis has increased the role of the U.S. as an 
Other in Asian regionalism and thus buttressed opposition to its hegemonial status, 
fostering the emergence of a collective East Asian identity. Authors also acknowledge 
that the willingness or ability of a regional power to exert leadership in a regional 
organization may be constrained by a lack of interstate trust (Anwar 2006; Murray 
2015). Diffusion may be driven by the concern of regional organizations to appear as 
legitimate actors on the international stage (Jetschke 2009; Korte 2012). Finally, many 
studies have pointed out that divergence in the domestic normative frames or cultural 
systems of regional states may be an obstacle to building strong regional organizations, 
which is supposed to account for the difference between Europe’s legalistic integration 
and Asia’s more informal regionalism (Acharya 2014: 94–95; Acharya and Johnston 
2007a: 17–19; Brennan and Murray 2015b; Eliassen and Árnadóttir 2014; Solingen 
2008).  
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That being said, work that systematically examines and compares the impact of 
ideational factors on different regional organizations is still rare. Those studies that do 
so often focus on collective identity, asking either how regional identities and ideas 
support regional organizations or, reversing the causal logic, how regional organizations 
contribute to the building of supra-national identities (Checkel 2016). Other studies treat 
historical narratives as drivers or impediments to regional cooperation. Fawcett (2015; 
see also Mayer 2015), for example, contrasts the common historical narrative in Europe 
with the lack of ‘agreed history’ in Asia to account for the different degrees of 
institutionalization in the two regions. 
By contrast, hardly any work is concerned with the basic understandings and 
norms about regional conduct which are shared among the main regional actors, and 
how they may impact on the shape of regional organizations. Two exceptions can be 
highlighted: first, the edited volume by Börzel and van Hüllen (2015a) on governance 
transfer contextualizes the increasing adoption and promotion of good governance 
standards by regional organizations in the global trend towards an endorsement of 
norms regarding human rights, democracy and anti-corruption. Second, Domínguez 
(2007) explains stability and change in the regional organizations of Latin America with 
longstanding ‘international rules’, such as the honouring of inherited colonial 
boundaries, non-intervention and active dispute mediation. He argues that the 
coincidence of economic depression, the collapse of authoritarian regimes and the end 
of the Cold War constituted a critical juncture, which resulted in the replacement of the 
notion of non-intervention with a shared obligation to defend constitutional democracy. 
Subsequently, norms and rules for the defence of democratic regimes were incorporated 
in Latin American regional organizations. Although he does not explicitly make this 
claim, Domínguez clearly implies that the development of regionally specific norms can 
explain particularities of and differences between regional organizations across the 
globe. In this line of thinking, regional organizations look different because they are 
embedded in distinct normative contexts influencing aspects such as their intrusiveness. 
2.3 Shortcomings of existing approaches 
Generally speaking, the literature discussed above has advanced the study of 
regionalism. Through its theoretical pluralism, it offers a number of explanations for 
differences between regional organizations – although various non-mainstream 
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approaches remain weakly represented – and its comparative perspective has made the 
study of regional cooperation and integration less Euro-centric. This study builds upon 
central insights and arguments of Comparative Regionalism: specifically, it takes into 
account that regional organizations are created by state representatives who can draw on 
differential power resources in order to gear them towards forms that are consistent with 
their preferences, as rationalist approaches contend. I also acknowledge the observation 
by the institutionalist and diffusion literature that, despite the fact that institutions are 
supposed to fulfil certain functions, they often seem to be less than optimal solutions to 
given problems and develop a ‘life of their own’. This being said, existing approaches 
suffer from some major deficits, two of which are addressed in this section: the unclear 
conceptualization of path dependence and the dilatory treatment of regional norms.  
2.3.1 Unclear conceptualization of history 
First, Comparative Regionalism is largely unconscious of history as an 
autonomous factor, and is therefore badly equipped to account for organizational 
pathways. Regional organizations and their shapes are mostly conceived to be a 
function of present environmental conditions, such as a specific distribution of power, 
preferences, domestic coalitions and the like. If these conditions change, so will – 
virtually unmediated – the organizational architecture of a region. Vice versa, if 
institutions persist, it is because the exogenous variables remain constant. 
The tendency to rely on such ‘synchronic’ explanatory approaches has been 
criticized in the discipline of IR as a whole (Buzan and Little 2000: 19–20; Lawson 
2006), but also with regard to Regionalism as a sub-discipline (Hurrell 2007b: 134). 
Some of the ‘puzzles’ of the rationalist literature on regional organizations, such as the 
absence or weakness of regional organizations in areas of high economic or security 
interdependence like East Asia (Börzel 2016: 50; Kahler 2000), can be attributed at least 
in part to the overemphasis on synchronic explanation. Power-political, domestic, and 
functional factors may very well have an impact on the development of regional 
organizations but the latter do not, as posited, adapt directly to change in the former. 
As noted above, some Comparative Regionalists do adopt a historical 
perspective when accounting for differences between regional organizations. However, 
in doing so, they mostly content themselves with tracking their development over time 
(Beeson 2005). By contrast, perspectives that see regional organizations as being 
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subject to temporal dynamics, in the sense that institutional choices inform options for 
continuity and change in the future, are less wide-spread. As a consequence, their efforts 
to specify the historical conditions for differences between regional organizations 
remain unsatisfactory.  
While some Regionalist scholars adopt the concept of ‘path dependence’ to 
factor in the role of history, they use it in a very loose and generic way which contrasts 
with the original theoretical sophistication found in historical institutionalism, where the 
term was originally coined (Pierson 2004; see also Chapter 3 in this thesis). First, unlike 
implied in some Comparative Regionalist appropriations, path dependence does not 
cause institutional stasis but in fact leads to partial stability as well as conditional 
change. Missing this point, some authors adopting historical institutionalist ideas 
overemphasize similarities between old and new institutions – e.g. ASEAN and the 
ARF (Acharya 1997, 2001: 165–193; Nesadurai and Khong 2007) – while neglecting 
evidence of change. 
Second, historical institutionalist writers do not treat path dependence as a causal 
force eo ipso, as some Comparative Regionalists seem to do, but as a heuristic concept 
which helps to identify the social mechanisms causing institutional stability and change. 
Only an examination of the processes through which regional organizations are 
reproduced and the events leading to the adoption of certain institutional pathways at 
critical junctures provide the concept of path dependence with true explanatory power. 
By contrast, Comparative Regionalism has not been very attentive to the social 
mechanisms leading to the reproduction of ideational phenomena (Checkel 2016: 574). 
Consequentially, it interprets path dependence as if it were an inherent cause of 
stability. This does not amount to much more than the claim that institutions, once set 
up, are hard to change (Nesadurai and Khong 2007). 
Such conceptualizations are particularly unsatisfactory in their accounts of 
institutional change at critical junctures: if path dependence leads to stability almost all 
of the time, why does change suddenly become possible at certain moments in time, as 
in the 1980s in Latin America (Domínguez 2007)? If path dependence means that, 
usually, the possibilities for institutional change are relatively restricted, it is only 
plausible to pay particular attention to the contestation between different institutional 
models in such moments where the restraints on institutional adaption are temporarily 
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lifted. However, to date, moments of change and instances of contestation do not 
receive adequate attention in historically informed approaches to differences in regional 
organizations. Accordingly, the way in which actors set regional organizations onto 
specific pathways in these moments and, by consequence, reproduce differences 
between regional organizations is treated negligently. 
2.3.2 Unclear status of norms 
The second point of critique concerns the treatment of norms. As pointed out, 
many studies take into account the convergence or divergence of member states’ 
domestic norms as an explanation for differences between regional organizations. By 
contrast, only a few studies connect the shape of regional organizations to regionally 
specific understandings about international conduct. These approaches rightly point to 
the social embeddedness of regional organizations in a ‘deeper’ layer of social structure, 
and indicate that regionally specific normative frameworks can help explain differences. 
In this, they go beyond those approaches which ignore norms or treat them as mere 
epiphenomena “overlaid on extant realities” (Solingen 2008: 271). Yet, they have so far 
offered unconvincing accounts of how exactly these two layers of social structure are 
connected. For example, Nesadurai and Khong (2007; see also Acharya and Johnston 
2007a: 18) emphasize the persistent commitment to non-interference in connection with 
the longevity of the ASEAN Way, but it remains unclear in their account whether norms 
are part of ASEAN’s institutional features or variable explaining these features. 
Most accounts seem to assume that regional organizations are somehow 
‘embedded’ in a normative context. Embeddedness essentially implies that regional 
organizations share a certain structural logic with the fundamental norms prevalent in 
international society. For example, if the main actors of a region accept human rights 
norms, which grant the individual a certain legal status, then so will the concrete legal 
mechanisms of the regional organizations. This is problematic from a methodological 
point of view: unless the researcher can specify the causal processes through which 
norms and organizations are connected, the argument remains quite generic and borders 
on the tautological: if organizational features are an epiphenomenon or an expression of 
the underlying normative structure, then the latter cannot be used to explain the former. 
Again, I agree with Checkel (2016: 574) that there is an urgent need to study the causal 
mechanisms that connect the different layers of regional social reality. 
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Apart from this methodological issue, the embeddedness argument only works 
well if the normative context is treated as given. It is inept to account for cases where 
the social deep structure of a region is ambiguous in the sense that norms are contested. 
A look at Börzel and Van Hüllen’s treatment of norms illustrates this point. The 
researchers’ arguments about governance transfer presuppose a basic global consensus 
on human rights, democracy and anti-corruption, which then leads to the adoption of 
certain institutional models in regional organizations (Börzel and van Hüllen 2015c). 
However, they do not make much of an effort to provide evidence that such a consensus 
actually exists. What is more, although the authors concede that the eventual 
organizational instruments will be localized to fit regional contexts, they do not inquire 
what role regionally specific norms or interpretations which deviate from the purported 
global consensus play in such processes of localization. Thus, they neglect a potentially 
important factor in the explanation of persisting differences between the organizational 
forms of governance transfer across regions. What are the consequences for the creation 
and maintenance of regional governance transfer mechanisms if, for example, actors 
from non-Western regions reject liberal notions of democracy? Of course, norms may 
also be contested within regions, for example when some actors aspire to promote 
human rights as an international norm while others remain critical towards it. However, 
normative contestation has not been a major concern of comparative regionalist studies 
so far (see also Domínguez 2007). 
Ambiguity may also come in the form of tensions between certain norms 
prevalent in a region. Thus, even if there was a global consensus over the meaning of 
the three norms of human rights, democracy and anti-corruption, the regional 
governance transfer mechanisms may turn out to be more or less intrusive because they 
may conflict with other regionally specific norms, such as specific ideas about non-
interference and sovereignty. In Southeast Asia, for example, the recent years have seen 
an increasing recognition of human rights principles, which implies the 
acknowledgement of individual rights vis-à-vis the states of the region. At the same 
time, however, government representatives insist on undivided state sovereignty and 
non-interference in internal affairs, which has lead to the adoption of a relatively weak 
human rights mechanism (Aguirre and Pietropaoli 2012). 
The more contestation and normative tensions are present, the more the 
embeddedness argument – that regional organizations reflect the structural logic of the 
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underlying normative framework – runs into difficulties because it cannot explain which 
aspects of the competing normative expectations are translated into organizational 
features and which are not. To do so, it is necessary to take a close look at the processes 
through which such ambiguities are negotiated between the involved regional actors. 
An additional problem emanating from the unspecific treatment of norms is that 
it is largely uni-directional: it acknowledges that norms influence the shape of regional 
organizations but does not take into account that regional organizations may in turn also 
have an effect on the normative framework of the region. For example, the EC was 
created in the context of a changed understanding of sovereignty. At the same time, 
however, the EC provided an organizational framework through which further change in 
the deep structure could be promoted – leading, for example, to the transformation of 
the norms of conventional international law. Such two-way dynamics have a profound 
influence on institutional pathways and can therefore exacerbate differences between 
regional organizations. Without an account of the mechanisms connecting the two 
layers of social reality, our understanding of processes of stability and change in 
regional organizations remains incomplete.  
2.4 English School theory as an alternative perspective on regions 
The problems mentioned in the above section by no means derive logically from 
the Regionalist perspective as such. Neither do I argue that existing approaches are 
wrong. I agree with De Lombaerde et al. (2010: 741) when they assess that “most of the 
theories [of Comparative Regionalism] are not ‘competing’ in the sense that they try to 
‘explain’ identical phenomena in different ways, but rather they tend to focus on 
different (related) aspects of the phenomena we are interested in.” My intention is 
merely to emphasize that, due to either oversight or a lack of theoretical precision, 
current scholarship misses out on specific historical and normative aspects of 
regionalism that could provide additional explanations for differences between regional 
organizations. An approach which pays more systematic attention to these factors may 
also help to explain some of the open questions of the Comparative Regionalism 
literature, such as why functionalist explanations seem to work well in some cases but 
less so in others, or why and according to which prior circumstances regional actors 
chose to ‘localize’ diffusing norms. 
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In this sense, the presentation of the English School approach following in this 
section should not be seen as a rejection of existing Comparative Regionalism literature, 
but rather as an opening-up of a theoretical pathway which supplements the work that 
has been done so far in Regionalism studies, and which can answer questions other 
researchers have left unanswered. To clarify this argument, the following section 
outlines the main assumptions of the English School as a strand of IR theory. Based on 
this, I will highlight the potential of the approach to enrich Comparative Regionalism by 
sharpening its historical focus and paying attention to the role of international norms. 
2.4.1 Location within International Relations theory 
In the broadest sense, the English School deals with the social construction of 
international relations and the role of international institutions in this process. It 
developed in the course of the 1960s out of a double scepticism with regard to the 
dominant scholarship at the time.1 First, English School authors rejected the positivist 
orthodoxy of mainstream IR. This aspect will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.1. 
Second, they questioned realist – and, later, neo-realist – accounts of international 
relations as a more or less mechanical world where rational states as the primary actors 
behave in ways that are determined either by their nature or by the anarchical structure 
of the system. English School representatives made an effort to show that even if the 
(neo-)realist ‘system’ logic partly applies and international politics are anarchical – i.e. 
not subject to a supreme authority –, they are nevertheless shaped to a great extent by 
social elements such as norms and rules which are shared by states and individuals (Bull 
1966b, 1977; Manning 1962; Wight 1977a). In this, English School authors did not 
outright reject realist accounts of international relations but held that the realists’ view 
of international politics was one-sided and that social elements had to be taken into 
account (Little 2000). 
By consequence, the concept of international society forms a central part of 
many English School writings (Bull 1977; Bull and Watson 1984b; Butterfield and 
Wight 1966; Dunne 1998; Manning 1962). It points to the fact that states or their 
representatives consciously interpret their environment and give meaning to their 
actions, and that this is done in an intersubjective process (Navari 2009c: 39–41; Wight 
                                                 
1  Comprehensive accounts of the intellectual history of the English School as a theoretical strand in IR 
have been given by Dunne (1998), and Suganami and Linklater (2006). 
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1977a: 96–97). From an international society perspective, patterns of behaviour in 
international relations such as the balance of power are not just the unintended result of 
material forces, as neo-realism would have it, but of ideas shared by the political elite 
about rightful conduct between states (Bull 1977; Little 2000). 
A core way in which this international society materializes is through 
international institutions. One of the seminal works and still the main point of reference 
in this respect is Bull’s ‘The Anarchical Society’ (1977), in which the author developed 
a catalogue of five institutions that he believed to be representative of modern Western 
international society and critical in maintaining its order: balance of power, international 
law, diplomacy, great powers and war. These institutions are different from 
international organizations and regimes in that they represent fundamental norms, 
practices and understandings located in the deep structure of international society. As 
such, they are not necessarily the conscious creation of rational actors. Accordingly, and 
in contrast to liberal institutionalist approaches, English School authors’ writings on 
international institutions concentrates on their normative dimension and historical 
genesis. Questions of history, identity, legitimacy and shared values play a role that is at 
least as important in institutional cooperation as self-interest (Hurrell 1993). Institutions 
develop over time and are in fact constitutive of actors and their relations (Buzan 2004: 
161–162), which means that institutional theories that ascribe logical primary to rational 
actors and their interests are reductionist.  
It should be noted that the English School was never a homogenous movement. 
Some authors, including Bull, Watson and Wight were more concerned with historical 
and structural aspects of order in international relations, while the work of others, such 
as Vincent (1986), engaged more in normative theorizing, especially regarding the role 
of human rights as an international institution. While both strands have made invaluable 
contributions to the development of the discipline of IR, I mainly take inspiration from 
the former.  
After a certain decline in importance in the 1980s and 1990s, the original 
English School framework has been successfully revived around the turn of the 
Millennium by authors such as Buzan (1999; 2004), Linklater and Suganami (2006), 
Little (2000), Dunne (1998) and Wheeler (2000; see also Dunne and Wheeler 1999). 
This resurgence was in part driven by the debate between constructivist and rationalist 
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approaches in IR theory, because a lot of the claims made by the English School are 
compatible with constructivist ontology and epistemology (Bellamy 2005; Dunne 1995, 
2005a: 73–74; but see Adler 2005; Reus-Smit 2009; Wæver 1998, 1999 for a more 
nuanced view). Buzan’s influential ‘From International to World Society’ (2004), for 
example, engages intensively with the work of Wendt (1999) in order to refine English 
School concepts. Meanwhile, the division within the School between more normative 
(Dunne and Wheeler 1999; Jackson 2000; Linklater 1998; Mayall 2000; Wheeler 2000) 
and more analytical (Buzan 2004; Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez 2009; Reus-Smit 1997, 
1999; Schouenborg 2013) works persists (Buzan 2014), although some have questioned 
this dichotomous depiction (Williams 2011) and suggested other systematizations 
(Linklater and Suganami 2006: 43; Navari 2009a: 2).2 
2.4.2 Regionalism in English School writings 
It is an intuitive assertion that international society has an important regional 
dimension. Against this background, it is consequential that regional international 
societies have become a centre of attention in the more recent English School writings. 
However, despite the originally more globalist orientation of its classical 
representatives, regions have in fact figured in the writings of the School from the 
beginning (Stivachtis 2014). Three main figurations of regionalist ideas can be detected. 
First, on a basic level, scholars have noted that, historically, international 
societies were often regional phenomena. An underlying argument of early works was 
that international society presupposed a certain level of cultural affinity, which was 
more readily found among states in geographical proximity (Dore 1984). Wightʼs 
‘Systems of States’ (1977b), for example, devotes a whole chapter to the geographical 
dimension in the evolution of the modern states-system, and he analyses a number of 
historical cases of regional international societies. Watson (1992) also examined 
geographically circumscribed societies. Buzan (1993: 344) later offered a different, 
more functionalist interpretation of the emergence of regional social spaces, arguing that 
“the logic of anarchy works more powerfully over shorter distances than longer ones”, 
leading to a stronger need for adjacent states to develop rules of interaction. 
                                                 
2  A short critique of these various taxonomies follows in Section 3.1. 
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Second, English School scholars have analysed shifting boundaries. Bull and 
Watsonʼs edited volume on ‘The Expansion of International Society’ (1984b) tells the 
story of a regional international society whose frontier was constantly being pushed 
from the narrow confines of the European continent to eventually encompass the whole 
globe. Scholars working from this perspective have examined the characteristics of and 
the reasons for the ascendance of the Western international society to global ranks 
(Howard 1984; Louis 1984; Watson 1984) but also critically reflected on the role of 
coercion in this process (Bull 1984b; Gong 1984a; Vincent 1984). The expansion 
narrative is also at the core of the work by Stivachtis and others (Riemer and Stivachtis 
2002; Stivachtis 2002; Stivachtis and Webber 2011) on the enlargement of the 
contemporary European international society. 
Third, the regional dimension of international society has been put in relation to 
the global level. Seen from this point of view, the regional does not merely exist as a 
phase in the evolution towards a global international society, or as its source or nucleus. 
Instead, it is the parallel existence of distinct global and sub-global structures that 
becomes the centre of attention. The culturalistic argument sometimes reappears in this 
context. Wight (1977b: 117–118; see also Watson 1992: 256–260, 271), for example, 
interpreted international society as consisting of two concentric circles, a European core 
bound by the cultural unity of Christianity and a universal society constituted by the 
moral unity of humankind. 
The analysis of the differentiation of international society into levels and regions 
is a particularly common feature of more recent English School scholarship. This new 
research agenda is producing an ever-growing body of studies of regional international 
societies and their specific characteristics (Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez 2009; Buzan and 
Zhang 2014; Kacowicz 2005; Karmazin et al. 2014; Narine 2006; Pourchot and 
Stivachtis 2014; Schouenborg 2013). Some authors have taken up Wight’s idea of 
regional cores with a ‘thicker’ set of shared institutions (Buzan 2004; Hurrell 2007b; 
Stivachtis 2014). For example, Diez and others (Diez et al. 2011; Diez and Whitman 
2002a; Riemer and Stivachtis 2002: 21–22) argue that the European international 
society fundamentally transcends the classical Bullian international society surrounding 
it, albeit without subscribing to Wight’s culturalistic assumptions. 
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2.4.3 Potential contribution to Comparative Regionalism 
So far, English School studies of regional phenomena are almost entirely 
idiographic single-case studies, but researchers have recently started to engage in cross-
regional comparison (Costa Buranelli 2015a; Danner and Terradas 2014). This suggests 
that the English School could assume a place of its own at the pluralistic family table of 
Comparative Regionalism approaches. This would be a welcome development, as it 
might help to fill in the blind spots of the existing Regionalist literature identified 
above. 
First, it can help sharpen the historical focus of Comparative Regionalism, as 
most English School studies have a historiographic orientation (Bain 2009; Bull 1966a; 
Buzan and Little 2000: 30). The main motivating factor for this approach, the idea that 
the past is instructive for understanding the present, is also underlying the call for more 
historically informed perspectives in Comparative Regionalism (Fawcett 2015). The 
English School reconstructs how ideas about international conduct and international 
institutions developed over time (Navari 2009a). The objective is not primarily to show 
that international relations unfold according to general laws but to carve out its 
contingent, idiosyncratic nature (Bain 2009: 160–161). This conforms well with the 
purpose of this study, which is to enrich Comparative Regionalism by examining the 
historical ideational context within which different regional organizations develop. One 
of the ways in which Comparative Regionalism can benefit in this respect is 
methodological: historiographic methods of analysis, such as the study of historical 
documents and archival research, are well-developed tools in the English School (Little 
2009; Navari 2009a: 12), whereas they are weakly trained in conventional Comparative 
Regionalism. 
Second, the English School acknowledges the co-existence of international 
organizations and a deep structure of international norms. In ‘From International to 
World Society’, Buzan (2004: 166–167; 181–182; see also 2014: 16–17) offers a basic 
analytical framework to account for this two-level institutional structure by 
distinguishing between primary and secondary institutions. The former are the 
fundamental layers of international society, including general principles such as 
sovereignty and conventions such as multilateralism or great power management. These 
are basically Bull’s classical institutions of international society. The latter include 
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international organizations and regimes. Analytically, the distinction hinges on the type 
of genesis, or institutionalization: while primary institutions can evolve independently 
of any purposive effort of international actors, secondary institutions are consciously 
created.  
Applied to a regional context, these ideas hold the potential to clarify the role of 
international norms in the reproduction of different rules and procedures of regional 
organizations: regional secondary institutions are thus consciously created by regional 
actors in a regionally specific social context made up by primary institutions, which can 
emanate from more generic and less purposeful forms of interaction. This 
conceptualization, which I develop more fully in Chapter 3, goes beyond the simplistic 
assumption of ‘embeddedness’ prevalent in Comparative Regionalism in that it allows 
the researcher to specify the social mechanisms that connect the development of 
regional organizations to regionally specific norms. It enables him or her to examine 
processes of contestation as well as the consequences of normative tensions and to 
overcome the uni-directional focus of most Comparative Regionalism studies. 
A third advantage is that, in its study of primary institutions, the English School 
emphasizes that the normative deep structure of international societies must not 
necessarily be consistent. Instead, institutional ambiguity can be present in the form of 
tensions or contestation. Tensions in international society are a recurring theme in many 
of its core works – be it between general principles, such as ‘pluralism’ and ‘solidarism’ 
(Bull 1966c), ‘international’ and ‘world society’ (Linklater 1998) or order and justice 
(Bull 1977), or between the contents of specific primary institutions, such as 
sovereignty and human rights or humanitarian intervention (Vincent 1986; Wheeler 
2000).3 
Such tensions can be sources of friction and conflict but also drivers of change 
(Buzan 2004: 250–251). For example, Mayall (1990) analyzes how the emergence of 
nationalism as a primary institution created tensions with established ideas of 
international society, with the effect that institutions such as war, territoriality and 
                                                 
3  The pluralist-solidarist distinction is a well-known analytical heuristic in English School writing (for a 
comprehensive discussion, see Buzan 2014: 81–167). It contrasts institutions based on mere 
coexistence with those implying a more far-reaching consensus on common goals. The terms of 
international and world society are used to distinguish between norms and institutions shared among 
sovereign states, on the one hand, and ideas relating to the role of non-state actors, on the other (Buzan 
2014: 12–13). 
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sovereignty underwent transformations and new institutions, such as multilateralism, 
emerged. In the same vein, Knudsen (2015a) recounts the emergence of solidarist 
institutions such as humanitarian intervention and the way in which they affected and 
qualified the primary institutions of sovereignty, international law and great power 
management. This contrasts with Comparative Regionalism and its simplistic view of 
how the normative context shapes regional organizations, which does not account for 
inconsistencies between particular aspects of this context. 
Taken together, the historical orientation, the concept of primary and secondary 
institutions and the acknowledgement of institutional ambiguity can help produce 
accounts of how regional organizations develop along divergent pathways within a 
specific, potentially ambiguous normative context – something that existing approaches 
in Comparative Regionalism have failed to produce so far. However, in order to draw 
on the full potential of the English School for the analysis of regionalism and regional 
organizations, an open question in its theoretical framework has to be addressed: despite 
Buzan’s terminological innovation, the status of secondary institutions and their relation 
to the primary institutions of international society is still quite unclear in English School 
theorizing (Buzan 2014: 16; Knudsen 2015b). Traditionally, the English School has 
mainly concerned itself with ‘big picture’ accounts of primary institutions, seeing 
organizations and regimes as mere epiphenomena or as the object of regime theory. By 
consequence, the study of regions through an English School lens has often neglected 
the role of regional organizations. Buzan (2009: 43) rightly deplores that  
the division of labour [between students of primary and secondary institutions] 
has gone too far, with neither English School writers nor liberal institutionalists 
and regime theorists bothering to think about how the level of institutions that 
they study relates to the other. 
Some regional applications of English School theory do acknowledge the role of 
regional organizations, e.g. the special edition of the ‘Journal of European Integration’ 
(Stivachtis and Webber 2011; see also Murden 2009). In this collection of articles, 
Webber (2011) notes that the exclusion of Russia by NATO has pushed the country to 
the margins of the European international society and discusses – albeit with strong 
realistic undertones – its merits in upholding the institution of great power management. 
Diez, Manners and Whitman (2011, see also Diez and Whitman 2002a) investigate the 
role of EU institutions in transforming the primary institutions of Bull’s classical 
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Westphalian international society. Other contributions in the same special edition stress 
the role of organizations in socializing actors into the practices or norms and values of 
the European international society. In another example, Foot (2014) argues that the 
persistence of the primary institutions of sovereignty and nationalism in East Asia put a 
brake to regional cooperation, and that different interpretations of the primary institution 
of great power management in East Asia contributes to the coexistence of regional 
organizations with different security logics.4 
However, even in these accounts, the exact role of secondary institutions 
remains unclear: at some points, organizations and regimes are depicted as 
“expressions” (Pourchot 2011) or “reflections” (Foot 2014) of the regional international 
society, or as “representing” it (Stivachtis and Habegger 2011). In this perspective, the 
primary institutions of the region are usually conceived as given and unmalleable. 
However, authors also indicate that secondary institutions can strengthen international 
society as a “socializing agency” (Pourchot 2011) or “as an institutional basis” and an 
“instrument for diffusion of European values” (Stivachtis and Habegger 2011). In yet 
another interpretation, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) is described as constituting a “version” of the European international society 
(Stivachtis and Habegger 2011). 
The authors thus leave open to interpretation whether such organizations should 
be thought of as indicators of international society, as independent variables explaining 
the existence or specific form of such a society, or as a causal force influencing its 
shape. This is problematic for three reasons: first, while all these perspectives are 
legitimate in principle, confounding them within a single analysis bears the danger of 
tautological reasoning. Regional organizations cannot at the same time be explained by 
and used as an empirical marker of primary institutions. 
Second, clarifying the relationship is necessary in order to understand how 
change in primary institutions may affect secondary institutions and vice versa. 
Historically, primary institutions have not been static but subject to change and one can 
                                                 
4  Foot focuses on the relation between the primary institutions of sovereignty, nationalism, great power 
management and economic development, and how they are reflected in the structure of the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), the ARF, the ASEAN Plus Three framework and the 
East Asia Summit in the post-Cold War era. Her study thus has a broader regional and less historical 
focus than this thesis. 
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expect that this influenced the shape of regional organizations. However, there is no 
linear logic leading from a primary institution to one specific secondary institution 
‘reflecting’ it on an organizational level: while different regional organizations have 
endorsed the notion of human rights in principle, they have created a large variety of 
organizational instruments for their protection and promotion. This suggests that there is 
usually more than one way in which a new norm can be translated into secondary 
institutions.  
Finally, and related to the second point, clarifying the relation is also necessary 
in order to analyze how ambiguities in the primary institutional context impact on the 
shaping and reshaping of regional organizations. I already pointed out that the English 
School has a well-developed sensorium for tensions between primary institutions, and 
Friedner Parrat (2015) claims that such tensions have been a driver of reform in a major 
international organization, the United Nations (UN). Her central argument is that 
tensions between the primary institutions of great power management and sovereign 
equality have driven the debate about Security Council reform and lead to the 
emergence of a primary institution of regional representation, while tensions between 
sovereign equality and a minimal standard for equality of people lie at the heart of the 
discussion about the Commission of Human Rights. While insightful, her account does 
not clearly separate the dynamics of the reform debate from the normative tensions that 
she claims to be a driver of these debates, neither in the analytical framework nor in the 
empirical analysis. As a consequence, the reform debates can be read both as evidence 
and a result of the tensions. 
This lack of clarity makes apparent a need to theorize how exactly ambiguities in 
regional primary institutions may affect the shape of regional organizations and what 
role regional actors play in this process in order to shed light on how the organizations 
develop along divergent pathways. Specifically, the English School is so far missing an 
account of how the regional actors and their discourses influence institutional 
developments. Only recently have scholars begun to address more systematically the 
question of how secondary institutions fit into the English School ontology, in particular 
through the working group on ‘International Organization in the Anarchical Society’ by 
the English School Section of the International Studies Association (Friedner Parrat 
2015; Knudsen 2015b; Navari 2016). In order to analyze pathways of regional 
organizations, a comprehensive theoretical framework of how primary and secondary 
The state of research 
31 
 
institutions relate and what social mechanisms connect them is necessary. In the 
following chapter, I develop such a framework. 
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3 Institutions in regional international societies5 
This chapter clarifies the relation between regional norms and regional 
organizations using the English School concepts of primary and secondary institutions. 
The resulting analytical framework allows me to analyze and explain how the secondary 
institutions of regional organizations – their rules and procedures – are reproduced and 
changed in a dynamic context of regionally specific primary institutions. The chapter 
starts by discussing the ontological status of the English School’s central concept, 
international society, and differentiating between individualist and intersubjectivist 
understandings. I adopt an intersubjectivist perspective because it draws attention to the 
mechanisms linking practice and institutional structures, and thus allows a more 
profound account of the institutional politics of regional international societies, i.e. how 
secondary institutions are shaped by the attempts of different actors to realize interests 
by asserting and maintaining definitional power over the region’s basic principles and 
norms. I then briefly reflect on the implications of studying international society from a 
regional perspective before discussing the relation between primary and secondary 
institutions. Adopting social constructivist ideas about the mutual constitution of 
institutions and practice, and incorporating the concept of path dependence as developed 
by historical institutionalism, I then develop an analytical model for the analysis of 
institutional pathways of secondary institutions in regional organizations. 
3.1 Individualist and intersubjectivist approaches to international society 
Scholars have used various differentiations to account for the heterogeneous 
nature of the English School. Buzan (2004: 1–3) and Dunne (2005b: 158) distinguish 
normative from historical-analytical approaches, Navari (2009a: 2) historical-
comparative from structural-functional and interpretive ones, and Linklater and 
Suganami (2006: 43) find structural, functional and historical orientations. Still others 
have proposed distinctions based on the methods used by different scholars (Costa 
Buranelli 2015b; Little 2000). In my view, these distinctions do not go to the heart of 
the matter since they are at least partly based on different interests of study or research-
practical preferences, not on fundamental scientific positions. Many English School 
authors have in fact oscillated between historical, normative and structural questions 
without leaving an ontologically, epistemologically and methodologically coherent 
                                                 
5  This chapter draws heavily on Spandler (2015). 
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paradigm. In contrast to these attempts at differentiation, I will propose a taxonomy that 
is based on different ontologies of the social, which are in turn linked to different 
methodological positions. To illustrate this point, let us look at the most fundamental 
terminology of the School. 
The notion of international society has for the most part been accepted as a 
conceptual cornerstone of the English School. It implies the existence of shared 
identities, interests and contractual agreements among international actors and as such 
expresses opposition to a materialist ontology of international relations. The term of 
international society has often been juxtaposed to those of international system and 
world society. While the former evokes notions of a Hobbesian – or Macchiavellian – 
power-political world, the latter refers to transnational relations including interaction 
between individuals or social groups (Wight 1991). However, Buzan (2004) has 
convincingly proposed to use international society as a superordinate term for all kinds 
of international interaction, including both state and non-state actors. 
Despite this baseline consensus about the central role of international society, 
the concept has been interpreted in quite different ways. Buzan (2004: 12–15; 2014: 18–
20) differentiates between perspectives that it as either representing ideas in the minds 
of political actors as in the work of Manning (1962; see also Jackson 2000), ideas of 
political theory and philosophy as in Wight’s (1991) writing, or as a scientific concept 
designed to analyze the structure of international relations as in the work of Bull 
(1966b; see also Little 2000) and also Buzan himself. 
However, it is questionable whether these notions can actually be separated as 
neatly as Buzan suggests. When statespersons make sense of the world, they base their 
interpretations on ideas of political philosophy and theory (Jackson 2000: 75). On the 
other hand, most of political philosophy is in some way based on accounts of how 
politicians and diplomats conceive the world. In his lectures on the Three Traditions, for 
example, Wight (1991) supplements his history of ideas with accounts of how the 
philosophical schools of thought are reflected in the political positions of statespersons. 
In his contribution to ‘Diplomatic Investigations’, Wight cites both philosophers and 
statesmen (sic!) as sources for International Theory (Wight 1966; see similarly 
Der Derian 2009: 299–301). Bull (1966b: 39), for his part, admitted both theories of 
international law and the analysis of state action as sources for theorizing about 
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international society. Finally, if one accepts the English School premise that the world 
of international relations is an essentially social rather than material phenomenon, it is 
implausible to expect that the concepts analysts use to describe this world should not 
influence, and be influenced by, the discourse that constitutes it as a social sphere. I 
therefore agree with Hurrell (2007a: 12), who understands conceptions of international 
society to be “obviously in one sense analytical constructs” but ones “that also have a 
long history and a complex and shifting relationship to practice and to the 
understandings of actors engaged in practice.” 
I suggest that it is more plausible to differentiate two fundamental ontological 
approaches towards international society within the English School: an individualist 
and an intersubjectivist one. The first one sees international society as consisting of 
units, their subjective interpretations of their environment and their collective patterns 
behaviour (Adler 2005: 176). This agent-based conception of international society can 
be traced back to the works of classical English School authors such as Bull and Watson 
(1984a: 1, emphasis added), who define international society as  
a group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political 
communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of 
each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have 
established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the 
conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining 
these arrangements.  
Most contemporary English School authors share this assumption, including the ‘neo-
classical’ writers, who see themselves in the epistemological and methodological 
tradition of the early writings, such as Navari (2009a), and representatives of the 
‘structural’ or ‘structuralist’6 strand, such as Buzan (2004) and Schouenborg (2013). 
Buzan (2001: 487), for example, writes that 
[international] society is constructed by the units, and particularly by the 
dominant units, in the system, and consequently reflects their domestic 
character. […] [English School thinking] also accepts as true for international, 
and perhaps world, society the neorealist injunction that international systems 
are largely defined by the dominant units within them. 
Insofar as ideas and values play a role in this conception, these are located in the 
subjective, individual interpretations of the world by the units. When talking about 
                                                 
6  I employ the two terms interchangeably. 
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shared ideas, what Buzan (2004: 141) has in mind is a “unity of interests and 
sympathies […] amongst a set of actors”. Although these units can be collective actors, 
the underlying ontology corresponds to a methodological individualism – which also 
implies that agents are logically prior to social structure (Copeland 2003; Ruggie 1998: 
869–870).7 
There is, however, a second reading of international society which I propose to 
call ‘intersubjectivist’. The scholars working within this strand reject the ontological 
conception of society as made up of aggregated individual qualities. Adopting a holist 
ontology, they see international society as being constituted by intersubjectively held 
meanings, such as collective identities, norms and rules, which emerge from interaction 
but are autonomous from agents (Adler 2005; Dunne 2001: 75–80, 2005b; Reus-Smit 
1997, 1999). Social structure is not reducible to individual properties or patterns of 
practice in this conception, because intersubjective meanings are constitutive of actors 
and their interactions in the first place (Knudsen 2015b): they define what can (but do 
not determine what does) count as an actor and as legitimate practice.8 The term 
practice describes the interaction of international actors insofar as it is guided by 
expectations about the behaviour of the Other and ideas about the appropriateness of 
one’s own actions. It thus differs from the more positivist notion of behaviour in its 
normative dimension (Navari 2011). This is an ontological position that follows 
constructivist ontology9 more consequently than Buzan’s individualist conception 
(Adler 2005). 
Positioning oneself in this dyad is important because it has major implications 
for what methods are used for the study of international society. ‘Individualists’ will 
rely more on observing the processes of interaction among the units and the structural 
patterns that these interactions form, or they will infer its substance by means of 
interpretative reconstruction of the ideas and values held by individuals (Navari 2009a, 
                                                 
7  In Wendt’s (1999: 138–139) terms, such a theory is ultimately not structuralist as posited by Buzan but 
individualist, since “a key feature of constructivism is holism or structuralism, the view that social 
structures have effects that cannot be reduced to agents and their interactions. Among these effects is 
the shaping of identities and interests, which are conditioned by discursive formations – by the 
distribution of ideas in the system – as well as by material forces, and as such are not formed in a 
vacuum.” 
8  Again, Buzan’s characterization of his perspective as structuralist might be misleading because both 
approaches are concerned with social structure – they simply disagree over what constitutes this 
structure. 
9  For authoritative examples and overviews, see Adler (1997), Guzzini (2000) and Wendt (1999). 
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2011, 2014). For example, Buzan (2004: 134) proposes to analyse the relative 
importance of interstate and world society elements by identifying different sets of 
actors or “types of unit”. In this interpretation, interstate society refers to patterns of 
practice where the primary actors are states, while world society describes patterns 
where the dominant units are individuals or transnational collective actors.  
From an intersubjectivist position, this view is problematic because referring to 
the types of actors says nothing about the logic of the identities and norms they base 
their relations with others on. It matters, for example, whether the EU perceives itself as 
a champion of a post-Westphalian world order or rather as a territorially based 
superstate (Borg and Diez 2016). Actors can have multiple identities and therefore see 
themselves as subjects or representatives of a nation, a state, a region and humanity as a 
whole at the same time (cf. Risse 2004: 166; Wendt 1994: 385 and, ironically, Buzan 
1993: 339). 
Instead of reconstructing interaction patterns and individual intentions, therefore, 
‘intersubjectivists’ try to reconstruct collectively held meanings. The methodological 
focus shifts from behaviour and subjective interpretations to discourse and the 
mechanisms through which shared meanings are constructed (Adler 2005: 176–177; see 
also Chapter 4). This is promising for the purpose of this study because the theorization, 
identification and empirical analysis of the mechanisms linking regional organizations 
to the normative deep structure are weak spots of the existing Comparative Regionalism 
literature. As I show in Section 3.4, overcoming this shortcoming allows a more 
profound account of the politics of regional international societies, i.e. how secondary 
institutions are shaped by the attempts of different actors to realize interests by asserting 
and maintaining definitional power over the institutionalization of basic regional 
principles and norms – something which the individualist approach cannot do in equal 
measure. 
3.2 Regional international societies 
What are the implications of studying international society on a regional scale? 
Again, the answer depends on whether one adopts an individualist or an intersubjectivist 
ontology. An individualist reading of the English School focusing on actors and 
interaction would define a regional international society as a physical space where 
patterns of interaction are particularly dense and where individuals’ values and norms 
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converge. By contrast, an intersubjectivist perspective will contend that shared 
meanings form the essence of regional international societies. From this view, an 
international regional society is a geographically coherent entity that is characterized 
by distinctive patterns of intersubjective meanings that differentiate it from the rest of 
the world. Such an approach to regional international societies can add to Comparative 
Regionalism by drawing attention to the mechanisms by which these meanings are 
institutionalized or changed over time, and therefore to the political and social dynamics 
underlying the stability and change of regions. 
Note that this does not necessarily mean that such regional international societies 
are more solidarist than the global level, as the simplistic thick-thin distinction suggests 
(Stivachtis and Webber 2011: 110). The half-hearted incorporation of human rights 
norms and the idea of a Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in fact suggest that Southeast 
Asia is a more pluralist regional international society than the global one, where these 
human rights and the R2P have, one could argue, acquired the status of primary 
institutions. Instead, the regional-global nexus should be thought of as one of mutual 
constitution: regional international societies share certain primary institutions with the 
global level but they might reject certain others. Global primary institutions can 
influence developments on the regional level by determining a certain framework for 
the range of forms that regional societies can take, while at the same time, such global 
dynamics are likely to be driven by changes on the regional level. 
The example of the EU as a global actor can illustrate this mutual constitution. 
In its aspiration to assert its position as a global power, the EU has struggled to be 
accepted as a unitary actor in global fora such as the G8, the G20 or the Bretton Woods 
organizations (Jørgensen 2009). However, the structures of these fora and organizations 
were created based on the primary institution of national sovereignty. As they 
accommodate the hybrid ‘beast’ that is the EU, conventional notions of sovereignty are 
undermined, which is in line with the EU’s ambition to transcend the Westphalian, 
pluralist international society (Ahrens and Diez 2015). However, at the same time, the 
EU pursues efforts to increase its actorness in global governance (Murau and Spandler 
2015), which can result in it adopting more state-like features. This, in turn, impinges 
on its internal project of creating a post-Westphalian international society (Borg and 
Diez 2016). The relation between the regional and the global level of international 
society is thus complex and interdependent. 
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If the main features of regional international societies are substantial difference 
in shared meanings from the global level and a spatially circumscribed extension, as 
argued above, an intersubjectivist English School perspective on regionalism must focus 
on how different regions construct this difference by reproducing specific primary and 
secondary institutions. By consequence, this study will pay particular attention on two 
aspects in the study of regional primary and secondary institutions. The first is the 
question of how specific regional institutions contribute to the drawing of boundaries. It 
has been widely acknowledged in constructivist literature that social structures depend 
to a certain extent on the exclusionary and inclusionary effects of shared meanings. For 
example, the EU has developed an identity as a community of democracies. If we take 
liberal democracy to be a primary institution of the European international society, this 
institution draws a boundary – though not necessarily material – between EU member 
states and illiberal states.  
The second analytical focal point is: in what way does the building of regional 
primary and secondary institutions imply changing ideas about political authority in the 
region? Hettne and Söderbaum (2002: 461) have argued that the ‘regionness’ of an 
international social space depends on the degree to which “a geographical area is 
transformed from a passive object to an active subject capable of articulating the 
transnational interests of the emerging region.” This ties in with basic tenets of the 
English School theorizing of regions: since one of the defining features of the global 
international society is its largely anarchical structure, where states are by and large the 
only legitimate actors, constructing a regionally distinct level of international society 
can take the form of shifting authority to a central locus, thus shaping “a new collective 
set of priorities, norms and interests at regional level” (Warleigh-Lack 2006: 758). 
Using Watsonʼs (1992) terms, higher levels of regionness imply a move from 
independent constituent units to a more hierarchical international society.10 While an 
individualist ontological position would allow an English School researcher to 
acknowledge this, an intersubjective ontology also allows him or her to ask about the 
politics of this process: who promoted such changing ideas on basis of which authority, 
and using which kinds of legitimizing arguments? Who opposed regionalization and 
why was their resistance overcome? 
                                                 
10  Increasing regionness therefore goes beyond a mere ‘solidarizationʼ in that it implies a relocation of 
legitimate actorness at the aggregate regional level, whereas in a solidarist international society states 
remain the primary actors. 
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3.3 Primary and secondary institutions 
Having clarified the implications of regional analysis for English School 
theorizing, I now turn to the concept of international institutions, which has for a long 
time been a key element of the English School. This is not surprising, considering the 
fact that institutions embody the School’s core claims that international relations are 
socially constituted and that order is possible even in a context of anarchy (Bull 1977). 
From the outset, however, clear definitions or profound theorization of the exact nature 
of those institutions have been largely absent from the writings of the English School. 
Catalogues of supposedly existing institutions have been far more abundant11 than 
inquiries into the conditions and mechanisms of their emergence, persistence, and 
change. 
3.3.1 Different concepts of institutional hierarchy 
In particular, as I have mentioned above, while the idea that there is some sort of 
hierarchy between different kinds of institutions is a recurring theme in English School 
theorizing, scholars have not clarified the relation between different levels of 
international society (Knudsen 2015b). Bull (1977: xiv) was keen to demarcate his 
understanding of international institutions from formal organizations. The balance of 
power, international law, diplomacy, war, and great power management are deep 
structural components of international society because they are the very conditions for 
international order: they arise out of a functional demand, which is to render effective 
the rules that allow international society to follow its fundamental goals (Linklater and 
Suganami 2006: 58; Neumann 2003: 9).  
Other English School scholars, especially of the younger generation, replace this 
functional idea with the notion that the fundamental institutions Bull was talking about 
are constitutive of international society, its actors and their goals in the first place 
(Knudsen 2015b). Instead of using the degree of formality as a criterion, like Bull, they 
contrast these constitutive from regulative institutions, such as international 
organizations. While the first define the basic rules of the game and the actors involved, 
the latter constrain the range of possible forms of interaction. In this vein, Reus-Smit 
(1997) differentiates fundamental institutions and issue-specific regimes, Holsti (2004) 
                                                 
11  For an overview, see Buzan (2004: 167–176). 
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distinguishes between foundational and procedural institutions and Dunne (2001: 78) 
separates constitutive norms from more specific rules.12 
However, applying a constitutive logic to the level of general principles and 
norms while leaving the level of the more specific rules and procedures within the realm 
of regulative, and therefore rationalist, causality leads to an often overlooked problem: 
the constitutive-regulative distinction is, in essence, not merely about ontology (Dunne 
2001: 78; Keohane 1988; Searle 1995: 27–29) but also about epistemology – while 
regulative rules have causal effects, constitutive rules affect structure by defining 
situations and are therefore subject to constitutive explanation. Thus, the explanatory 
logic differs depending on what kinds of rules are in question (Dessler 1989; Ruggie 
1998; Wendt 1998). As a consequence, the concept curtails any attempts to coherently 
theorize the connection between the two types of institutions, especially in a dynamic 
context. 
The task is thus to find a conception of institutional levels within a singular 
ontology. Buzan’s (2004) distinction between primary/evolved and secondary/designed 
institutions is promising because it focuses on how the respective types of institutions 
come into being, rather than looking for profoundly ontological differences. However, 
his reflections on the relation between the two institutional levels and the question of 
institutional change remain underdeveloped and inconsistent. At one point, he depicts 
secondary institutions as derivative of actors’ self-interest and, consequently, as the 
object of regime theory (Buzan 2004: 163–167). When he does take on the matter, he 
sometimes falls back into the habit of ascribing them to different ontologies, namely 
when he suggests that secondary institutions can serve as a kind of empirical indicator, 
reflecting as a positive materialization or manifestation the existence of specific primary 
institutions or specific types of international society (Buzan 2009: 44, 180, 2014: 30). 
This is an idea derived from the individualist understanding of international society, 
where patterns of interaction can provide evidence for the existence of an international 
society. In this logic, secondary institutions are situated in a more ‘material’ ontology, 
which is epiphenomenal to the dynamics on the ‘ideational’ level of primary 
                                                 
12  In fact, while Bull does not classify his institutions into different types, his distinction of three kinds of 
rules contains a similar argument: These rules, which embody the institutions and render them 
effective, come in the form of fundamental or constitutional rules, rules of coexistence and rules 
concerned to regulate cooperation (Bull 1977: 67–71). With the rules of coexistence as a kind of 
intermediate layer, this tripartite taxonomy mirrors the constitutive-regulative distinction of the newer 
English School writings. 
Institutions in regional international societies 
41 
 
institutions. This view is shared by other authors who are sympathetic to an 
individualist understanding of international society (Murden 2009; Pourchot and 
Stivachtis 2014; Schouenborg 2013: 32).13 
In yet another interpretation, Buzan (Buzan 1993: 250; see also 2014: 30) 
indicates that regimes are somehow nested in the larger structure of international 
society, which makes the latter “a regime of regimes”. He thus seems to see the more 
fundamental institutions of international society, such as international law, as being 
constitutive of secondary institutions: they form “the political foundation that is 
necessary before regimes can come into play” (Buzan 1993: 350). This resonates not 
only with Manning’s (1962: 160) description of the League of Nations and the UN as 
‘games within the game’ of international law, but also with the embeddedness argument 
of Comparative Regionalism, according to which the shape of regional organizations 
reflects the underlying regional norms. 
Buzan does not elaborate, however, on how this constitution works, and what 
role secondary institutions play in this framework: do they merely adapt to changes on 
the level of primary institutions or do they have genuine effects that are irreducible to 
the primary structures? While the terminology seems to suggest a hierarchy between the 
two layers of international society, I think it should not be theoretically prejudiced 
towards a uni-directional logic of institutional change in which secondary institutions 
always adapt to developments on the primary level. In this, I agree with Knudsen 
(2015b: 3), who argues that “international organizations are important as means and 
drivers of fundamental institutional change.” Therefore, the direction of causal influence 
between the layers should be seen as an empirical question. 
3.3.2 Engaging the primary-secondary distinction with constructivism  
Despite Buzan’s advances, thus, the relation between primary and secondary 
institutions remains an open question in English School theorizing. I contend that a 
more thorough engagement with constructivist and institutionalist ideas offers the key to 
remedying this shortcoming. Several constructivist authors have called to acknowledge 
the constitutive effects of more specific rules, which are often only seen as regulative or 
functional (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986; Onuf 1989). In a contribution to a volume on 
                                                 
13  The methodological implications of this understanding are criticized by Navari (2009c: 45–46). 
Regional Organizations in International Society 
42 
 
regime theory, Hurrell (1993: 59) writes: “The functional benefits of specific rules are, 
therefore, only one part of the picture. An essential element is the legitimacy of rules 
which derives from the common sense of being part of a legal community [...].” The 
constitutive character of specific rules – or secondary institutions – is rooted in the 
acknowledgement by the actors that their identity as a member of the international 
community is dependent on their acceptance of the rules, and visible in their efforts to 
justify their actions. Similarly, Adler (1997: 345) notices that “international 
organizations can be a site of interest and identity formation”, granting or denying 
recognition as a member of the global ‘community of nations’, as in the case of the 
United Nations (UN), or of a region, as in the case of regional organizations such as the 
EU. 
In a response to two critical reactions to ‘From International to World Society’, 
Buzan (2005: 190–191) is quite accommodating towards such arguments about the 
constitutive effects of secondary institutions and admits: “one of the unresolved 
questions left hanging in the book is where, if anywhere, the constitutive power of 
institutions of any sort stops.” However, his individualist approach and his conception 
of institutions seem to distract him from a potential solution. Locating structure in unit 
properties, he defines institutions as “durable and recognized patterns of shared 
practices rooted in values held commonly by the members of interstate societies, [and] 
embodying a mix of norms, rules and principles” (Buzan 2004: 181, emphasis added).14  
This definition, which conflates norms, rules and practice, ties in with Bull’s 
(1977: 74) definition of institutions in ‘The Anarchical Society’ as “a set of habits and 
practices shaped towards the realization of common goals”. Both conceptions are rooted 
in a behaviouralist understanding of institutions, represented among others by March 
and Olsen (March and Olsen 1998: 948; Raymond 1997), who see institutions as “a 
relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour for 
specific groups of actors in specific situations”. The most striking characteristic of this 
definition is the identification of behaviour or practice as an element of institutions. As 
Duffield (2007: 4) notes, “the primary emphasis is on the actions and activities of the 
                                                 
14  To be exact, this definition refers to primary institutions, but there is nothing to indicate that the 
centrality of practice should not pertain to his definition of secondary institutions as well. More on the 
primary-secondary distinction below.  
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actors concerned rather than other institutional features.” If interactions are permanent 
and rule-bound, then they are institutional. 
The habit of conflating practice and norms has been criticized by a range of 
authors. The reasons for this critique include that practice must not necessarily be 
informed by underlying norms or rules, that norms and rules can exist despite their 
disregard in practice (Onuf 1989: 71, 78; Raymond 1997: 217), different practices can 
uphold the same norms (Knudsen 2015b: 17) and that, from a methodological 
standpoint, the conceptual integration of norms and behaviour precludes the use of the 
former to explain the latter (Duffield 2007: 4; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 892). From 
the point of view of this thesis, the main disadvantage of merging institutions and 
practice is that it obscures the ways by which the former emerge out of the latter and the 
latter are constitutive of the former (Wendt 1999: 26–27). The approach is also inept to 
account for cases when different institutions formulate contradictory expectations – a 
likely scenario, as I have pointed out above. Without an account of these mechanisms, it 
is hard to clarify the relation between regional organizations and regional normative 
deep structures. 
By contrast, if one adopts an intersubjective ontology, institutions are seen as 
sets of intersubjectively held meanings, which are analytically separated from the 
practice of international actors. Behaviour which is inconsistent with prevailing norms 
does not invalidate those norms, as long as it is perceived as a transgression of the 
boundaries of acceptable behaviour by the perpetrator or by others. It thus opposes 
approaches which ascribe an inherent normative quality to practices as such (Bull 1977; 
Navari 2011) and sees practice instead as guided by norms – an idea that is also 
prominent in sociological institutionalism (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). While 
institutions are analytically separate from practice, they are intricately linked to it in a 
structurationist process: they emerge from interaction and at the same time inform 
interaction by defining who can count as a legitimate actor and what is perceived as 
legitimate practice (Giddens 1984; Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986; Onuf 1989; Reus-Smit 
1999).15 In the English School, such a structurationist interpretation of international 
institutions is also suggested by Knudsen (2015b). The intersubjectivist approach draws 
                                                 
15  The social-theoretical concept of structuration was famously introduced into IR theory by Wendt 
(1987; see also 1999: 139–190; Wendt and Duvall 1989). Other appropriations include Kratochwil and 
Ruggie (1986), and Onuf (1989). 
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attention to two kinds of mechanisms that link institutions and practice: on the one 
hand, the processes of institutionalization by which collectively held meanings 
emerge, and on the other, the processes of constitution by which these meanings are 
informative of practice. In this sense, I take international institutions to be sets of 
discursively formulated expectations about legitimate actorness and rightful conduct in 
international relations.  
To sum these thoughts up, Buzan’s distinction between primary and secondary 
institutions promises to clarify the relation between different institutional levels, but so 
far this promise remains unfulfilled. I propose that adopting an intersubjectivist 
conception of international society offers a way of answering open questions because it 
draws attention to the mechanisms by which different kinds of institutions emerge from 
the practice of regional actors and in turn shape this very practice. Applying this idea 
not only, as Knudsen (2015b) does, to primary but also to secondary institutions opens 
up ways of including the latter more firmly as elements of English School theory and 
analysis in their own right, because it allows us to distinguish between primary and 
secondary institutions within a single ontology. In the following section, I expand on 
this point by developing a model of change and continuity in primary and secondary 
institutions. 
3.4 Institutional stability and change – towards a structurationist model  
If, as asserted above, both primary and secondary institutions have some kind of 
constitutive effect on actors and their practice, a central criterion for distinguishing 
between the institutional levels collapses (Onuf 1994: 9). However, to renounce any 
differentiation between types of institutions is not helpful either. To assume that an 
international organization is effectively the same as a normative principle such as 
sovereignty is not only counterintuitive, it would also mean to forego possibilities for 
explaining the dynamics of the relations between them.  
So how can we meaningfully distinguish between the two layers of international 
society within a single ontology? Having made the case for an intersubjectivist reading 
of the English School and an analytical separation of institutions and practice, I propose 
that the best way to recover the primary-secondary distinction is by adopting a 
structurationist perspective that revolves around an understanding of primary and 
secondary institutions as being entangled in specific processes of constitution and 
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institutionalization. I argue that primary institutions and secondary institutions both are 
informative of international practice, but they are so in different ways, as there are 
different mechanisms of constitution and institutionalization at play (Wendt and Duvall 
1989: 63–66). In the remainder of this chapter, I will present a model of primary and 
secondary institutions in international society (Figure 1). This model can be used as a 
heuristic in the analysis of pathways of the development of regional organizations. I will 
first elucidate the constitutive and institutionalizing mechanisms that shape the relation 
between the institutions and international practice, then the effects and processes that 
explain institutional stability and change. The argument is thus based on various 
established arguments of institutionalist literature and connects them to the idea of 
primary and secondary institutions in order to arrive at an original and ontologically 
coherent model of institutional dynamics.  
 
3.4.1 Constitutive processes 
Both primary and secondary institutions organize meaning in a systematic way 
and, as a consequence, have structuring effects on the reality of international relations. 
In this, they can be perceived as stabilized parts of discourses (Wæver 2002: 29). 
However, the structuring effects differ on the primary and secondary layer. Primary 
 
Figure 1: Structurationist model of primary and secondary institutions 
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(rules and procedures of 
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institutions are constitutive by defining who can count as an actor, how such actorness 
is acquired, and the basic nature of the relations between those actors. Besides states, 
primary institutions can also endow non-state actors and secondary institutions with 
actor quality (Duffield 2007: 12; Knudsen 2015b: 20). For example, it has been argued 
that in the European regional international society, institutions such as ‘pooled 
sovereignty’, empower the bodies of the EU while challenging the role of member 
states (Diez et al. 2011). 
Apart from shaping its basic composition, primary institutions can also 
constitute the scope of an international society as such, and change in primary 
institutions can lead to expansion or contraction of established societies, or the 
emergence of new ones. Again, the example of colonial rule is insightful: as long as the 
primary institution of colonialism was upheld, the European centre and the colonized 
peripheries were so intricately linked that it is hard to speak of these regional sub-
entities as international societies in their own right. Only with the period of 
decolonization did autonomous regional international societies emerge in places such as 
Southeast Asia and Sub-Sahara Africa. Primary institutions also influence the basic 
interests of actors (cf. Wendt 1999: 122–125) and, more fundamentally, the kind of 
rationality actors pursue (Kratochwil 1993: 75–76). The institutional framework can 
encourage maximizing as well as ‘satisficing’ behaviour, and it is quite likely that 
elements of both will be present in an international society.  
At the same time, however, secondary institutions are constitutive as well, 
namely by ascribing differentiated roles to actors and by empowering them to engage in 
specific forms of interaction that would not be possible without the existence of those 
institutions (Guzzini 2000: 172; Onuf 1989: 145, 2002: 224; Wendt and Duvall 1989: 
61). As an obvious example, membership in international organizations has a profound 
impact on who is perceived as a member of international society (Risse 2004: 169). 
Membership can signal the political relevance of an actor, as in the case of the EU’s 
eagerness to take part in fora such as the G20 and the East Asia Summit, the 
rehabilitation of former pariahs, as in the accession of Myanmar in ASEAN, and even 
the status as an actor as such, as in the case of Palestine’s struggle for formal 
representation in the UN framework. Apart from multilateral formats, it seems to be 
conclusive to also include bilateral treaties and agreements in this category. These 
different kinds of institutions can affect members’ relations by constituting hierarchies, 
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rights and duties. They are also constitutive by distributing material resources, defining 
preference structures and sanctioning behaviour with a wide range of instruments, 
including ‘shaming’, conditionality and formal jurisdiction (Stivachtis and Habegger 
2011). In this, they privilege certain actors while disempowering others. For example, 
aspiring EU members face the condition to accept the Copenhagen Criteria set by 
existing members in a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ situation, which in effect gives the existing 
members a powerful tool in defining the conditions of membership in the international 
society. This is not to say that accession to secondary institutions is a necessary 
condition for membership in an international society (Diez et al. 2011: 125). Still, 
secondary institutions define to a considerable extent and in more detail than primary 
ones the identities, interests and capabilities of the actors, and thus open up possibilities 
for meaningful interaction (Adler 1997: 336). 
It follows from these considerations that primary institutions contribute to 
shaping the social context in which secondary institutions are institutionalized but the 
logic also applies vice versa – primary institutions are reproduced in the context 
constituted by secondary institutions of an international society. International actors are 
thus embedded in a double-layered constitutive framework of primary and secondary 
institutions, and it can hardly be said that their actorness and behaviour is influenced 
any less by secondary institutions than by primary institutions, or that the primary level 
dominates, let alone determines, developments on the secondary one, as the 
‘embeddedness’ argument of classical regime theory (Ruggie and Kratochwil 1998: 
770) and Comparative Regionalist approaches suggests. When there are tensions 
between primary and secondary institutions, these contradictions are not simply 
resolved in favour of the primary level. This might be a plausible interpretation of some 
instances, such as the negotiation for a post-war international order after 1945, where 
new secondary institutions had to be created to conform to the changed understandings 
of sovereignty and the legitimate use of force, but in other cases, the original 
momentum for change is more plausibly looked for in the evolution of secondary 
institutions – think of the neo-functional theories of European integration. In any case, 
an inquiry into the conditions under which any of these logics prevails needs to take into 
account the role of agency. 
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3.4.2 Processes of institutionalization 
For the constitution of practice by intersubjective meanings is only one part of 
the story. As Dunne (2005c) has pointed out, the English School must not 
overemphasize structure to the detriment of agency in its analysis of international 
society. In a process parallel to constitution, therefore, practice feeds back into primary 
and secondary institutions in distinctive ways of institutionalization. By 
institutionalization, I mean the emergence of permanent patterns of intersubjective 
meanings through social, particularly discursive practice.  
Primary institutions are institutionalized primarily via the iteration of practice, 
especially the repeated articulation of complementary speech acts, which gives these 
practices normative character and leads to convergent expectations about behaviour 
(Adler and Pouliot 2011: 12). It is only when meanings are assumed by actors as 
something that does not need to be agreed upon in every single social encounter that 
they become effective as institutions (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 50–63; March and 
Olsen 1998: 948; Onuf 1989: 83–85). Primary institutionalization can be more or less 
inclusive and shaped by a variety of actors including political leaders, influential media 
and civil-society representatives, who found their participation upon different bases of 
authority and legitimacy (Der Derian 2009: 301–302; Hansen 2006: 65–68). These 
discursive processes are not limited to a specific time and place but are rather 
permanently carried out in a diffuse, semi-public realm, although they sometimes 
crystallize in specific formats such as conferences or commissions. For example, the 
International Commission on State Intervention and Sovereignty, which formulated the 
R2P as a new international norm, operated as a focal point of a broader discourse about 
the relation of sovereignty and human rights. The more actors with credible authority 
claims are included in such discourses and the less hierarchical they are organized, the 
more likely it is that meanings are contested and that discursive struggles impede 
institutionalization. On the other hand, however, inclusiveness also promises to 
strengthen the legitimacy of an institution once consensus is found. 
For secondary institutions, institutionalization takes place primarily by means of 
formal institution-building, i.e. the conscious creation, reform or dissolving of 
international organizations, regimes, treaties, networks and the like. While institution-
building is also a discursive practice, it takes place in more discrete situations and 
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among a smaller group of authorized actors. Potential components of this mechanism 
are the differentiation of specific roles and the establishment of rules and standard 
procedures, e.g. by means of declarative speech acts or legal codification (Berger and 
Luckmann 1966: 67–74; Onuf 1989: 136–137). Institution-building must not be driven 
by an instrumental logic of action. The consideration of legitimacy, coercion and 
argumentative rationality play equally important roles in the creation of institutions, as 
Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986: 773), Adler (1997: 341), and Risse (2000) have 
respectively pointed out. 
A question I have deliberately left unanswered so far was how exactly primary 
and secondary institutions should be defined so as to allow for a clear empirical 
identification. The identification of the different mechanisms of institutionalization now 
offers a good foundation for such a definition. Three essential points should be 
emphasized: 
 First, primary and secondary institutions can be distinguished based on the 
kind of institutionalization practices that produce them. Thus, secondary 
institutions are rules and procedures formally enshrined in official 
documents, while primary institutions do not rely on formalization: they are 
principles and norms that can be found in the broader discourse on 
international conduct. This definition picks up on, and further clarifies, 
Buzan’s distinction between ‘evolved’ primary and ‘designed’ secondary 
institutions.16 
 Second, regional organizations consist of sets of secondary institutions 
(Friedner Parrat 2015). For example, the EC was a complex of secondary 
institutions pertaining to different policy fields. One of these secondary 
institutions was the European Political Cooperation (EPC), a set of informal 
rules and procedures with respect to foreign and security policy. The EPC 
specified obligations and regular courses of action for a specific set of actors, 
mainly the member states as represented by the foreign ministers and, 
eventually, the Commission, in a specific policy field. 
                                                 
16  The degree of formality is also one of the criteria proposed by Puchala and Hopkins (1983: 57) to 
distinguish types of regimes. 
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 I will call the constellation of primary and secondary institutions in a 
regional international society its institutional configuration. 
3.4.3 Path dependence in international institutions 
The above arguments imply that primary and secondary institutions change in 
response to altered practices of institutionalization.17 However, the way in which this 
happens is not straightforward. What makes the system of constitution and 
institutionalization so powerful with respect to international society is that, taken 
together, the mechanisms of constitution and institutionalization tend to have a 
reproductive consequences (Wendt 1999: 186–187). They give rise to what historical 
institutionalism calls positive feedback effects that lead to path dependence in 
institutional development. The notion of path dependence helps us explain the relative 
stability of institutional set-ups, while at the same time allowing us to account for 
institutional change. One of the basic ideas of path dependence is that self-reinforcing 
processes lead to institutional stability so that change will usually happen incrementally, 
while fundamental transformations are only possible in response to external shocks. As 
a consequence of this emphasis on path dependence, the analytical focus in the study of 
the historical development of international societies is redirected to the social context 
and the mechanisms that lead to the emergence, the persistence and the change of 
international institutions.  
This is an approach towards the study of international institutions that suggests 
the use of ‘historical causal analysis’, an approach that comprises two explanatory 
components: first, a reconstruction of the processes that initiated particular institutional 
paths at critical moments, and second, an account of the mechanisms that lead to its 
reproduction “even though the original generating event or process does not recur” 
(Pierson 2004: 45–46, emphasis in original; see also Krasner 1989: 83–84). Causal 
analysis understood in conventional, static terms can hardly paint the whole picture 
(Ikenberry 1994: 20; Thelen 1999). In the context of international society, this means 
answering not only questions about the constitutive role of institutions and their 
emergence through initial institutionalization, but also about their path-dependent 
interaction which leads to institutional stability and change. 
                                                 
17  For primary institutions, this argument is also made by Knudsen (2015b). 
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Positive feedback 
Positive feedback, as I employ the term, is an effect of the mechanisms of 
institutionalization and constitution. This means that feedback effects are not 
themselves mechanisms connecting institutions to practice, like formalization or role 
differentiation, but rather processes of stabilization that result from these mechanisms 
and reinforce them. Feedback can materialize in different dimensions: 
First, positive feedback results from power effects. Processes of 
institutionalization are heavily informed by permanent processes of political assertion 
and contestation (Schmidt 2010: 15; Wiener 2008). At the same time, the constitutive 
effects of institutions tend to increase the power of those with the most ability to 
influence their form – a point that has been stressed by both rationalist and 
constructivist authors (Kratochwil 1993: 72; Pierson 2004: 36–40; Thelen 1999; Wendt 
1999: 331). Even post-structuralist authors like Laclau and Mouffe, who emphasize that 
meanings are in permanent struggle and deny the possibility of a final fixation, have 
acknowledged the existence of such temporal stabilizations in discursive practice. “Any 
discourse”, they write, “is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, 
to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 111–
112; see also 136, 142; and Foucault 1980b). Despite this connection to certain 
arguments in post-structuralist literature, the concept of power effects as employed here 
is more narrow than Foucauldian interpretations, which see the discursive practice and 
the way in which it creates identities and social realities as such as a form of power 
(Foucault 1980a; Price 1995: 87–88). It merely denotes that institutions can be 
stabilized because they tend to increase the dominant discursive position of those actors 
who initially set them up. 
The ability to influence institutional developments depends to a great extent on 
the endowment with power resources and political authority of those who postulate 
them. In international relations, the very ability to claim discursive authority is highly 
unequally distributed among different actors. Government officials can claim the 
symbolic authority of being elected as representatives of their state, as well as the 
physical authority of being backed by a security apparatus. By contrast, attempts to 
establish an influential transnational public sphere are seriously complicated by 
language barriers and parochial political loyalties – even in a culturally relatively 
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homogenous space such as Europe. However, even where such a public sphere, 
however rudimentary, can be discerned, only those who possess the necessary resources 
and infrastructure to influence its discourse will have a voice in the process of 
institutionalization. Once established, therefore, primary institutions reflect the interests 
of privileged groups and reproduce the power relations that produced them in the first 
place (Adler 1997: 336–340; Guzzini 2000: 172). 
Second, through effects of reification, institutions assume a taken-for-granted 
status for those whose lives are shaped so fundamentally by them. Institutions are 
unlikely to change “ultimately because they structure the very choices about reform that 
the individual is likely to make” (Hall and Taylor 1996: 940; see also Berger and 
Luckmann 1966: 82–85; Wendt 1999: 326–336). While contingency becomes obvious 
with the benefit of hindsight, those living in a historical international society have 
always tended to construct the principles of that society either as expressions of a 
natural or even divine order – think of the self-understanding of China as the Middle 
Kingdom in its imperial era and that of the Roman Church in pre-Westphalian times – 
or as a stage in a teleological process – an argument that served to justify Soviet 
imperialism during the Cold War. 
This is not to suggest that any institutional configuration has ever been accepted 
completely as given by everyone living in it. What can be asserted, however, is that it is 
difficult for those challenging an institutional configuration to draw on existent 
meanings in order to claim legitimacy, or even invoke a common identity on the basis 
of which to act against established institutions. For example, indigenous anti-colonial 
movements had a hard time establishing claims for self-determination because the 
institution of nationalism was originally constructed as pertaining only to Western 
states. The dominant construction of the relation between the colonial rulers and the 
colonized population as one between the civilized and the non-civilized world 
naturalized the racial difference, and made it hard for the latter to be heard (Anghie 
1991). 
Third, vested interests shift preference structures towards rule-consistent 
behaviour and inhibits institutional change. Actors feel that it is expedient to promote 
existing norms and play by established rules because they benefit from compliant 
behaviour. ‘Benefit’ in this context has to be understood in broad terms: it can mean to 
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obtain material profit because coordination effects, adaptive expectations and high start-
up costs make it inefficient to choose other institutional frameworks (Krasner 1989: 87–
88; Pierson 2004: 33). However, benefits can also flow from an increase in legitimacy 
and status (Wendt 1999: 325), as is evidenced by the striving by newly independent 
polities for recognition as sovereign states. Such ambitions do not only reinforce the 
primary institution of sovereignty but also the role of international organizations as 
embodiments of the international community and as providers of legitimacy and status 
by means of accession. 
Mutually reinforcing relations between primary and secondary institutions of 
this sort lead to a fourth source of institutional feedback, namely institutional linkages. 
This is connected to the argument that complex international societies normally consist 
of a web of mutually compatible institutions and consequentially, a single institution 
cannot be changed without additional change in or of a number of other institutions if 
excessive tensions in the overall institutional set-up are to be avoided. Pierson (2004: 
27) has this in mind when he says that “[p]ath-dependent processes will often be evident 
not only at the level of individual organizations or institutions but at a more macro level 
that involves configurations of complementary organizations and institutions.” 
In an English School context, this means that institutional configurations, i.e. 
sets of compatible and complementary institutions, are quite persistent once they have 
been established. This is not to say that there are no tensions between individual 
institutions at all, and we will see that they can be a powerful motor of institutional 
change. Yet, the very fact that international society has been so reluctant to 
accommodate new institutions, such as the notion of humanitarian intervention or 
environmental stewardship, into the established set of institutions is evidence that some 
norms and rules do not fit easily into the horizontally linked web of Westphalian-style 
institutions, which combine sovereignty, nationalism, non-intervention and other 
institutions that can be seen as logically connected and intricately linked. 
Krasner (1989: 78) has introduced the term of ‘horizontal linkages’ for this 
phenomenon. Having established the idea of primary and secondary institutions as 
distinct constitutive layers of international society, it seems appropriate to supplement 
Krasner’s concept with the idea of ‘vertical linkages’. In this sense, primary and 
secondary institutions form constitutive contexts for each other. Up to a certain extent, 
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secondary institutions must reflect the meanings inherent in prevalent primary 
institutions because they are institutionalized on the basis of actors’ identities and 
expectations which are constituted by the primary level (Knudsen 2015b: 20; Reus-Smit 
1999: 34).  
This effect limits the prospects for change in secondary institutions: in contrast 
to what functional and rational-choice accounts of institutions suggest, secondary 
institutions hardly ever adapt optimally to functional demands or coordination problems 
(Koslowski and Kratochwil 1995: 138) because the positive feedback effects that link 
them to the primary fabric of international society limit the range of included actors and 
what counts as a legitimate attempt at institutional reform. Moreover, it restricts the 
transferability of organizational forms from one regional setting to another. The 
supranational set-up of the EU works well in the context of Europe’s move towards 
post-Westphalian norms and principles after the Second World War, but it lends itself 
only partially as a model for organizations such as ASEAN or the Mercado Común del 
Sur (Mercosur), which are situated in primary institutional contexts that put a lot more 
emphasis on national sovereignty. Vice versa, primary institutions are unlikely to 
change drastically as long as the secondary constitutive context does not change because 
secondary institutions help to make primary ones more durable. As the literature on 
norm socialization has pointed out, secondary institution-building can be an attempt to 
‘lock in’ certain norms and principles because challenges to those primary institutions 
can be delegitimized as a violation of formal arrangements and codified law (Friedner 
Parrat 2014a). 
Explaining change: endogenous dynamics and shocks 
Taking path dependence seriously means that an institutional configuration will 
be relatively stable once the social mechanisms of reproduction have been put into 
operation. Change thus depends on the ability of discursive actors to engage in new 
institutionalization practices despite the feedback effects. Two sources can help them in 
such efforts. First, dynamics that are endogenous to the institutional configuration can 
subvert established meanings. Institutionalist and constructivist literature is rich in 
suggestions for sources of such dynamics – unintended effects, the re-interpretation and 
subversion of established meanings, contact with foreign institutions or societies and 
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gradual power transformations (Laclau and Mouffe 2001; Martin and Simmons 1998; 
Streeck and Thelen 2005; Wendt 1999: 188; Young 1983: 107–108).  
Another important endogenous source for contestation are tensions between 
institutions, i.e. situations where different institutions prescribe mutually exclusive ways 
of behaviour (Buzan 2004: 250–251; Friedner Parrat 2014b, 2015). Contradictions and 
tensions can occur between institutions on the same level, for example between 
sovereignty and human rights (Bull 1977; Knudsen 1999; Vincent 1986; Wheeler 
2000), or between sovereignty and the notion of environmental stewardship. In that 
case, they can lead to a gradual reinterpretation of an institution. For example, 
sovereignty continues to be the main primary institution in global international society 
but, over the last two decades, it has come to be seen as depending on the ability of a 
government to protect the basic human rights of its own population. 
Inconsistencies disrupt institutional linkages, which opens up possibilities for 
discursive contestation. Up to a certain point, inconsistencies can be tolerated or 
suppressed in institutional arrangements, and it might well be that they are an intrinsic 
characteristic of any international society, as Buzan implies when he speaks of the 
“perennial and permanently necessary discussion of how order and justice relate to each 
other in an ever changing global system” (Buzan 2014: 169; see also 2004: 250–251). 
Therefore, the resulting institutional inconsistencies will not per se and automatically 
prompt adaption. However, they constitute a potential point of attack since discursive 
actors can point to contradictions in order to question the legitimacy of certain 
institutions. If such strategies succeed, the reform or transformation of existent 
institutions or, in extreme cases, their dissolution and the creation of new ones become 
likely. As enabling conditions, inconsistencies between institutions can thus provide 
additional momentum for change after initial shifts in the institutional set-up have 
occurred. 
Second, change can also be induced by shocks. These are events that create 
discursive contexts in which contradictions become plainly apparent and can be openly 
addressed, private beliefs and grievances can be mobilized and actionable, and 
innovative ideas obtain sufficient space for their realization. For example, Bull argues 
that the dynamics of contestation of the European colonial order were already 
conceivable in the interwar period but only came to fully play out and lead to a 
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transformation of international society as a result of the radical power shifts in the 
course of the Second World War (Bull 1984b: 224).  
The Historical Institutionalism literature has been criticized for failing to explain 
the exact processes through which shocks or critical junctures induce institutional 
change (Schmidt 2010: 14), but a focus on the mechanisms of constitution and 
institutionalization allows us to overcome this shortcoming. To count as a shock, an 
event has to have a disturbing effect on the feedback processes of constitution and 
institutionalization so that their reproductive impact on the institutional configuration is 
disrupted (Thelen 1999). Having identified the mechanisms of positive feedback in 
international society as outlined above, it follows that shocks are events that (a) disturb 
reification by fundamentally altering established patterns of meaning production and 
lead to what Adler (1991) has called ‘cognitive evolution’, (b) change the distribution of 
power among actors (Hopf 1998: 180), or (c) alter the preference structures in a way 
that is not consistent with the logic of the existing institutional configuration. 
It seems appropriate that to count as a shock, an event should affect more than 
just one of the feedback effects because otherwise, the reproductive processes that 
remain intact can compensate the disturbance of a single mechanism. Major wars, crises 
and fundamental power shifts are likely candidates for such shocks. For regional 
international societies, external processes such as changes on the global level of 
international society need to be taken into account as well. 
Shocks lead to ‘critical junctures’, at which practices promoting alternative 
meanings and institutional forms have better chances to succeed in the struggles 
surrounding the processes of institutionalization than during ‘normal’ times, until the 
feedback effects begin stabilizing the institutions again and they largely follow the 
adopted path (Krasner 1984: 240–243, 1989; Mabee 2011; Mahoney 2000; Pierson 
2004: 14). For a moment of contingency, possibilities for the adaption or dissolution of 
old institutions or for the emergence of new ones open up. However, such instances of 
openness are not simply a result of institutions releasing their constraints imposed upon 
actors so that the latter obtain a broader set of options for action, as has been argued 
(Capoccia and Kelemen 2007). An approach that stresses the constitutive nature of 
institutions has to look instead at the way in which, at critical junctures, meanings gain 
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in relevance that provide legitimacy to new kinds of actors and forms of practice that 
were previously not considered as justifiable, or not considered possible at all. 
The idea of critical junctures emphasizes that timing and context are decisive for 
institutional development: when and in what institutional context critical shocks appear 
and how they are interpreted will greatly affect the forms secondary institutions will 
take. This notion of timing can not only refer to a simple point in a universal 
chronology, such as ‘in 1986’, but also to a particular stage in historical development 
that may occur at different chronological points in different regions, such as processes 
of state-building or industrialization. For example, while the initiatives for region-
building in Europe and Southeast Asia occurred roughly at the same time, in Europe the 
experience of the Second World War led the long-established nation-states to adopt a 
regional project aimed at transcending state sovereignty and precluding war as a means 
of regional politics, while in Southeast Asia the processes of decolonization and nation- 
building made it imperative for the fledging states to build institutions that strengthened 
sovereignty and territoriality (Acharya 2009; Diez et al. 2011). 
Some words of caution should be added. First, it should be noted that neither 
shocks nor endogenous dynamics should be equated with institutional changes. The 
former are merely a necessary condition for the latter, and the mere instance of a shock 
does not preclude the institutional configuration of an international society from 
continuing to move along the established path (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007: 352). 
Second, the notion of shocks seems to introduce some sort of materialism in the form of 
wars, power shifts etc. back into an essentially ideational perspective. This is not my 
intention. While I acknowledge that historical events rely to some extent on material 
foundations such as spaces and objects, these become socially relevant only in the 
interpretation by actors in the context of existing intersubjectively shared and 
institutionalized meanings. Shocks and endogenous dynamics, therefore, do not result in 
a simple adaption to a changed external context but are subject to political processes, as 
they become effective only in their discursive representations. Consequently, agency is 
a crucial element because the possibility of change and the direction it will take depend 
on the relative ability of actors to claim new sources of authority and effectively 
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mobilize discourses that challenge or defend the existing institutions (Schmidt 2010).18 
The disturbing impact of shocks and endogenous dynamics on the feedback effects lie 
in the fact that references to them make possible powerful objections to particular 
hegemonic discourses – for example by claiming that the events contradict prevailing 
lines of thought. If the dominant discourse cannot accommodate these tensions and fails 
to justify its own validity, paths for the institutionalization of alternative meanings open 
up (cf. Capoccia and Kelemen 2007; Guzzini 2012b; Thelen 1999). 
As a concluding note, it should be pointed out that external shocks and 
endogenous dynamics can reinforce each other. For example, shocks can create contexts 
in which tensions and contradictions arise, or existing ones become apparent and can be 
openly addressed. Bull (1984b: 224) argues that the dynamics of contestation of the 
European colonial order were already conceivable in the interwar period but only came 
to fully play out and lead to a transformation of international society when the “Second 
World War left the European imperial powers too weak to maintain old kinds of 
dominance”. 
3.4.4 Analyzing pathways in the development of regional organizations 
What are the lessons of these theoretical considerations for the analysis of how 
regional secondary institutions develop over time? Four points can be highlighted: 
 First, the mechanisms surrounding the reproduction of regional institutions have 
stabilizing effects. To overcome these effects, actors can use endogenous and 
exogenous processes as sources to question the legitimacy of existing 
institutions. 
 Second, primary and secondary institutions mutually form constitutive contexts 
for their reproduction. The institutionalization of secondary institutions takes 
place in the context constituted by a region’s primary institutions, and vice 
                                                 
18  These interpretations are, of course, influenced by the existing institutional-ideational framework. 
Based on a similar argument, Guzzini (2012a: 4) argues that trigger events induce change in 
intersubjective meanings only through the lens of “pre-existing interpretive dispositions,” therefore “a 
kind of classical outside-in process tracing, where the same international event might trigger different 
responses depending on the domestic [or, in my case, regional] process variables, is not possible. 
Rather, the very meaning of the event is part of the analysis and needs to be assessed on a case-by-case 
basis.” 
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versa, so that each institutional level informs the shape of the respective other. 
This leads to a logical connection between primary and secondary institutions. 
 Third, as primary and secondary institutions are coupled, change on one 
institutional level can catalyze change on the other (Wendt and Duvall 1989: 
65). 
 Fourth, the above notwithstanding, the two institutional levels do not necessarily 
have to be coherent (Krasner 1983: 5). To the contrary, in times of institutional 
dynamic, it is quite likely that principles and norms come into tension with rules 
and decision-making procedures, leading to contradictions between primary and 
secondary institutional levels and potentially pressure for institutional change. 
The way in which such vertical tensions are resolved (or not) depends on how 
the struggles between the actors involved in the discourses surrounding regional 
institutions play out. 
In contrast to conventional Comparative Regionalism, this framework 
emphasizes the way in which actors engage in normative arguing in order to promote 
certain ideas about the rules and procedures of regional organizations. It goes beyond 
existing explanations of difference between regional organizations with a normative 
focus in several ways: 
First, it confirms the connection between regionally specific norms and 
differences between regional organizations but offers a more complex picture than the 
embeddedness argument which implicitly underlies existing accounts. It does so by 
specifying the social mechanisms that link primary and secondary institutions. 
Organizations do not directly reflect norms; instead, the way in which the primary 
institutional context translates to secondary institutions is mediated by discursive 
processes. These processes are informed by struggles between actors who hold 
differential power resources, interests and beliefs. Therefore, primary institutions do not 
determine the form of secondary institutions but merely constitute a context for their 
creation, reform or dissolution. Whether, when and how change in primary institutions 
will be followed by corresponding change in secondary institutions is therefore an open 
question to be answered by empirical analysis of the developments on both institutional 
levels. 
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Second, by introducing the mediating mechanisms of constitution and 
institutionalization, the framework also enables researchers to account for ambiguities 
in the primary institutional context of regional organizations. Established perspectives 
implicitly assume that regional norms are consistent. They are thus ill-equipped to 
explain cases in which regional organizations exist in a normative context characterized 
by tensions between different normative claims. The framework developed here 
acknowledges that the institutionalization of secondary institutions may have to take 
into account competing legitimacy standards because the constitutive effects of primary 
institutions do not need to be consistent. 
Third, it incorporates the idea of path dependence in a way that is true to the 
original concept as developed by historical institutionalists. It does not equal path 
dependence with institutional stasis, as some adoptions by Comparative Regionalist 
writings do, but as a heuristic that enables the researcher to identify the mechanisms 
leading to partial stability and conditional change in regional organizations. As such, it 
can also be used to analyze moments when regional primary and secondary institutions 
undergo transformation – something of a blind spot of the historically informed 
Comparative Regionalism approaches. At the same time, the framework goes beyond 
historical institutionalist concepts, which usually focus either on organizations or on the 
kind of broader institutional frameworks which the English School would call primary 
institutions. The links between primary and secondary institutions can provide 
additional sources for stability as well as change. This idea provides the basis for the 
argument that differences between regional organizations can be explained as the result 
of divergent institutional pathways, in which rules and procedures are connected to a 
dynamic normative context. 
Finally, it acknowledges that, in the course of arguing about the shape of 
regional organizations, actors may – willingly or unwillingly – either reproduce or 
transform the very normative points of reference they employ to justify their demands. 
Thus, regional organizations may help reproducing primary institutions but also act as 
drivers of change in international society (Ahrens and Diez 2015, Knudsen 2015a, 
2015b). As norms have constitutive effects, such transformations can affect the chances 
of different actors to succeed in their legitimization efforts by changing their identities 
and their discursive authority. My analytical framework thus paints a more complex and 
dynamic picture of the relation between regional organizations and the social deep 
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structure of regions than those approaches that see regional organizations as mere 
expressions or epiphenomena of underlying norms, and thereby allows me to analyze 
the pathways of the institutional design of regional organizations in full depth. 
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4 A methodology for analyzing change in primary and secondary 
institutions 
The preceding chapter established that pathways of regional organizations – 
conceived of as the development of secondary institutions over time – are deeply 
intertwined with dynamics in the primary institutions of their regional international 
society. Accordingly, changes in the two institutional levels need to be studied in 
parallel. This chapter elaborates a methodological approach to this task and outlines the 
structure of the empirical chapters. The first two sections (4.1 and 4.2) deal with basic 
questions of methodology and epistemology. Like most English School authors, I 
endorse a perspective that is interpretivist and rejects the positivist notion of nomothetic 
explanations. My approach does not, however, shy away from explanatory and causal 
logic altogether, as it aims to account for change and continuity in the secondary 
institutions of specific regional international society by disclosing the mechanisms of 
constitution and institutionalization that made them possible. 
To reach this objective, Section 4.3 presents the basic research design, which 
juxtaposes the regional international societies of Europe and Southeast Asia in three 
specific episodes of institutional change. The final part (4.4) develops a set of methods 
to put these ideas into practice. This ‘toolbox’ connects a two-level analysis of 
discursive practices with elements of constitutive analysis. This allows me to analyze 
the effects of endogenous dynamics and exogenous events on the feedback effects 
surrounding the regional international societiesʼ institutional structure, and thus account 
for the interrelated dynamics of primary and secondary institutions. 
4.1 English School methodology 
The term methodology, as it is employed here, denotes any coherent form of 
thinking about the nature of scientific inquiry. It comprises two aspects: first, beliefs 
about the relation between empirical reality and scientific knowledge in general 
(philosophy of science), and second, positions on how to best proceed in the production 
of such knowledge (methods). Generally, the choice of methods should be guided by 
and be compatible with the philosophical assumptions a researcher makes about his or 
her relation to the subject of research (Jackson 2011). In this section, I will begin by 
shortly outlining some core methodological assumptions undergirding most English 
School work. The picture that emerges from this discussion is that of a field of research 
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that is characterized by certain shared tenets regarding the philosophy of science and a 
pluralistic and sometimes eclectic use of different methods. My own approach to the 
study of international institutions, which I will develop in the remainder of this chapter, 
makes no exception here, as it takes inspiration from different examples of interpretivist 
scholarship. 
Contrary to most of the theoretical schools of IR, the English School does not 
have an explicit, uniform methodology. One of the main reasons for this is that the 
ontological core assumptions about international society are in fact quite open to 
divergent interpretations, as we have seen in the theory chapter of this thesis. Another 
reason for the School’s equivocality is that it has, for quite a long time, not been very 
self-conscious with regard to methodology, as numerous authors have asserted 
(Copeland 2003; Finnemore 2001; Linklater and Suganami 2006: 6; Little 2000: 409; 
Navari 2009a; Spegele 2005; Wilson 2012). This has certainly impeded the 
development of a coherent methodological framework for the English School. 
Nevertheless, one can identify a set of foundational scientific assumptions that 
are shared by most English School authors. The central feature of the English School’s 
philosophy of science is a pronounced scepticism towards positivist epistemological 
conceptions that see the researcher as distinct and separated from his or her object of 
study (Navari 2014). In fact, delimiting their understanding of social research from the 
then ascending ‘scientific’ position on philosophy of science and its notion of a mind-
independent world was an important identity-forming exercise in early works of some 
of the scholars that are nowadays linked to the English School (Bull 1966a; Butterfield 
and Wight 1966). Instead, these authors’ ‘classical approach’ asserted that knowledge 
about international society can only be produced from within a historical context and by 
means of subjective interpretation by the researcher. Ultimately, international society is 
“not itself a matter of fact”, but “a mental construct. And what takes place within it does 
so not in fact but in idea” (Manning 1962: 5). It can therefore not be subject to the 
vigorous standards of empirical falsification required by the positivist approach. The 
social researcher conducts his or her inquiry in a social context, which is at the same 
time an object of study and a prerequisite for his or her identity as a researcher. As a 
consequence, English School scholars see the kind of objective knowledge pursued by 
positivists as an illusion.  
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A second and related feature is the rejection of causal claims in a narrow, 
Humean sense. Based as it is on the social and historical contingency of all knowledge, 
the English School is necessarily cautious towards the notion of law-like generalizations 
about the social world (Navari 2009c). As I will show in the next section, this does not 
mean that English School scholarship has to abstain from making causal claims 
altogether, but it makes the testing of nomothetic hypotheses a rather uncommon 
business among its proponents. To be sure, some English School authors identify 
recurring patterns, as in Watson’s (1992) argument that international societies oscillate 
between anarchy and order, or linear tendencies, such as Buzan’s (2004) claim that 
world society assumes an ever-increasing significance in the structure of international 
society. However, generalizations of this kind are usually not formulated in law-like 
terms but put in the context of historical contingency, which frustrates any attempts of 
finding general hypotheses. 
Upon this baseline methodological consensus, different contemporary English 
School authors emphasize different approaches towards the study of international 
society.19 A number of authors that could be called ‘neo-classicals’ locate their work 
quite firmly in the tradition of the classical approach represented by Bull (1966a), 
Wight (1966) and Manning (1962). Important reference points for this perspective are 
Navari’s (2009b) edited volume on English School methodology and Jackson’s (2000) 
‘The Global Covenant’ (see also Spegele 2005). These authors point to the importance 
of interpretivist methods in studying international society. The English School scholar’s 
task is historical interpretation, i.e. retracing the meanings of shared understandings 
about international relations prevalent in specific historical and social contexts, and 
evident in statespersons’ practice. Although some authors define practice in a general 
sense – implying any kind of activity of international actors – as their empirical referent 
object, they generally focus on communication and language as the paramount 
manifestation of international society (Navari 2009c, 2011, 2014: 213; Wilson 2012). 
As Jackson (2000: 37) argues,  
a very significant part of international human relations, and arguably the most 
significant part, is discourse and dialogue concerning what policies or activities 
[…] are desirable or advisable or appropriate or acceptable […]. Written or 
verbal discourse is the main vehicle of political activity. 
                                                 
19  For a more fine-grained classification, see Costa Buranelli (2015b), who distinguishes classical, 
practice-based, historical, hermeneutic and soft-positivist versions of English School scholarship. 
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Therefore, the neo-classicals study the discourse of those who are engaged either 
in the actual workings or in the theoretical contemplation of international relations. 
Most of these works rather aim to reconstruct the individual agent’s intentions, or 
‘cognitive-symbolic structures’ (Navari 2011: 616; see also 2009c), which guide 
interaction than to look for intersubjective, discursive structures that exist autonomously 
from agents: “In the English School, language is expressive of meaning, and its analysis 
is directed towards recovering intent, not detecting its structural constraints” (Navari 
2011: 620; see also Jackson 2000: 72, 93). 
By contrast, advocates of the structuralist approach have a somewhat more 
diffuse methodological viewpoint (Buzan 2004; Schouenborg 2013). In some respect, 
they try to transcend the interpretivist focus on agents of the classical authors by using 
empiricist methods that aim to produce historical and taxonomical accounts of the 
structures of individual or state behaviour, which implies a focus on patterns of 
interaction or action arenas (Little 2009; Navari 2014: 207). Then again, values and 
their subjective interpretations by individuals play an equally important part in their 
conception of international society.20 The researcher must therefore identify actors, 
observe their interactions and their subjectively held values, and from this draw 
conclusions about the structure of international society (Buzan 2004).21 The decisive 
move, therefore, is to infer structures from agential attributes via aggregation and to 
develop concepts that are able to describe the structures that emerge from this analysis.  
Sometimes, this angle has been approximated to a positivist methodology 
because of its epistemological phenomenalism, i.e. the assumption that international 
society is something ‘out there’ existing independently of the researcher (Buzan 2014: 
20; Costa Buranelli 2015b: 2–4; Dunne 2005b; Navari 2009c: 45–46). From the 
empirical work, however, it is less clear that the structuralist English School authors 
actually proceed in a manner that is fundamentally different from the classical authors. 
Far from directly observing actors’ behaviour or conducting interviews, they ultimately 
rely almost as heavily on interpretive readings of primary and secondary texts as their 
fellow English School scholars. Possibly, they are more sympathetic towards an 
                                                 
20  See for example Buzan’s (2004) account of the pluralist-solidarist debate in ‘From International to 
World Society’. 
21  This is a methodological standpoint close to that of early regime theorists stressing the subjective 
nature of regimes, such as Puchala and Hopkins (1983: 64), and Young (1983: 95). For a critique of 
this approach, see Copeland (2003: 432) and, with a more general outlook, Kratochwil and Ruggie 
(1986). 
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understanding of this interpretative work as a straightforward analysis of international 
interaction or behaviour, rather than a more abstract advance into international 
communication or thought. With regard to the methods employed to gather this 
knowledge, however, the identification of a ‘structuralist’ English School as a distinct 
line of work may be overstating the point. Both neo-classicals and structuralists 
eventually rely on an agent-based methodology and interpretive methods (Navari 2014: 
212). If the latter are to be called positivist, that label can imply hardly more than a 
vigorous separation of normative and empirical-analytical work (Adler 2005: 180–181). 
Other researchers have gone beyond the reconstruction of subjective 
interpretations and look instead at institutions as an intersubjective structure. These 
authors emphasize the constitutive nature of international institutions, which is why the 
label sociological-institutionalist may be appropriate. Recovering statespersons’ 
intentions is not of interest to these authors; instead, they want to uncover the normative 
foundations of international conduct – of which individual actors might not always be 
aware. They therefore examine the types of practice that is enabled by institutions, how 
basic ideas about authority in specific societies shape them, and how such ideas change 
over time (Holsti 2004; Reus-Smit 1997, 1999). To this end, they employ techniques 
such as discourse analysis and historiographic research. Like some classical authors, 
they also interpret classical texts of political theory. However, the primary aim of this 
exercise for sociological-institutionalist English School authors is to disclose the 
constitutive ideas about rationality and legitimacy underlying historical international 
societies, as Reus-Smit (1997) does with his reading of Aristotle. 
A fourth group of authors who, while not entirely representative of the English 
School, can be loosely associated with some of its ideas, argue for the use of a range of 
alternative methods, including critical discourse analysis, genealogical analysis and 
ethnography, which focus on uncovering the social contingency of intersubjective 
meanings. On these foundations, they problematize processes and effects of knowledge 
production, identity formation and representation in international society (Neumann 
2002, 2012a; Neumann and Welsh 1991). They also reflect on the nature of scientific 
inquiry as a social practice (Der Derian 2009). These ‘post-classical’ (Neumann 2003: 
16) authors began their studies in IR under classical English School authors but have 
subsequently come in touch with critical and post-modern perspectives and pushed the 
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theoretical and methodological boundaries of the School.22 They do not believe that 
texts or practice directly convey the intentions of actors, as neo-classical authors 
assume. Practice can be an expression of meaning, but it also produces meanings and 
therefore is a source for their stability or change (Navari 2011). From this perspective, 
‘classical’ interpretive methods can only do part of the job. Instead, the ‘post-classicals’ 
have complemented their analyses of internationally shared meanings by a focus on the 
social practices – including discursive struggles – and power relations undergirding the 
construction of these meanings, mainly in the institution of diplomacy (Constantinou 
and Der Derian 2010; Der Derian 1987; Neumann 2002, 2003, 2012a; Wæver 1998). 
Nevertheless, these more critically oriented scholars of international society share with 
the English School authors an occupation with international institutions, their treatment 
of international practices as shaped by common understandings of reality, and their 
acknowledgement of the importance of studying texts for uncovering these 
understandings. 
As becomes clear against the background of this short discussion, there are no 
clear-cut sub-schools using starkly opposing methods but rather several clusters of 
authors emphasizing different aspects of their work. Apart from these varying 
emphases, most English School authors share a set of basic scientific assumptions, and 
their actual empirical analyses are often characterized by a fairly eclectic use of a 
variety of interpretivist, non-positivistic methods, such as historical and discourse 
analysis. There are some exceptions to this rule, such as an article by Little (2000), 
which pictures the three concepts of international system, international society and 
world society as distinct ontologies and associates them with positivist, interpretivist 
and critical methods, respectively (see also Linklater 1990). I will not discuss this 
position at length here but merely indicate that it depends on a conception of 
international society as ontologically distinct from an international system – a 
perspective that has convincingly been challenged by Buzan (2004) and James (1993). I 
would also put into question whether it is helpful to blur the lines between the English 
                                                 
22  Bull was a tutor and doctoral supervisor of Der Derian during his studies at Oxford University (Der 
Derian 2009). Also studying in Oxford, Neumann was heavily influenced by the English School 
teachings of Vincent (Neumann 2012b). 
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School and conventional positivistic approaches by basically incorporating neo-realism 
as one dimension of English School scholarship.23 
My study, therefore, largely follows the eclecticist stance. It is informed by a 
classical approach in that it relies heavily on an interpretivist reading of historical 
sources in order to reconstruct the intersubjectively held meanings by which people 
have made sense of international relations. In contrast to structuralist approaches, it 
rejects the assumption that such meanings can be inferred from observing behaviour – 
although the extent to which structuralists actually employ such observation can be 
questioned, as has been pointed out above. Instead, like the authors inspired by 
historical institutionalism, I use discourse analytical methods broadly conceived (see 
Section 4.4) to identify patterns of shared meanings that preserve certain constructions 
related to the nature of international relations and ask how they constitute the region as 
a political sphere. 
At the same time, the study also incorporates some of the critical impulse. 
Although certainly not post-structuralist in orientation, it does inquire into the practices 
of contested institutionalization by which meanings are constructed, as well as the 
power relations that shape these processes. In this sense, it is compatible with 
Neumann’s call for ‘Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn’: “The analysis of 
discourse understood as the study of the preconditions for social action must include the 
analysis of practice understood as the study of social action itself” (Neumann 2002: 
627–628). However, the variant of discourse analysis I employ is not strictly 
Foucauldian or critical (Fairclough 2003): it focuses on the contents of texts as well as 
the struggles between various actors to assert the dominance of their own particular 
interpretation, and it also takes into account the differential power positions of those 
actors. However, it does not concern itself with the role of such discursive practices in 
reproducing identities or with discourse as a form of power but rather in 
institutionalizing intersubjective meaning structures, which then have constitutive 
effects independent of individual discursive practices. Thus, the form of discourse 
analysis I employ aims to develop convincing narratives that make sense of the social 
                                                 
23  It should be noted that Little (2009) has somewhat weakened his claim about the triadic ontological-
methodological division of English School thinking in more recent publications. 
A methodology for analyzing change 
69 
 
mechanisms involved in the reproduction of institutions, rather than to disclose the 
violent or contradictory effects of discourses as such.24  
With this goal in mind, the study is aware of the ‘post-classical’ monition that 
such narratives are never just simple and perfect representations of the world but 
themselves always constitutive of reality and that this constitutive quality of research 
has to be reflected to avoid – or at least minimize – the pitfalls of reification. Analytical 
concepts must not be confused with objectively present processes operating ‘out there in 
the real world’. They are representations developed by the researcher to make sense of 
what he or she observes (Der Derian 2009: 301; Dunne 2005b: 164; Manning 1962). 
The present work is therefore not Critical, with a capital C, in the sense of devising and 
prescribing normatively superior forms of international society. While it acknowledges 
endeavours to open up discursive spaces for potential transformations of international 
society, it is not prescriptive in its ambitions. It is, however, critical in two respects: 
firstly, in pointing to the historical contingency of given international societies and 
disclosing the social mechanisms underlying their persistence and change, and 
secondly, in being aware of the contingent, representational and constitutive character 
of the research process itself. 
4.2 Causality and explanation 
A word should be said about the role of causality and explanation in this 
methodological framework. As has been indicated above, a positivist social science 
aspires to generate objective knowledge by testing theoretically deduced hypotheses. 
Explanation is equalled with causal inference, while causality is understood as the 
deterministic effect of an independent on a dependent variable, observable in a regular 
correlation between the two (King et al. 1994; Kurki 2008; Patomäki 2002).  
The English School has hardly ever engaged in such nomothetic-causal 
explanation, and neither do I, as such explanations run counter to an ontology which 
sees ideational factors and practice as constitutive of each other and therefore 
inextricably linked. Wendt (1998: 105) has pointed out that a causal explanation in the 
conventional sense includes three conditions: “in saying that ‘X causes Y’, we assume 
                                                 
24  For regional applications of the latter variant, see Borg and Diez (2016), and Diez (1999). I refrain 
from using the term ‘textual analysis’ for my approach, as it invokes the idea of more immanent, 
linguistic interpretation, which does not take into account the social dimension of meaning production 
(Fairclough 2003: 2–6). 
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three things: 1) that X and Y exist independent of each other, 2) that X precedes Y in 
time, and 3) that but for X, Y would not have occurred.” The third condition is clearly 
given in many English School arguments. For example, if it was not for the institution 
of the diplomacy, communication among state representatives and, by consequence, the 
pursuit of common interests, would be much more difficult. However, the first and the 
second conditions are usually not fulfilled, because to assume that two social 
phenomena (such as primary institutions and actors’ identities) are co-constitutive is 
exactly opposing the assumption of independence and anteriority of one or the other (cf. 
Hansen 2006: 25–28). In so far as it accepts constitutive effects of institutions, 
therefore, the English School cannot provide causal explanations in the narrow, 
positivist sense.  
However, despite this scepticism, the School never rejected causal theorizing 
entirely (Navari 2009c; Schouenborg 2013: 39). In fact, only adherents to a strict 
separation of ‘understanding’ and ‘explaining’ approaches would suggest that rejecting 
the positivist, nomothetic understanding of causality means abstaining from making 
explanatory or even causal claims altogether (Hollis and Smith 1990). Wendt has 
stressed that accounts of the empirical reality can also take the form of constitutive 
explanations, where a phenomenon is disclosed by reference to the discursive 
structures – and, I should add, mechanisms – “by virtue of which it exists” (Wendt 
1998: 105, see also Patomäki 1999: 83–88; 2002). Kurki (2008; see also Wæver 2002) 
takes this claim even further, seeing interpretive and discursive accounts as not merely 
explanatory, but also as causal in the sense that they uncover the enabling and 
constraining conditions underlying social action. Based on this interpretation of 
causality, there is nothing suspicious about claiming that certain mechanisms or effects 
caused stability or change in the institutions of an international society. 
In this sense, my methodological approach has the explanatory goal of 
identifying constitutive mechanisms, which are understood as “heuristic devices about 
the social processes that lead to the constitution of Y by X” (Pouliot 2007: 374). In line 
with the analytical model of institutionalization and constitution, it has to fulfil a 
twofold task: first, to produce an analysis of the practices that lead to the discursive 
construction of certain institutions; and second, to give an account of how these 
institutionalization practices were informed by the meaning structures constituted by 
those institutions. Since these processes are historically contingent, the goal of this 
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analysis is not to generate a-historical, nomothetic generalizations but to develop 
historical narratives that help understand current political phenomena (Linklater and 
Suganami 2006: 86–108).  
Apart from adopting this general perspective on explanation, I have silently 
subscribed to a particular view on causation by including arguments about path 
dependence and the inertia of discourses in the theoretical framework. The implications 
of such a conceptualization are emphasized by Pierson: 
Path-dependent arguments rest on what Arthur Stinchcombe has termed a 
conception of ‘historical causes’ […] – some initial event or process generates a 
particular outcome, which is then reproduced through time even though the 
original generating event or process does not recur. (Pierson 2004: 45, emphasis 
in the original) 
Adopting this perspective means rejecting the ‘synchronic’ logic favoured by most 
Regionalist approaches to explaining the institutional development of regional 
organizations, which confine themselves to identifying present factors and ignore that 
the initial processes that lead to the emergence of certain organizational features in the 
first place may no longer be in effect. However, it neither implies focusing only on the 
deterministic nature of established ideational structures, which hardly leave any room 
for change, as some constructivist analyses do (Wæver 2002: 22). By contrast, a 
‘diachronic’ historical analysis takes into account both aspects. It acknowledges the 
structuring effects of institutions but at the same time leaves room for the possibility of 
transcending these effects: 
In such a process [of institutional reproduction] the crucial objects of study 
become the factors that set development along a particular path – and which lie 
in the past – and the mechanisms of reproduction of the current path, which at 
first glance might seem commonplace, perhaps almost invisible or at least 
analytically uninteresting. (Pierson 2004: 45–46, see also 1999) 
Stability and change are therefore seen as dialectical phenomena, which are induced and 
mediated by specific mechanisms, and it is the task of the researcher to uncover these 
mechanisms. 
4.3 Basic design of the case studies 
The empirical part of this study consists of a comparison of changes in the 
secondary institutions of regional organizations in Europe and Southeast Asia, which 
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illustrates how the model presented in the theoretical chapter can help understand 
historical institutional developments in international societies. More to the point, it 
looks at three specific dimensions, or ‘episodes’, of change in regional organizations 
and asks how these played out in the respective regions. These episodes, to each of 
which a chapter is dedicated, are decolonization, regionalization and enlargement. 
Decolonization is taken here to comprise the dissolution of the old colonial institutions 
linking peripheral communities to a European core and the emergence of distinct 
regional organizations in Europe and Southeast Asia. I use regionalization, for want of a 
better term, in a narrow sense to describe the successive relocation of authority in the 
regional international societies in more hierarchical ways once the regional 
organizations are set up. Finally, enlargement means the expansion of the boundaries of 
the regional international societies. 
These should not be seen as distinct stages of regionalism. Regionalization can 
occur before, after or in parallel to enlargement. Accordingly, the temporal expansion of 
the episodes within the regions partially overlap. They do, however, mark key processes 
related to the development of regional organizations that almost all regional 
international societies hosting such organizations have undergone. Since the processes 
of decolonization, regionalization and enlargement did not occur in exact temporal 
conjunction in Europe and Southeast Asia, the timeframes of analysis in the two regions 
are not entirely congruent (Breslin et al. 2002: 10). For example, the examination of 
legal integration in Chapter 6 focuses on the period from 1961 to 1992 in the EC case, 
and from 1976 to 2007 for ASEAN. 
In each episode, the analysis focuses on certain key aspects of the developments: 
the decolonization chapter deals primarily with how ideas about extra-regional relations 
were connected to the emergence of regional organizations, the regionalization chapter 
with legal integration, and the enlargement chapter with specific enlargement ‘rounds’. 
The primary goal is to track the nature and the drivers of change in regional 
organizations in thematically circumscribed areas, rather than to develop an all-
encompassing historical account of the institutional development of the respective 
regional international societies. Therefore, each chapter focuses on those institutions 
that are most relevant for the particular dimension of change in question. 
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As the model does not propose any nomothetic causal hypotheses but offers a 
template for understanding institutional dynamics, the purpose of the case studies is not 
theory-testing. Rather, its aim is to show the heuristic and analytical value of the model 
in understanding distinct institutional dynamics in regional international societies. The 
model is valid if it creates a plausible narrative that offers explanations that other 
theories or models cannot provide. As a consequence, the empirical findings cannot 
falsify the theory but they can serve to fine-tune the analytical framework and to 
identify mechanisms that have been overlooked in its theoretical construction.25  
Accordingly, the case studies are not designed in an overly rigid comparative 
frame, which would be more useful if the goal was to isolate possible law-like causal 
mechanisms and effects. While I am interested in common traits, an equally important 
aim of the study is to show the historical contingency of individual cases, and empirical 
generalizations are only in a very limited sense useful to this end. Therefore, I do not 
systematically juxtapose the two regions on a number of variables and test for possible 
alternative explanations, but merely identify and emphasize parallels and differences in 
the institutional development of the two regional international societies where they 
appear to be salient. 
For example, in the chapter on regionalization, I find that actors in both regions 
pushed for legal integration by pointing to assumed functional necessities, in the sense 
that economic integration must be undergirded by an according legal order, but 
European pro-legalization actors could additionally refer to the primary institutions of 
democracy and Community constitutionalism in order to legitimize their claims. 
However, in contrast to a rigid ‘most similar cases design’ study, I do not conclude from 
this observation that the existence of these primary institutions provides a necessary or 
sufficient cause for the relatively high degree of legal integration in Europe but merely 
that it provided an important enabling context for the institutionalization of respective 
                                                 
25  For example, the analytical conception initially contained an ideal-type framework discerning four 
types of change according to two dimensions: the speed of change (sudden vs. gradual) and the 
direction of change (primary to secondary vs. secondary to primary). However, empirical findings 
suggested that even change sparked by apparently revolutionary events usually develops in longer time 
periods, and that processes of institutional change were more complex than the linear assumption of a 
dominant direction could account for, as the momentum of change often oscillated between the two 
levels. In reaction to this, I dropped the ideal-type framework and conceptualized institutional change 
instead as a process that unfolds in sequences, where institutionalization practices on the primary 
institutional level may create constitutive contexts conducive to further change on the secondary, and 
vice versa. I thank Nicolás Terradas for pointing out the possible long-term effects of singular shocks 
to me. 
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secondary institutions. Such a flexible application of the comparative method can help 
to identify commonalities and differences across cases and uncover the historical 
contingency of the development of regional international societies.  
For purposes such as those outlined above, George and Bennett have proposed 
the method of structured, focused comparison, a procedure of semi-standardized data 
collection concentrating on certain empirical aspects of the cases in question. This 
method, in their words,  
is ‘structured’ in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the 
research objective and that these questions are asked of each case under study to 
guide and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison 
and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible. The method is ‘focused’ in 
that it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined. (George 
and Bennett 2005: 67) 
In the present study, the interrelated goals of structuring and focusing the inquiry are 
achieved by means of two features: first, applying the theoretical model of constitution 
and institutionalization presented in the theoretical chapter serves as a means to 
structure the inquiry, as well as the narratives that emerge out of this inquiry. Its 
concepts are used to develop questions that guide the analysis of the empirical material 
in both regions. For example, the concept of shocks translates into the question of what 
historical events have been constructed as serious challenges to the institutional set-up 
in each region – these questions will be developed in more detail below. At the same 
time, the questions also limit the scope of the inquiry by turning the attention towards 
the mechanisms surrounding the reproduction of institutional configurations, and away 
from other potential factors influencing the development of regional organizations. 
Second, the analysis will be centred on the three historically central episodes of 
institutional development mentioned above. These focal points lend a meta-structure to 
the analysis of the cases and further limit the empirical aspects under which they are 
examined. 
4.4 Analytical approach 
The theoretical framework adopted in this thesis conceives of organizations as 
being informed by discourses that represent sets of intersubjective expectations on two 
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levels of abstraction, namely primary and secondary institutions.26 As I have already 
pointed out in the theoretical groundwork of this thesis, behaviouralist analysis in the 
sense of the observation of interaction and the subjective internalization of norms is not 
a conclusive method to study the relation between intersubjective meanings and agency. 
Instead, the analysis needs to disclose discursive practices and their constitutive 
effects,27 which is why the main method employed in this study is discourse analysis. 
International society manifests itself in discursive struggles over expectations about 
actorness and legitimate practice in the international realm, and it is these struggles and 
the temporary fixation of meaning in institutions that have to be analyzed.  
Such discourses revolve around specific aspects of international relations, such 
as the use of violence, communication or the hierarchy between actors.28 It is likely that, 
in any international society, competing expectations are formulated with respect to these 
issues. The various discursive strands dealing with one specific aspect of international 
conduct form a discursive field. Within a discursive field, those sets of expectations that 
are dominant in the sense that they are more widely accepted than others form 
international institutions. A discursive field can give rise to more than one institution, 
and these institutions can formulate more or less specific expectations.  
Analyzing international institutions thus means looking for those parts of the 
wider discourse on international relations that revolve around expectations about 
actorness and normativity/legitimacy, and examining the discursive practices of 
institutionalization by which some notions acquire dominance. For example, in the 
discursive field about the use of violence, there may be competing discursive strands 
formulating expectations, ranging from pacifist to aggressively expansionist and from 
nationalist to secessionist, which give specific answers to the question of who may, 
under which circumstances, rely on what means of force in international relations. The 
analysis then needs to trace which of these strands become dominant so that the 
expectations they formulate form institutions such as the primary institution of 
defensive warfare or the secondary institutions constituting the UN Security Council. 
The goal is to create a ‘dialogical narrative’ of how certain discourses become dominant 
                                                 
26  This should be re-emphasized: Secondary institutions are not equivalent with regional organizations 
and regimes, but the former are a constitutive part of the latter (Friedner Parrat 2015). 
27  A focus on practices is also advocated by Navari (2011). Note, however, that Navari’s interest in 
practice is to recover subjective frames of thought, not intersubjective meanings. On the potential of 
practice-based approaches for identifying primary institutions, see also Buzan (2014: 176–177). 
28  More on this ‘functional’ aspect of institutions in Section 4.4.4. 
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and others dominated, and what power relations inform these discursive struggles 
(Foucault 1981; Pouliot 2007: 373; see also Dunn 2008).  
4.4.1 Mapping pathways of regional organizations 
I develop this dialogical narrative through a number of analytical steps. The first 
task is to identify and study the texts relating to the specific dimension of change in the 
regional organizations in question, with a view to tracking the development of the 
discursive field over time. In a basic sense, this means studying texts for references to 
primary and secondary institutions, in each case identifying their authors and the 
arguments they make. This allows me to trace the institutionalization practices 
employed by the involved actors. But what counts as change in this analysis? And when 
do expectations in a discursive field become so dominant as to be counted as 
institutionalized? 
Since my research interest is explaining pathways in the development of regional 
organizations, a focus on alterations in their formal foundations, such as treaties and 
charters, is warranted. Formalization is a defining consolidating moment of change in 
regional organizations, as the formal statement of rules and procedures stabilizes the 
identities of its members, clarifies their mutual expectations and increases their 
obligations. As such, changes in formal foundational texts constitute the analytical 
starting point of my analysis. For example, in the case of regionalization in Southeast 
Asia, the formal enshrinement of dispute settlement mechanisms in the ASEAN Charter 
is the change in the organizational pathway that I want to account for. Chronologically 
speaking, however, such treaty or charter changes are only the – preliminary – 
endpoints of longer institutionalization processes by which certain intersubjective 
understandings become dominant in a regional organization, which also include 
discursive interventions of a lower formalization degree. For example, the inclusion of 
European citizenship rights in the Maastricht Treaty was preceded by interventions by 
different actors dating back to the 1960s, such as politiciansʼ speeches, parliamentary 
resolutions, declarations by heads of state and government, and the like, which 
cumulatively contributed to making intersubjective understandings about rights and 
obligations of individuals in the European Community dominant (Wiener 1998).  
Hansen has pointed out that mapping key events is a way of structuring a 
historical analysis focusing on stability and change of discourse (Hansen 2006: 32). 
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Taking up this idea, I start each of the analytical parts by identifying a key event 
marking a decisive formalization of new secondary institutions in a specific dimension 
of regional international society (Table 1), based on the operationalization of the 
concept of secondary institutions outlined below (see Section 4.4.3). Each of these focal 
points represents the culmination of a process of change in the secondary institutions of 
the regional organization. 
Table 1: Key events in episodes of institutional change 
Episode of change Key events Europe Key events Southeast Asia 
Decolonization Establishment of the 
Association framework in the 
EEC (1957) 
Enshrinement of foreign policy 
rules in the Bangkok Declaration 
(1967) 
Regionalization Establishment of citizenship 
rules in the Maastricht Treaty 
(1992) 
Formalization of dispute 
settlement mechanisms in the 
ASEAN Charter (2007) 
Enlargement Eastern Enlargement and launch 
of European Neighbourhood 
Policy (2004–2007) 
Creation of ASEAN Regional 
Forum and accession by ‘CLMV’ 
states29 (1994–1999) 
 
In Europe, the creation of the Association framework transformed the relations 
between European states and their ‘overseas territories’ by communitarizing policies 
that had hitherto been the prerogative of national empires. It thereby constituted a 
hallmark in the decolonization of the region. In Southeast Asia, decolonization was of 
course firstly expressed by the acquisition of national independence of former 
dependent territories but it also comprised a regional dimension. This regional aspect 
found its formal expression in the creation of a code of conduct regarding member 
states’ relations with external powers – including the former colonial powers – in the 
Bangkok Declaration of 1967, ASEAN’s founding document. 
While regionalization can take place in different policy fields, my empirical 
analysis focuses on the legal realm, looking at the processes through which the nation-
states cease to be the sole location of judicial authority. Here, I argue that Europe’s core 
institutionalization moments was the establishment of citizenship rules in the Treaty of 
Maastricht. While the establishment of an independent judiciary in the form of the ECJ 
                                                 
29  The acronym represents the four states of Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam, which joined 
ASEAN in the late 1990s.  
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was also a defining moment, it can be seen as a mere step in the undermining of 
classical international law, which culminated in the acknowledgement of individual 
rights in the citizenship framework. In Southeast Asia, legal integration has seen a 
milestone in the signing of the ASEAN Charter, which formalized and enhanced dispute 
settlement mechanisms in the region. 
The last episode of change contains two distinct but closely related formalization 
events in both regions: the EU’s Eastern Enlargement marks the greatest expansion in 
terms of membership of the EU. Since the European Neighbourhood Policy was 
launched in close sequence and effectively institutionalized forms of inclusion beyond 
actual EU membership, I analyze it in conjunction to the Eastern Enlargement. In 
Southeast Asia, the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 can also 
be seen as an expansion beyond actual ASEAN membership, whereas the successive 
accession of Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia substantially pushed the 
boundaries of ASEAN as such. 
The analysis aims to trace the discourse producing the institutional pathways 
leading up to these culmination points (see Section 4.4.2). This raises the difficult 
question of when an institutional pathway begins. Bennett and Checkel (2015a: 26–27) 
are right when they write that there is no guarantee that starting the analysis at any given 
point in the past actually traces the process in its entirety. On the other hand, the 
analysis has to start somewhere. My solution to this conundrum is to use secondary 
literature and intertextual references to find the texts that contain the first explicit 
references to the secondary institutions in question and then use these as the 
chronological starting point of the analytical process. For example, on the issue of legal 
integration in Europe, regional actors introduced the concept of a European citizenship 
in the early 1960s, which is why I use that point in time as the chronological starting 
point of the analysis. I cannot exclude the possibility that discursive roots in the form of 
related concepts actually date further back in time but would argue that this move is 
justifiable both on pragmatic grounds and given that my analysis tries to show how 
marginal ideas about institutions became more dominant, not provide a linguistic 
genealogy of the related concepts. 
I have argued in the theoretical chapter that secondary institutions are 
institutionalized through processes of formalization and primary institutions through 
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non-formal reiteration. This means that by classifying each relevant textual source in 
terms of its author and its formality (see Section 4.4.2), I can trace how secondary 
institutions emerge from the context of primary institutions. A low degree of 
formalization indicates that the discursive practices of institutionalizing a new 
secondary institution are not very advanced. In this, the analysis rejects approaches that 
focus on instances of formal treaty changes only. Wincott (1995; see similarly Øhrgaard 
1997) has criticized liberal intergovernmental accounts of legalization in the EC for 
focusing on formal treaty negotiations while neglecting the everyday practices of 
supranational bodies. I agree with Wincott that, beyond the big intergovernmental 
conferences, continuous practices have shaped the EC, but I reject his insinuation that 
the two are fundamentally different and cannot be analyzed within a single analytical 
framework. Rather, treaty negotiations appear as an endpoint of a process of gradual 
institutionalization which includes a variety of actors and discursive interventions of 
varying formality (cf. Finnemore and Toope 2001). 
4.4.2 Identifying and structuring sources 
Although discourses do not necessarily consist of verbal representations, they 
mainly manifest themselves in texts. To be considered relevant to the analysis, texts 
have to articulate general implicit or explicit statements about who is or should be an 
actor in international relations, and/or about what norms and rules guide or should guide 
the interaction among those actors (Reus-Smit 1999: 30). Leaving revolutionary 
moments of mass mobilization aside, discourses of international society are usually not 
shaped by and targeted at the broad public but have a limited, specialized audience. This 
reference group mostly consists of academics and practitioners of IR such as politicians, 
diplomats and spokespersons of large civil society groups.30 Therefore, sources 
revealing international society discourses can be expected to be found in ‘primary 
sources’ – that is, historical documents – authored by leading political figures from the 
international society in question.  
To paint a comprehensive picture and to be able to contextualize individual 
texts, there are a number of different textual genres and authors to be considered. The 
analysis focuses official discourse, i.e. texts produced by actors with legal authority in 
international relations such as heads of state and government, foreign ministers and 
                                                 
30  Wæver (2002: 42) makes a similar argument for discourses about foreign policy. 
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senior officials in international organizations. However, in order to capture the 
dynamics of discursive contestation and stabilization in the context of the hegemonic 
official discourse, it also includes texts by other actors who engage with this discourse 
and are therefore part of the wider debate about regional international relations. These 
can be opposition leaders and, in certain cases, spokespersons of civil society 
movements and organizations (Hansen 2006: 61). 
In principle, therefore, relevant textual sources can be the following, as far as 
they are accessible either through the internet, libraries or archives, and as far as they 
are written in English, French or German.31 The list puts them in the order of their 
formality, proceeding from high to low:  
1. Legal agreements between actors of international relations, including the 
founding documents and statutes of international organizations or regimes. The 
most relevant organizations are the EU and its predecessors in the case of 
Europe, and ASEAN and its predecessors in the case of Southeast Asia. Other 
regional organizations and regimes, such as the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the Court of Human Rights, the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon 
Free Zone and the ARF for ASEAN are accounted for insofar as they influenced 
the development in these regional organizations. 
2. Legislation and jurisdiction. This primarily concerns the directives and 
regulations of the EC/EU, as well as rulings by the ECJ, as they are the only 
bodies of regional organization under study with the respective competences. 
However, in certain cases, national legislation and jurisdiction may be of 
importance, as with the reactions of the High Courts of EC member states to the 
assertive interpretation of EC law by the ECJ. 
3. Resolutions and declarations issued by international actors. These often 
represent formal commitments but lack legal character, which impedes their 
enforcement. The founding document of ASEAN, the Bangkok Declaration, is 
an example. However, unlike laws and jurisdiction, they can also be published 
                                                 
31  Due to the international audience which is addressed by most of these texts, they can be expected to be 
mostly written in English. This is also the case for Southeast Asian sources – for example, the working 
language of ASEAN is English. For important sources written in other languages, I will rely on 
translations as far as they are available. 
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by actors without ultimate decision-making power, and irrespective of formal 
competences in the field.  
4. Other kinds of official communication emerging from the administrative 
machinery of regional organizations, such as reports and meeting minutes. 
Possible authors include the representatives of organizational bodies, such as the 
ASEAN Secretary-General or the Presidents of the various EC/EU bodies, but 
also ad-hoc designated rapporteurs, committees, ‘eminent persons groups’. 
These documents are of a less formal character than resolutions and declarations 
but they may shed light on different discursive strands, as they do not always 
represent a consensus view. Since, at least in the case of the EC/EU, the various 
organizational mouthpieces have been publishing an ever-increasing plethora of 
regular and ad-hoc statements, reports, press-releases and statistics, documentary 
research in this area has to be focused by narrowing it down to specific search 
terms and timeframes. 
5. Speeches, interviews, statements and articles by important national and 
international political actors. These can be heads of state and government or 
other high-ranking officials, especially foreign ministers, of nation-states. Of 
particular interest are statements issued at international conferences and at 
meetings in the framework of international organizations. If available, leaked 
minutes of meetings and ‘non-papers’ can allow insights into the non-official 
diplomatic discourse. To account for oppositional discourses, leaders of 
oppositional parties and important social movements are included. 
In light of this variety of potential sources, the search has to eschew both the risk 
of generating too little and too much sources. On the one hand, there is no way to be 
sure that all relevant documents are included in the analysis. This is especially the case 
for events lying further in the past, and for those texts representing not the dominant 
discourses but the more ‘subaltern’ views, which are by definition unlikely to be 
supported by institutional authority (Neumann 2008: 66–67). As a consequence, it is 
possible that these alternative positions cannot be traced in the form of a discursive 
strand which is consistent over time and space, but rather as punctual emergences of 
oppositional views challenging the dominance of the existing institutions. This problem 
cannot be addressed other than by paying special attention to those discursive positions 
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wherever they are breaking to the surface and to analyze in particular how they differ 
from the dominant institutionalized meanings, what authority they claim for their 
arguments and why they did or did not manage to significantly influence the established 
institutions of international society.  
On the other hand, especially in the case of more recent events, the risk is that of 
having to handle an overwhelming amount of data, the individual significance of which 
for the actual institutional development is hard to establish. The task is then to find a 
way of limiting the analysis to a manageable sample of this data while eschewing the 
risk of selection bias. However, the relative openness of the interpretive approach 
employed here precludes the use of hard selection criteria. I therefore use a more 
generic way of selecting texts and limiting the analysis, which has features of 
‘theoretical sampling’. In a broad sense, theoretical sampling means that the collation of 
sources does not follow a set of selection rules defined in advance in order to generate a 
random sample but is developed step-by-step in the process of conducting the analysis 
itself (Glaser and Strauss 2012: 45–77). Relevant texts are thus identified while 
analyzing other texts.  
My approach draws on this idea but complements it with other methods of 
finding relevant texts. Hansen (2006: 82–87) mentions intertextual references, a clear 
reference to the issue in question and a certain backing by institutional authority as 
criteria for establishing the relevance of a text. Taking this into consideration, I start the 
analysis in each case by using the texts of the key events outlined above as a reference 
point. I then use secondary literature that indicates important preceding documents 
informing their genesis, which usually have a less formal character (Hansen 2006: 83). 
As the literature on the genesis of institutional rules and procedures may not pay 
adequate attention to texts that represent dynamics in the primary institutional context, I 
also make use of literature with a broader focus on the regional international society of 
the period in question. This includes works on regional international relations with a 
historiographic focus and genealogical studies tracing the development of key concepts 
(Neumann 2008: 67). 
Apart from this, the textual corpus may be broadened by paying attention to 
intertextual references, in the sense that already identified documents may in turn refer 
to other important material of an earlier date. For example, motions for resolutions of 
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the European Parliament (EP) can point to earlier reports or communiqués from other 
EC/EU bodies. This conforms to the idea of a gradual development of the textual corpus 
outlined above. Finally, research based on key words in the databases of regional 
organizations, such as EUR-Lex32 and asean.org can provide additional sources. In this 
way, I collate material until I see repeating argumentative patterns – either a single 
discursive strand or a number of opposing views – emerge from the interpretation of 
these sources to a point where the consideration of additional texts do not promise 
additional information and ‘theoretical saturation’ (Glaser and Strauss 2012: 61–62; see 
also Bennett and Checkel 2015a: 27–28) is achieved. In line with the notion of 
discourse tracing, I then put these sources in a chronological order for each of the cases 
in order to allow for a historically exact reconstruction of the discursive dynamics 
surrounding institutional stability and change. 
The analysis of institutional pathways calls for an emphasis on chronology, so 
that the processes of discursive contestation and the institutionalization of new 
meanings can be examined in their temporal sequence. This approach conforms to what 
LeGreco and Tracy (2009) have called ‘discourse tracing’. Combining elements of 
process-tracing and its focus on social mechanism (Bennett and Checkel 2015b) with 
genealogical methods which aim at reconstructing the emergence of normative claims 
out of discursive struggles (Price 1995), this is a variant of discourse analysis that puts 
particular emphasis on the temporal dimension in order to analyze the dynamic relation 
of dominant and competing discourses.33 “Chronology”, the two authors write, “is 
important because it helps researchers to detect the emergence of social processes across 
time and context” (LeGreco and Tracy 2009: 1526). However, a chronological reading 
as the only structuring element of the analysis would not be enough to create a 
meaningful narrative, especially in a comparative research setting. The quantity of 
potentially relevant data needs to be limited by some sort of complexity-reducing 
mechanism. LeGreco and Tracy seem to have this in mind when they point out that 
discourse tracing can be facilitated by means of a “structured, focused comparison of 
somewhat parallel situations, policies, or cases” (LeGreco and Tracy 2009: 1531). This 
                                                 
32 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu. 
33  For similar approaches, see Guzzini’s (2012b) notion of ‘interpretive process tracingʼ, as well as 
Pouliot (2007). The call to use process tracing to explain dynamics in regional international societies is 
echoed by Costa Buranelli (2015b). 
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is in line with the basic research design of my case studies, which provides a number of 
structuring and focusing concepts in order to make sense of the chronological data. 
4.4.3 Distinguishing primary and secondary institutions 
Analyzing these sources allows me to put the institutionalization of secondary 
institutions through formalization in the context of the relevant regional primary 
institutions. I have already established in the theoretical chapter (Section 3.4.2) that the 
main distinguishing criterion between primary and secondary institutions is that the 
former are institutionalized by iterated speech acts and the latter by means of 
formalization. For this reason, I classify those elements of the discourses that formulate 
expectations about actorness and conduct without aiming to establish them as formal – 
in the sense of being unspecific and non-binding – parts of primary institutions and map 
their development separately from the secondary institutions. 
For example, an analysis of the discourse leading up to the institutionalization of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU would find texts from the 
1970s and 1980s arguing for the formalization of procedures in the foreign and security 
relations of the EC. These would form part of the institutionalization process of the 
CFSP framework as a secondary institution. However, the same texts would also 
contain references to certain guidelines of interaction which are neither formal nor 
aiming for formalization. These would be evidence of a specific interpretation of the 
primary institution of diplomacy based on the notion of a ‘coordination reflex’, which 
implies that foreign policy officials of member states should automatically seek 
consultations with each other, although such a policy was not officially articulated until 
later. A special case in this respect are the preambles of treaties, declarations and 
resolutions: although these sources as such may be highly formalized, I take the 
preambles to be prefixed – in the literal meaning of the Latin word praeambulare – as a 
legitimizing preface to the actual provisions of the text, and therefore not as secondary 
but primary institutions. 
Despite this relatively straightforward criterion, ambiguities will be unavoidable. 
The notions of supremacy and direct effect, for example, emerged from the concrete 
legally binding decisions of the ECJ, which means that they have aspects of a secondary 
institution. However, insofar as these concepts gained relevance as principles of the 
European doctrine of international law independent of the specific formal case law, they 
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changed conceptions of legal and legitimate authority in regional international society 
more broadly speaking. I thus classify them as elements of a primary institution of 
Community constitutionalism, which constituted an emergent legal order beyond that of 
national and inter-state law and defined individuals as legal subjects beyond national 
context. 
Obviously, my analysis cannot entirely sidestep the problem that the application 
leaves a notable degree of subjectivity. Insofar, it must face up to the same sort of 
criticism that has been launched at classical regime theory, which has been censured for 
the “wooliness” (Strange 1983; see also Buzan 2004: 163–164) of its concepts and the 
problem of adequately defining and delineating these elements. However, hardly any 
analytical category is safe from this accusation. Ultimately, the distinction is a heuristic 
tool, and as with all such tools, its application remains subject to the judgement of the 
analyst, just as its usefulness depends on the plausibility and theoretical expediency of 
the analyses it generates. Critical reflection upon the analytical expedience of using the 
two criteria therefore forms an integral part of the empirical work. 
4.4.4 Mapping primary institutions 
How do I establish which textual references are materializations of which 
primary institution? Finnemore (2001: 509; see also Copeland 2003; Spegele 2005: 97; 
Wilson 2012) has pointed to the English School’s continual problem of finding 
empirical evidence for its ontological concepts: “how do you know an international 
society (or international system or world society) when you see one?” For the purpose 
of my study, I have already established that we know an international society from the 
discursive struggles over legitimate actorness and behaviour. However, this leaves open 
the question of how to infer the presence of primary institutions from the plethora of 
utterances that can be found in these discourses. 
Any discourse analysis is confronted with the question of how to generate valid 
claims from its data. Some authors hold that pure induction is the silver bullet (Hopf 
2002). In this understanding, letting the relevant concepts emerge from the texts in the 
course of analysis will minimize any analytical bias that might be introduced by the 
preconceptions of the researcher. While for secondary institutions, this task might be 
considered manageable, for primary institutions pure induction poses a problem of 
practicality – without any points of reference, virtually anything could, in principle, hint 
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at the existence of an institution.34 This is also why I do not take up Wilson’s (2012) 
suggestion to use grounded theory in its original sense to analyze international 
institutions. The idea is certainly instructive insofar as it introduces methodological 
rigidity and empirically grounds theorizing about international institutions. However, in 
a field as complex and open as international society, the call to reject any pre-empirical 
theoretical concept-building while at the same time considering a large amount of 
sources such as texts, interviews, participant observation and the like is confronted by 
the problem of inferring a discrete set of institutions from a virtually unlimited set of 
data without any analytical guidelines.  
It might therefore appear expedient to rely on deductive methods when it comes 
to identifying primary institutions. This would mean either using a catalogue of 
institutions from existing academic literature or applying sheer logic of reason to derive 
at oneʼs own catalogue, and then look for evidence of them in the texts. However, 
relying on such work in this thesis runs counter to the assumption of the spatio-temporal 
variability of international society and is certain to introduce an analytical bias. The 
problem is exacerbated because authors hardly ever make explicit the rules of evidence 
by which they have arrived at a particular catalogue of institutions,35 and they may be 
biased according to specific research interests. For example, works on European 
integration often pay more attention to internal institutions while neglecting the 
development of principles, norms, rules and procedures in relation to external actors 
(Diez et al. 2011). Such imbalances may be legitimate analytical choices but they show 
that a rigid deduction from established accounts is of limited value considering the 
specific purposes of my study.  
In light of this apparent dilemma, I take a middle ground position that makes use 
of two sources to guide the analysis: first, if available, I draw on existing literature to 
get an idea about the institutional context other authors have identified for the period in 
question. In order to judge the validity of their findings, I analyze some of the key 
sources they cite. If I can reconstruct the findings they claim, I also apply them to the 
sources of relevance to the episode at hand, which I have identified in the previous step. 
                                                 
34  To be sure, some authors have chosen this approach with remarkable results (Schouenborg 2014: 81–
84), and I am not saying that it cannot be done. However, it is far from clear to what degree these 
authors have actually arrived at their lists without any deductive or heuristic elements. The limits of 
this method are further demonstrated by the fact that the authors’ different ‘inventories’ show a 
remarkable variability with respect to which institutions are identified. 
35  See the synopses and critiques by Buzan (2004: 167–176) and Wilson (2012). 
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If the discourses show references to the principles and norms that are defined as 
elements of a certain primary institution in the existing literature, I take this institution 
to be a part of the primary institutional context for the change on the secondary level 
under study. 
Second, I will triangulate these findings with an original discursive analysis 
guided by functional heuristics. Such an approach has already been used by some 
English School scholars. It starts from the assumption that in any international society, a 
set of general aspects or problems of international relations has to be addressed, and that 
the answers that are given to these questions are likely – albeit not certain – to be 
institutionalized in primary institutions. This functional notion is a recurring idea in 
English School theory (Buzan 2014: 174–175; Schouenborg 2014: 80), and several 
authors provide lists of functions that can provide a basis for the empirical analysis in 
this study (Table 2).36 
                                                 
36  Reus-Smit (1999) also provides a functional argument, according to which international societies 
develop specific constitutional structures that serve to legitimize the identity of states in three respects: 
They provide a moral purpose for the state, an organizing principle of sovereignty and a systemic norm 
of procedural justice. I do not include his functional categories here because they are limited to 
societies of sovereign states, which is itself already a specific form of international society. 
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Table 2: Functions of international institutions 
Author Bull (1977: 16–
20) 
Buzan (2004: 
186–190) 
Donnelly (2006: 
11–12) 
Schouenborg 
(2014: 32) 
Functions or 
goals of an 
international 
society 
Preservation of 
the system 
Maintaining in-
dependence or 
external 
sovereignty of 
states 
Maintenance of 
peace 
Limitation of 
violence 
Keeping of 
promises 
Stabilization of 
possession by 
rules of property 
Membership 
Authoritative 
communication 
Limits to the use 
of force 
Allocation of 
property rights 
Sanctity of 
agreements 
Making rules 
Regulating 
conflicts 
Regulating the use 
of force 
Regulating owner-
ship and exchange 
Communicating 
and interacting 
Aggregating in-
terests and power 
Legitimacy and 
membership 
Authoritative 
communication 
Trade 
International 
organization 
Regulating 
conflicts 
Source: adaption from Schouenborg (2011: 32). In contrast to Schouenborg, however, I refer not to Bull’s general 
functions to be fulfilled by any society but to those he lists specifically with respect to international societies. 
Of these, Buzan’s catalogue is the most convincing, most importantly because it 
incorporates the question of membership – in contrast to Bull, who presupposes 
sovereign states as the basic units of international society, and Donnelly, who 
conspicuously omits the question of actorness from his list. This category is also of 
particular importance when interrogating regional international societies, as for these 
geographic boundary-drawing, i.e. the delineation of a regional social space from the 
global level, is a constitutive process. Schouenborg’s proposal to include international 
organization seems unfit because it is a matter of secondary institutions. Bull’s, 
Donnelly’s and Schouenborg’s other suggestions can be subsumed in one way or the 
other under Buzan’s functions. One aspect that is missing from all these lists is the 
function of enabling and regulating interactions with the environment, supposedly 
because none of the authors had specifically regional international societies in mind. I 
therefore use Buzanʼs catalogue as an inspiration from which to draw a set of functions 
that serve as analytical focal points of my empirical chapters, complementing it with the 
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issue of external relations. For the three episodes of change, the following functional 
categories are important: 
a) Decolonization 
 Membership: who counts as an actor, how does one acquire actorness 
and what is the basic nature of the relation between the actors 
(hierarchical or equal)? 
 Limits to the use of force: who can legitimately be subjects and objects 
of violence, and under what circumstances? 
 External relations: how should actors from inside the region conduct 
themselves vis-à-vis actors from the outside? 
b) Regionalization 
 Membership: see above 
 Sanctity of agreements: how do the actors ensure that rules and mutual 
arrangements are observed? 
 Legal personality: what kinds of actors are perceived as legal subjects, 
and what kinds of rights and obligations do they assume? 
c) Enlargement 
 Membership: in contrast to the above episodes, there is a slight shift in 
emphasis in this category – the main questions are: What are the 
geographical boundaries of the region? Is membership a dichotomous 
concept or are there gradated forms of membership? What are 
elementary qualities a candidate must fulfil in order to become a member 
of an international society? The latter question highlights that, in 
principle, primary institutions pertaining to all the other functions can 
become relevant here. For example, as I will show in Section 7.2, 
questions of authoritative communication and limits to the use of force 
(Who may decide on matters of conflict resolution? What are the 
guidelines of conflict resolution? How does communication about such 
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issues take place?) played an important part in the enlargement of 
ASEAN. 
Every international society can give its particular answer to these problems and 
can indeed develop several primary and secondary institutions around one specific 
problem. For example, the question of the limits to the use of force can be addressed by 
the principles and norms of peaceful dispute settlement, coupled with the idea of non-
intervention and specific conflict prevention mechanisms. On the other hand, one 
institution can deal with several problems. For example, the institution of international 
law contains rules about communication, the allocation of property rights and the 
sanctity of agreements. 
Like Schouenborg (2014: 84), I do not seek to explain the emergence of 
institutions by reference to these functions: I merely use them as heuristic categories or 
an analytical template to direct my discourse analysis (see also Buzan 2014: 175). The 
explanatory logic is constitutive in the Wendtian sense, rather than causal: using the 
functions as heuristics or ‘sensitizing concepts’, I ask what kind of international society 
is constituted by the international institutions.37 I am aware that the a priori assumption 
of functional requirements for international societies is difficult to sustain in an 
essentially post-foundationalist framework (cf. Linklater and Suganami 2006: 58; 
Wilson 2012). These functions are postulated rather than empirically inferred. However, 
the analytical bias which may be introduced is more limited than if one were to use a 
fixed catalogue of institutions as a starting point. 
Still, the risk that the importance of a particular primary institution for a case of 
secondary institutional change will be overlooked cannot entirely be dismissed. It is 
important, therefore, that the functional categories remain open to refinement in light of 
empirical findings. If a discourse reveals frequent references to norms and principles 
that have initially not been considered as a relevant primary institution, I reconsider 
their relevance and examine the discourse with additional attention to them. This was 
the case, for example, with respect to enlargement in Southeast Asia, where I found that 
questions of conflict resolution and diplomacy were more present in the discourse than I 
had initially expected. 
                                                 
37  This approach is similar to Wæver’s (2002) framework for analyzing national identity discourses in the 
Nordic states, which draws on a number of key concepts – the nation, the state etc. – and ideal types as 
heuristic anchors to guide their empirical work. 
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The explicit formulation of expectations is not always necessary for a segment of 
discourse to count as materialization of a primary institution. Instead, concepts may be 
used that are understood as representing a broader set of expectations by readers who 
are familiar with the discourse. For example, in the European regionalization process, 
the notion of ‘legitimacy deficit’ may be read as implying the argument that regional 
actors should be subject to principles of democratic representation and norms of 
accountability, transparency and participation. In my analysis, I will identify such 
concepts and count references to them as a materialization of the respective institution, 
in this case: democracy. 
As for secondary institutions, discourse tracing is also important when analyzing 
the primary level because primary institutions are not static. It is possible that certain 
sets of principles and norms come to replace others as dominant. The question of what 
counts as change thus reappears for primary institutions, but I answer it in a different 
way than in the case of secondary institutions: rather than looking at increasing 
formalization, I assume that change in primary institutions is evident in the frequency of 
the evocation of certain expectations by authoritative actors in the texts, and the 
intensity of explicit opposition to those expectations. If certain principles and norms 
cease to be reiterated while others appear more often, then I assume that a primary 
institution has changed. 
4.4.5 Analyzing path-dependent change 
So far, the methods outlined provide a basis for describing the 
institutionalization practices and the ensuing changes in the institutional configuration 
of a regional international society. In order to tap on the full explanatory potential – 
explanatory, it should be repeated, not in a narrow causal sense – the analysis needs to 
be complemented by methods that uncover the processes of stabilization and 
destabilization influencing the dynamics on the two institutional layers. This part 
essentially relies on three elements: analyzing the role of feedback effects, identifying 
sources for contestation and examining the interplay of the two institutional layers. 
With regard to the first step, I have elaborated in the theoretical part how various 
feedback effects may impinge on actorsʼ ability to engage in practices of institutional 
contention. As outlined in the theoretical section, these are power effects, reification, 
vested interests and institutional linkages. As all of them can be at work simultaneously, 
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the analysis takes up each effect, analyzing how strongly they worked in favour of the 
continued institutionalization of the existing institutions and impeded oppositional 
discourses from posing serious challenges to the institutional configuration.  
Power effects rely on the phenomenon that institutions have an impact on 
actorsʼ abilities to participate in the process of their reproduction because they identify 
certain actors as legitimate and authoritative while others are ascribed a subordinate 
position or denied actorness altogether. In international societies, the inclusiveness of 
these processes depend on the degree of its ‘stratification’ (Keene 2014), meaning the 
differentiation of power positions within an international society, indicates which actors 
assume privileged or subordinate discursive positions.38 If a primary institution ascribes 
legitimate authority for some actors over others, I will take this to indicate a privileged 
power position. Secondary institutions constitute actors in the sense that they ascribe 
more differentiated roles. To determine their stratifying effects, it is helpful to identify 
what kinds of positional power they entail. Such power is indicated by privileged access 
to institutionalization practices, for example through the granting of veto power in the 
decision-making procedures of a regional organization. The more restricted the access 
to the main institutionalization processes of an international society, the stronger I will 
assume power effects to be. 
Reification means that the basic structural conditions of international society 
generated by the international institutions are taken for granted. This effect is of course 
hard to pin down, as it by definition concerns latent aspects that are not manifest in 
discourse. One way of dealing with this problem is to look at the degree to which 
discursive articulations of an institution are connected to explicit legitimizing 
arguments. For example, the virtual absence of a discourse legitimizing the restriction 
of national self-determination, and the hierarchy constituted by this interpretation, 
during the colonial era attests the naturalized status of these ideas.  
Vested interests are present when the relevant actors have preference structures 
that are conducive to the reproduction of existing institutions. The empirical observation 
                                                 
38  Unlike Keene, who uses a multi-dimensional framework to analyze the relative importance of different 
logics of stratification (material, social and legal), I adopt the more simplified view that generally, the 
power positions constituted by different international institutions, or in different power dimensions, 
will be more or less aligned. The view is thus rather one of an international society stratified along a 
single hierarchy. While Keene focuses on interstate relations, the concept can easily accommodate 
supranational and ‘world society’ actors. 
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of preferences is a longstanding problem of neo-liberal institutionalist literature, which 
has tried to circumvent the lack of means of direct observation by assuming ‘revealed 
preferences’, meaning that preferences can be observed from behaviour. I will take a 
slightly different, though similarly parsimonious, approach here, which infers 
preferences, on the one hand, from a simple assessment of the general distribution of 
benefits effectuated by the institution in question, and on the other, from discursive 
statements of actors. I thus ask two questions: first, who benefits from the allocation of 
resources, broadly understood to include pecuniary as well as security rents and social 
status? And second, what preferences do the actors express factually? If those benefiting 
the most are also the ones with privileged access to the reproducing institutionalization 
practices, then the feedback effects should be assumed to be strong. 
Institutional linkages are strong when the institutional configuration displays a 
high degree of consistency. I have argued that references to endogenous tensions 
provide oppositional actors with arguments justifying their discursive practice. If, 
however, the configuration is largely consistent, the strong institutional linkages will 
make criticism harder. In the empirical chapters, I therefore map out the relevant 
primary and secondary institutions that defined the institutional context at the point in 
time when calls for change first gained momentum in the discourse, and look for 
potential tensions in the configuration. This requires comparing the constitutive logic of 
different institutions, both within and between the two layers. Are all the institutions 
consistent with regard to the actors and the practice they identify as legitimate? Or are 
there conflicting expectations in the sense that a specific action can be judged as 
legitimate or illegitimate, depending on which institutionsʼ standard is applied? The less 
consistency I find, the weaker I assume institutional linkages are. 
The impact of these effects can be influenced by institutionalization practices. 
Drawing on specific discursive sources, subordinate actors can increase their authority, 
problematize apparently natural conditions, change preference structures and weaken 
institutional linkages. This is one of the core assumptions of my constitutive explanation 
of institutional change. As indicated in the theoretical section, an analysis of the social 
processes that make institutional change possible must consider two sources: exogenous 
shocks and endogenous dynamics. The two sources are not mutually exclusive, as it 
may well be that the discursive representation of a shock exacerbates dynamics that are 
internal to the institutional configuration itself. For example, the collapse of the colonial 
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empires of the UK and France beginning with the Second World War coincided with, 
and accelerated, an incremental discursive shift in the relation between, on the one hand, 
the institution of national self-determination and, on the other, the interpretation of 
sovereignty as a gradual concept applying first and foremost to the nation-states of the 
Western core of international society. Accordingly, the objective of the analysis is to 
determine the relative importance of the two sources in the particular instance of change 
in question, rather than making an either-or distinction. 
The analysis of these sources pays particular attention to oppositional voices at 
the onset of change. It is not so much the substance of the competing visions of 
international order that are central here but rather the justifications that are given for the 
call for change by those actors. On what grounds do some actors call the existing 
institutional configuration into question? If the texts mainly refer to a contingent and 
discrete event to delegitimize an institution and make change appear desirable, then we 
can assume such pressures to be exogenous, or shock-induced. Such arguments can 
take the form of describing the expectations of an existing institution as outdated or 
dysfunctional in light of certain events, or promoting new institutional expectations as 
timely or better equipped to fulfil certain functions. These events must not necessarily 
be punctual but can also take the form of longer-term processes, such as globalization. 
The relevant feature of a shock is not its ‘suddenness’ but the fact that it initially occurs 
outside of the institutional logic of constitution and institutionalization. 
If an external reference is missing and oppositional discourses refer to the 
institutional configuration as such, then endogenous dynamics should be assumed to be 
present. This can take the form of explicit references to contradictory expectations in 
order to delegitimize an institution. For example, socialist anti-colonial actors pointed to 
the inherent contradiction between the institution of national-self determination and the 
idea that the sovereignty of peripheral states could be compromised. Obviously, the 
opportunity to use this kind of discursive resource is influenced by the degree of 
consistency in the institutional configuration, which is analyzed in the previous step. 
Alternatively, the need for a new institution can be derived from an existing institution. 
For example, the ECJ began ascribing constitutional character to Community law on the 
grounds that the institution of pooled sovereignty constituted a relation between the 
individual, the nation-state and the supranational authorities which could not be 
accounted for under the premises of classical international law. 
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I have pointed out in Section 3.4.3 that shocks and endogenous dynamics are not 
transcendental events but only become relevant and actionable through certain 
discursive interpretations. Therefore, it is important to know not only the source of 
change as such but also the kind of interpretation that made the source discursively 
relevant and mobilized opposition – the process, in other words, that transformed it 
from a mere event into a motivation for acting towards institutional change. The 
discourse analysis follows this line of thinking by uncovering the main line of argument 
behind the discursive interventions that contest established institutions: why is the status 
quo considered to be in need of overhaul? Change can be constructed as a necessary and 
inevitable response to coercion, as an expedient choice to maximize utility or as a 
morally desirable act. Only if the argument resonates with the frames of thought of a 
large part of the audience, it will interrupt the feedback effects by changing power 
relations, deconstructing taken-for-granted perceptions, modifying interests and 
preferences, or putting institutional linkages into question have a chance of inducing 
change.  
Important aspects in this respect are points in time when a particular primary or 
secondary institution has become institutionalized. The theoretical implication is that in 
such instances, change in the institutions on one level has created a new constitutive 
context for institutionalization on the other. This context consists of discursive positions 
and meaning structures which either stabilize the institutional configuration by 
‘freezing’ tensions, or further destabilize it by affecting the feedback effects and thereby 
enabling certain actors to challenge the institutions on the other level 
(institutionalization). The former case is evidenced by instances where an institutional 
discourse on one of the two levels has become dominant, but this is not followed by 
institutional change on the other level. The latter case is marked by a discourse in which 
references to certain general expectations have become dominant and now calls for the 
creation or adaption of specific rules that apply to a certain regional organization in the 
same field become more pronounced, frequent and formalized – or vice versa, the 
formalization of certain secondary institutions in a regional organization is followed by 
an increase in interventions promoting expectations that apply more generally beyond 
the organization as such. In both cases, the analysis examines how change on one level 
affected the feedback effects and what results this had for institutionalization practices 
on the other: 
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 Did it create new power positions for the involved actors or leave them intact? 
The positional power of an actor or a group of actors, in this context, can be 
conceived to increase when influential texts ascribe new authority to them. This 
authority can come in different forms. It might be by a diffuse acknowledgement 
of equality or inequality between groups of actors, by concrete statements of 
specific rights or by defining rules of participation in the discourse, such as more 
or less restrictive decision-making procedures. 
 Did it create meaning structures that called into question taken-for-granted 
realities, or reinforce their reification? Hard evidence for de-naturalization is 
difficult to find, but the increasing need to legitimize previously taken-for-
granted assumptions may provide some indication. Coming back to the example 
given above, after the Second World War, colonial practices were increasingly 
dependent on being legitimized through the notion of development, which 
indicates an increasing problematization of the structural conditions of the 
international society in this period. 
 Did it alter preference structures or leave them intact? Based on the 
considerations outlined above, I examine whether the institutional change 
resulted in an altered distribution of resources. Such an altered distribution may 
mean that a certain practice is now rewarded or sanctioned differently. For 
example, the rise of a nationalist discourse in the Southeast Asian dependencies 
caused local elites to reorient their loyalties from collaborating with the foreign 
rulers towards supporting the independence movements, as local audiences were 
increasingly central for the acquisition of status and authority.  
 Did it freeze institutional dynamics by strengthening institutional linkages or 
catalyze further change by weakening them? Freezing can be assumed when the 
institutionalization contains implicit or explicit references to seemingly 
contradicting institutions on the respective other level. For example, the 
Bangkok Declaration of ASEAN froze the tension between the primary 
institutions of national self-determination and non-alignment in security and 
defence policies through ambiguous language in its provisions on foreign bases 
and accession criteria. Evidence for a catalyzing effect of institutionalization can 
be found when the call for new institutions on one level is explicitly justified by 
A methodology for analyzing change 
97 
 
reference to a previously established institution on the other level, but also when 
they are less explicitly connected – for example, when a primary institution is 
invoked in the preamble of a resolution calling for secondary institutional 
change. 
4.4.6 Structure of the narrative and summary 
Bringing together the analytical steps outlined above allows me to write a 
‘dialogical narrative’ of each instance of institutional change. This narrative does not 
precisely follow the sequence of analytical steps outlined above; instead, it consists of 
four parts in each case: first, I briefly outline the cases under study and determine the 
timeframe from the first calls for change until the formalization of new secondary 
institutions. Then, a section on the context of change describes the initial configuration 
of primary and secondary institutions at the beginning of the timeframe and outlines the 
main feedback effects. A third part then traces phases of institutional change and 
describes the sources of change on which the oppositional actors drew to challenge the 
existing institutional configuration. By showing which of the two institutional levels 
these challenges were targeting over time, I can discern different phases of 
institutionalization. Taking into account the impact of these institutionalization 
processes on the feedback effects, the narrative shows how change on one level 
achieved during a particular phase affected the chances for change on the other in the 
subsequent phase. 
As we have seen, the analytical tasks needed to produce this narrative are quite 
extensive. To give an overview, the basic elements are summarized in Table 3. It 
divides the elements of the approach elaborated above into distinct analytical steps and 
provides questions guiding each step. These questions are further specified in the above 
sub-sections but I do not provide clear-cut rules of evidence. For example, I do not 
employ a strict coding schema that provides me with exact criteria for when a text refers 
to a certain institution, or a certain source of change. This would neither reflect the 
interpretive research practice of most English School authors, some of which were quite 
vocal in rejecting such rigid research designs (Bull 1966a; Jackson 2009; Wight 1966), 
nor would it lend itself to a research question with an explicitly long-term, historical, 
and general perspective on institutional change. For this reason, the questions listed here 
are deliberately held rather open. 
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Table 3: Overview of analytical framework 
Analytical 
step 
Analytical tasks Guiding questions 
Collating 
discursive 
material 
Identify timeframe 
Identify texts 
Bring material in chronological 
order 
What is the key formalization event? 
When did the call for change in this 
dimension first emerge? 
Which sources have been identified as 
central texts on the issue at hand? 
Which other texts may be central because 
of intertextual references in other primary 
sources? 
When were the texts written? 
Map initial 
primary and 
secondary 
institutional 
context 
Draw on existing academic 
literature for heuristic ideas 
about existing institutions and 
attempt to reproduce them 
Extract expectations relating to 
the relevant functional 
dimensions from the early texts 
Triangulate findings from both 
analyses  
Distinguish between primary 
and secondary institutions on the 
basis of formalization 
What institutions have been identified by 
other authors? 
Does this conform to my reading of the 
texts? What other expectations are 
formulated with respect to the dimension 
in question? 
Who is defined as a legitimate actor? 
How are relations between the actors 
understood? 
Which parts of the texts relate to (actual 
or attempted) formalization and which do 
not? 
A methodology for analyzing change 
99 
 
Tracing 
institutional 
changes 
Map discursive field 
Identify sources for contestation 
Trace changes on both levels 
over time 
Which actors defended the existing 
configuration? Which actors opposed it? 
What justifications do oppositional actors 
give for their challenges to existing 
institutions? Do they refer to existing 
institutions or external events? Why do 
they perceive the institution to be in need 
of overhaul (inevitable response to 
coercion, lack of effectiveness, or lack of 
legitimacy?) 
 
Which institutional level was the focal 
point of the discursive struggle? When did 
actors emphasize (actual or attempted) 
formalization, and when did they not? 
When was a given set of expectations 
firmly institutionalized (by means of 
formalization or its general acceptance)? 
Analyzing 
constitutive 
mechanisms 
Analyze feedback effects  
Analyze impact of discursive 
practice on feedback effects 
To what degree was the institutional 
configuration stabilized by power effects, 
reification, vested interests and 
institutional linkages? 
How did discursive practices affect these 
mechanisms? Did shifts from primary to 
secondary institutionalization strengthen 
or weaken them? 
Writing the 
narrative 
Outline case study 
Map initial institutional 
configuration and feedback 
effects (context) 
Describe and explain phases of 
institutional change (account for 
institutional practices and their 
impact on feedback effects) 
 
  
 
  
PART II: THE CASES OF EUROPE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
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5 Decolonization: collapsing empires and the emergence of 
regional organizations 
The emergence of regional organizations in Europe and Southeast Asia started 
early in the second half of the 20th century. The European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) was established by the Treaty of Paris in 1951. Plans for a European Defence 
Community (EDC) took form in 1952 but were later buried due to their rejection by the 
French National Assembly. In 1957, representatives of the six member states of the 
ECSC39 signed the Treaties of Rome, which created the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom) and the European Economic Community (EEC). Of the three 
Communities, the EEC with its goal of establishing a customs union and a common 
market was the most far-reaching in terms of intervening in formerly national 
competences. 
In Southeast Asia, several early attempts at fostering inter-state cooperation 
failed. The Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) was founded in 1954 under 
U.S. leadership as a kind of complement to NATO but quickly fell into obscurity. The 
governments of Malayia40, the Philippines and Thailand formed the short-lived 
Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) in 1961, which remained equally insignificant. In 
reaction to this failure, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia launched a number of 
agreements under the heading of Maphilindo in 1963, but the cooperation dismantled 
only weeks after its inception due to the policy of konfrontasi (confrontation) adopted 
by the Indonesian government against its Malaysian neighbour. Only after the 
resolution of the conflict in 1967 did the attempts at forming a regional organization 
finally gain traction. The foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand convened to sign the Bangkok Declaration establishing 
ASEAN. 
As pointed out in Chapter 2, the fledging Comparative Regionalism literature 
has developed various theoretical arguments about the emergence of regional 
organizations. It points to power-political, domestic and ideational factors as well as to 
functional demands and diffusion processes. By contrast, due to its focus on synchronic 
                                                 
39  These were Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands. 
40  Malaya was the name of the federation which existed on the Malay Peninsula until the formation of the 
state of Malaysia in 1963. 
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explanatory factors, it has largely ignored processes of decolonization and their 
historical legacy for regionalism in different parts of the world. Even studies that adopt 
a historical perspective do usually not focus on colonialism and its demise but on the 
regional repercussions of the global Cold War and superpower influence (Beeson 2005; 
Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002; Katzenstein 2005). This is regrettable because the 
particular importance of colonial, de-colonial and post-colonial experiences for 
regionalism around the world has been described as one of the main potential insights 
from more comparative perspectives (Acharya 2012). 
In a rare exception, Domínguez (2007) acknowledges that ‘international rules’ in 
emerged among the newly independent states in Latin America, transforming colonial 
legacies such as imperial territories into regional principles and norms such as a respect 
for inherited boundaries. He also argues that these legacies informed the shape of the 
Organization of American States (OAS). Domínguez does not inquire into the 
discursive struggles that accompanied the construction of these primary institutions, or 
ask to what extent their translation into formal rules and procedures was contested or 
incomplete. While it is possible that the institutionalization processes were rather 
unproblematic in Latin America, the same does certainly not apply to Southeast Asia 
and Europe, where tensions between and disagreement over different normative claims 
and organizational models were quite pronounced, as the following analysis will show.  
I argue that the initial efforts of building regional organizations in Europe and 
Southeast Asia – per definition one of the critical moments in the regional 
organizational pathways – were closely connected to broader processes of 
decolonization and their normative ramifications. Regional organizations emerged as 
the colonial international society, which had covered virtually the whole globe, 
unravelled. By consequence, questions of boundary-drawing came to the fore, both in 
geographical and in normative terms: cutting colonial ties gave rise to various regional 
ideologies such as pan-Africanism, pan-Arabism, pan-Asianism and pan-Europeanism, 
each of which ultimately sought to establish their own primary and secondary 
institutions. This required thinking not only about what types of practices and 
understandings of actorness should guide regional affairs, but also who could be 
legitimate interaction partners beyond the region and how the relations with those 
external actors should be defined. 
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This chapter focuses on the latter set of questions and sees the construction of 
primary and secondary institutions concerning external relations as an indispensable 
element in the emergence of regional organizations. By establishing and maintaining 
norms and rules differentiating between members and non-members, organizations 
attain an inside-outside distinction necessary for their emergence and maintenance. For 
Europe, the question of external relations materialized mainly in the discourse about 
relations with ‘overseas territories’ in the context of the creation of the EEC. The 
discussions eventually resulted in the creation of the Association framework for 
development policy in the early 1960s. In Southeast Asia, negotiators argued over 
guidelines for ASEAN member states’ security relations with major states – including 
former colonial powers.  
The following analysis demonstrates that these developments in the secondary 
institutions of the two regional organizations were related to transformations in the 
primary institutional context of the global international society and, subsequently, the 
emerging regional international societies. It is organized in three main sections. The first 
section will outline the main relevant primary institutions characterizing the global 
colonial international society and show how discursive contestation resulted in the 
demise of those institutions, focusing on actors from Europe and Southeast Asia. To 
narrow down the scope of the inquiry, the focus on the primary level will be on how the 
institutions of gradual sovereignty and concert of empire became subject of anti-
colonial critique. These two can be seen as the colonial core institutions because they 
chiefly define the stratified nature of the colonial international society. The second and 
third sections then deal with how the emergence of regional organizations in the two 
regions was related to attempts of building primary institutions expressing post-colonial 
standards of legitimacy. I will focus on the institutionalization of primary and secondary 
institutions concerning external actors because, as I argued above, it is a necessary – 
although not sufficient – condition for the emergence and maintenance of regional 
organizations. 
5.1 Challenging the colonial international society 
The colonial international society that existed roughly until the 1950s was of an 
virtually global reach and a case can be made that there neither existed a Southeast 
Asian nor a genuinely European international society prior to its dismantling. In fact, 
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Southeast Asia as a regional concept was not in common use prior to the establishment 
of the Allied South East Asia Command in 1943 (Katzenstein 2005: 54; Tarling 2001a: 
3–4). There were other geographical notions that partially overlapped with this space, 
such as the Indies, East Indies, Farther/Further India or the Malay Archipelago 
(Encyclopedia Britannica 1902: 487–491). However, these were mainly tied to the 
representation of colonial possessions by individual Western states, and therefore 
constituted territorial claims rather than a coherent regional identity, let alone regionally 
specific institutions. 
With regard to Europe, there definitely existed a regional concept and possibly 
even a collective identity. However, if there had been a genuinely European 
international society at some point in time, its boundaries had shifted fundamentally by 
the beginning of the 20th century: first, a considerable number of non-European polities 
such as Japan and the U.S. had acquired membership as sovereign states; second, if we 
depart from the classical Grotian view of international society as constituted by a group 
of sovereign equal states and instead allow for more hierarchical and nuanced 
conceptions of international society (Keene 2014; Wæver 1996; Watson 1992), one sees 
that what existed in the first half of the 20th century was not a European but a global, 
albeit highly ‘stratified’ (Keene 2014) global international society. Its institutions 
constituted a core-periphery structure, the core being made up by a small number of 
sovereign states while the periphery consisted of a large number of dependent and semi-
dependent polities (Bull 1984a: 124–125; Buzan and Little 2000: 337).41  
In the process of decolonization, the primary and secondary institutions of this 
stratified international society became increasingly challenged and eventually replaced 
by institutions that constituted more regionally oriented social spaces – even before the 
actual creation of regional organizations. This chapter traces these developments, 
starting with an outline of the institutional configuration at the outset. 
Some historians have depicted decolonization as a process driven mainly by the 
imperial powers themselves, spurred by cost-benefit estimates that made overseas 
possessions appear increasingly as economic or geostrategic liabilities (Darwin 1991; 
Springhall 2001: 13–17). It is not the purpose of this study to evaluate the significance 
                                                 
41  The conceptualization of international societies – or states-systems, in his parlance – in core-periphery 
terms goes back to Wight (1977: 42-43). 
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of these calculations for domestic imperial policies. However, while such considerations 
may have had a profound effect on domestic colonial policies in specific cases, they did 
not affect the general institutional configuration of the colonial international society as a 
whole, at least in the initial post-war years. As the following analysis of shows, pro-
active and deliberate renunciations of colonial practices were decidedly not a dominant 
part of the discourse in Europe, and strictly anti-imperialist positions remained 
marginalized until at least the late 1950s. By contrast, powerful discursive challenges to 
the colonialist institutions of gradual sovereignty and the concert of empires in the 
periphery mobilized resistance to colonial practices, which eventually led to the collapse 
of colonial secondary institutions. 
5.1.1 Institutional context 
With the consolidation of foreign rule in the non-Western communities, the 
institutions of the colonial international society were shared in the sense of being 
accepted as valid by actors both in the core and the periphery. The fact that those 
institutions constituted a highly stratified international society and were primarily 
upheld by force makes their legitimacy questionable but does not put their existence 
into doubt. What did the institutional configuration of this international society look 
like? In the following, I will give a short overview over the main primary and secondary 
institutions as well as the feedback effects surrounding their reproduction. The focus is 
on those institutions constituting the international society’s stratified structures. 
Primary institutions 
The first of these was a gradual conception of sovereignty. In this 
interpretation, sovereignty was not an absolute, natural right but seen in direct relation 
to a teleological conception of civilizational advancement (Gong 1984b). Therefore, full 
sovereign statehood was granted only to a core of civilized polities. It was expected that 
in the periphery, authority could be penetrated to varying degrees by the imperial states 
which had established protectorates and colonies. In these territories, governmental 
authority was often not centralized but divided between local rulers and an imperial 
administration that held far-reaching prerogatives, especially concerning foreign policy 
and international representation. This was legitimized by reference to the idea of 
trusteeship: a ‘civilized’ state could assume governing powers over a less advanced 
people until their development allowed them to be left to self-government (Louis 1984).  
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Whether and when this paternalistic relationship was to be terminated was 
determined by their degree of development (Anghie 2005) or by the ‘standard of 
civilization’, a set of preconditions to be fulfilled before membership as an autonomous 
actor in international society would be granted by the established core members (Gong 
1984b). While it was created initially by European states as a benchmark for accrediting 
equal status to external states and as such narrowly defined the boundaries of the 
community of sovereign equal states (Stivachtis 2014: 113), the standard of civilization 
was a shared institution beyond European borders insofar as polities beyond Europe 
recognized it as a linchpin for ensuring independence and indeed aspired to fulfil it 
(Gong 1984a), as Siam successfully did in Southeast Asia.  
Second, and closely related to this gradual notion of sovereignty, was the 
primary institution of a concert of national empires. What I mean by this is the 
dominant role of a few major powers within the core, which recognized each other as 
sovereign-equal but successfully claimed supremacy in the periphery. While this 
imperial system contained strong elements of competition over territorial control, it was 
to some extent based on informal coordination. Although their analysis is limited to the 
period from 1870 to 1914, Puchala’s and Hopkins’ (1983: 68) assessment that a notion 
of constraint, equity and “international management over selected parts of the non-
European world” was present among the imperial powers holds true also for much of 
the first half of the 20th century. An early expression of this coordination was the Berlin 
Conference in 1884 and 1885, which established norms and principles such as that of 
‘effective occupation’, according to which colonial claims had to be supported by actual 
territorial control (Hansen and Jonsson 2014: 33–34). 
A characteristic element of imperial concert can be found in the tacit or explicit 
agreements on spheres of influence and neutral ‘buffer states’ such as the Siamese 
Kingdom in the periphery (Tarling 2001b: 49). It was expected that the polities in one 
power’s sphere of influence do not hold relations with other major powers, nor that a 
major power interfere in another’s sphere of influence (Puchala and Hopkins 1983: 68). 
It thus becomes obvious that the special role of national empires impacted deeply on the 
logic of territoriality in international society: within the core, territoriality was based on 
the principle of nationality. Meanwhile, in the periphery, the logic of territoriality was 
based on the colonial interests and power relations of the empires (Puchala and Hopkins 
1983: 68; Tarling 2001b: 91–92). One of the consequences of this logic was the 
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fragmentation of social structure in the periphery, where individual polities were to limit 
their interaction to relations with the metropole and refrain from establishing political 
ties with other peripheral polities (Galtung 1973: 42–43). This impacted on the global 
economy, as intra-imperial trade relations conflicted with the idea of global free trade. It 
also precluded the construction of a regional international society in the Southeast Asian 
periphery. 
Third, while the state was seen as the paramount source of legitimate force in 
international relations, both externally and internally, the notion of national self-
determination bound the execution of sovereign state rights in form and substance to 
the will of a people with a collective identity living under its rule. By means of the 
principle of nationality, the state was also the source of identity of individuals in the 
international realm: only by virtue of belonging to a specific state did people require 
international status and certain political rights. Statelessness and double nationality were 
seen as an abnormality to be eradicated (Convention on Certain Questions Relating to 
the Conflict of Nationality Law 1930, preamble). The institution of national self-
determination was not a stratifying concept in principle but its actual distribution of 
these rights was unequal, as indigenous populations of colonies and protectorates did 
not necessarily assume the full status of citizenship as the people in the core, although 
in the case of France, the populations of its colonies were regarded as French citizens. 
In general, imperial administrations were not obliged to apply the same principles 
regarding nationality to them as to their home population, not least because it would 
have blurred the distinction between the civilized and the non-civilized (Convention on 
Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law 1930: Art. 29; Société des 
Nations 1922: 88).  
To these three could be added other primary institutions that also displayed a 
stratified logic. For example, international law at that time displayed a dual structure, 
meaning that its applicability was dependent on the recognition as a sovereign state, 
which was not decided upon on the basis of a codified catalogue of requirements but 
generally granted or denied by the established members of international society (Anghie 
2005: 53–54; Gong 1984a: 179). Equally, the institution of peaceful dispute settlement 
reserved the right to use force in conflicts to exceptional cases of self-defence but 
conferred this right only to those actors enjoying full status as a member of international 
society, i.e. independent nation-states. Finally, the institution of diplomacy limited the 
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access of representatives of the periphery to the circles of authoritative communication 
and the ability to establish diplomatic contacts among themselves (see Satow 1922: 
190–191). However, I would argue that these asymmetries largely reflect the stratified 
nature of other primary institutions, rather than producing them. For example, the 
asymmetries of diplomatic principles and norms can be traced back to the fact that 
sovereignty was seen as a gradual, rather than absolute, concept. For this reason, I focus 
on the institutions of gradual sovereignty, concert of empires and national self-
determination here. 
Secondary institutions 
A number of secondary institutions existed alongside these primary institutions. 
I cannot go into much detail here and will only provide a basic overview. Generally, 
much like today, multilateral and bilateral secondary institutions co-existed. Among the 
former can be counted the rules and procedures of the League of Nations, which was 
the dominant, albeit seriously flawed, international organization of the interwar period. 
The creation of the League was mainly informed by ideas about collective security, but 
through its Mandates System, according to which member states could assume authority 
over foreign communities formerly under German or Ottoman rule, it also had a 
connection to questions of colonialism. 
Other secondary institutions include the multilateral treaties specifying rules 
for a peaceful international order. Some of these installed mechanisms of collective 
security, such as the Locarno Pact, while other treaties defined goals of disarmament, 
such as the Naval Treaties of Washington. Both types were mainly concluded by major 
powers of the core of the international society. There were also multilateral treaties that 
aimed at preserving a particular territorial status quo in the periphery. The Four Power 
Treaty between France, Japan, the UK and the U.S., which was concluded at the same 
conference as the Naval Treaties and which secured the respective parties’ possessions 
in the Pacific, can serve as an example.42 
                                                 
42  A type of secondary institutions left out of this overview are multilateral conventions that followed the 
overarching objective of codifying and specifying established principles of conduct of international 
law, primarily in the field of peaceful dispute settlement. Examples include the Geneva Conventions, 
the Paris Peace Conventions of 1864 and 1906 and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. They are 
of minor interest to this analysis because their structural logic was not as clearly stratified as that of the 
other secondary institutions. 
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Finally, there was the plethora of bilateral treaties between members of 
international society. It is, of course, impossible to account for their contents here. 
However, two general patterns can be discerned: first, the core of international society 
functioned as a hub of a system of bilateral treaties, so that actors from the periphery 
often had contractual relations with only one European state, while European states 
concluded treaties with a large number of other actors from the core and the periphery.43 
Some of the core-to-core treaties delineated the boundaries of imperial control in the 
periphery, such as the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale or the Franco-Italian Agreement 
of 1935, which both determined spheres of influence in African territories. Second, 
while the treaties among the core states were generally based on notions of reciprocity, 
European states drew on the tradition of unequal treaties in their dealings with the 
periphery. The most common examples are treaties granting extraterritorial jurisdiction 
to Western powers in semi-sovereign states under their influence, which provided for 
religious freedoms, but also immunities and exemption from taxation for people from 
the core. Although the heyday of this practice was the 19th century and there was 
increasing resistance against it, it was still common during the first half of the 20th 
century (Satow 1922: 251–328). This was facilitated by a treaty law that recognized the 
validity of treaties concluded under duress (Bull 1984b: 217; Stivachtis 2014: 115). 
Feedback effects 
Taken together, the primary and secondary institutions of the colonial 
international society constituted a starkly stratified structure of highly unequal power 
relations between the core and the periphery. This institutional configuration was far 
from monolithic. There was an increasing social mobility – meaning that, through 
various forms of ‘accession’ to the community of sovereign nations, states could move 
from the core to the periphery – and the reproduction of the institutional set-up suffered 
some serious blows by anti-colonial uprisings (Springhall 2001), the declining 
importance of the League as well as its inability to respond to crises such as in 
Abyssinia in 1935 and 1936, and the aggressive ideology of fascism. Considering these 
challenges, the principal logic of stratification remained remarkably stable until the 
outbreak of the Second World War. This relative stability of international society during 
                                                 
43  Keene (2014) describes this phenomenon for the 19th and early 20th century, but it extends in principle 
to the entire first half of the 20th century, albeit with a larger and expanding core. 
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the interwar period can be attributed to the feedback effects surrounding its international 
institutions (cf. Puchala and Hopkins 1983: 87). 
Power effects were obviously very strong up until the interwar period. The 
primary and secondary institutions were created mainly by a community of influential 
state representatives. Bull (1984b: 217) notes that up until 1945, the evolution of 
primary institutions was dominated by a group of international lawyers and politicians 
of mostly European origin. For example, the single most important moment of 
institutionalization of the interwar international order was the Paris Peace Conference of 
1919, which was dominated by the ‘Five Great Powers’ represented in the Supreme 
Council of the allied victors, namely the U.S., the UK, France, Italy, and Japan.44 While 
they aimed at setting the seal on the dismantling of the defeated old European empires, 
they ensured at the same time that their own imperial interests beyond Europe were 
kept. Although the core of fully sovereign states was growing, a large part of the non-
Western world was still granted limited or no access at all to the conference (Mishra 
2013: 192–194, 199–200). This concentration of decision-making was also 
institutionalized in the Council of the League of Nations,45 which comprised the major 
imperial powers, and which could for example define the exact degree of colonial 
control in the framework of the Mandate System (Société des Nations 1921: 5). Based 
on an exclusive logic, which connected autonomous actorness to being identified as 
‘civilized’, the institutions perpetuated the unequal capabilities of claiming authority. 
Insofar as non-European elites of the periphery participated in this process, they were 
normally educated in European institutions and acculturated to Western ways of 
thinking.  
Power effects are also, and more obviously, recognizable in the unequal treaties 
on the secondary institutional level, where local rulers were stripped to varying degrees 
of their authority. Once established, these conditions were seldom seriously challenged 
by local actors for a number of reasons: first, compliance could be enforced by the 
imperial party, who disposed over superior military power (cf. Puchala and Hopkins 
                                                 
44  Some accounts of the events ascribe the leading role merely to the Council of the ‘Big Fourʼ Western 
powers, but Satow (1922: 190) notes that a Japanese member was included in the proceedings of the 
Council. 
45  Similar to the UN Security Council, the League Council was formed by four permanent and four non-
permanent members. The permanent members were the UK, France, Italy and Japan. The U.S. was not 
a member of the League because Congress refused to ratify the Versailles Treaty establishing the 
League. 
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1983: 69) and in some cases also over coercive measures in the dependent territory, 
such as para-military colonial police forces and penal or convict labour systems as a 
means to suppress resistance. 
Second, a discourse that tied the right to self-determination to purported 
civilizational advancement reified colonial institutions, as it deprived independence 
movements of a potentially powerful basis for legitimate authority by effectively 
denying them recognition as legitimate actors. However, the impact of this effect was 
arguably limited and seriously weakened at least since the early 1900s. Mishra (2013) 
has described how the Russian defeat in the war against Japanese forces in 1905 helped 
anti-imperial agents in Asia deconstruct the image of the seemingly invincible West and 
spark hopes for independence. A growing assertiveness and demand for recognition by 
actors from territories under foreign dominance thus increasingly worked against the 
reification of international society’s stratification. Similarly, the First World War had 
unveiled the destructive potential of imperialism, which could be interpreted either as a 
sign of the West’s moral nihilism or of the necessary epiphenomenon of a capitalist 
world order. Either way, it delegitimized Western claims to act as a guarantor of peace, 
wealth and stability. As formulated by the League against Imperialism (1927), 
[t]he world-war and its consequences clearly showed [...] that imperialist 
colonial capitalism, and capitalism in general was its own grave-digger. The 
explosion of the worldwar not only revealed the amazing internal dissessions 
[sic!] by which capitalist society was torn, but millions of men had to lose their 
lives in the attempt to adjust and smooth over these dissensions.  
Third, local elites often had vested interests in upholding the institutions, as 
their preferences were aligned with those of the core states. From the collaborateurs in 
French Cochinchina to the Anglo-Burmese and Indian officials in Burma, a cooperative 
local bureaucracy, often actively recruited by the colonial power, executed 
administrative tasks and thus helped in upholding the institutions of colonial rule in 
exchange for receiving a privileged status within the system and for being protected 
from challenges by rival groups or ethnical or religious violence (Anderson and 
Killingray 1991; Benda 1965; Puchala and Hopkins 1983: 69).  
Finally, institutional linkages exist both between primary institutions, and 
between primary and secondary level. Starting with the latter, it should suffice to point 
to a number of vertical linkages between the secondary institutions of the League of 
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Nations and the primary institutions to demonstrate their pervasiveness: first, the 
membership rules enshrined in the League Covenant explicitly allows dominions and 
colonies to become members and thus effectively legitimized the idea of gradual 
sovereignty. It is also instructive to look at the exact wording of the Mandates System, 
which confers the right to govern other territories in the name of the League. This is to 
say that the legitimization of foreign rule did not emanate from the respective 
populations of the mandate territories but was transferred by the League (cf. Société des 
Nations 1921: 5). The limited applicability of self-determination finds its specification 
in administrative rules here. The type of mandate, and consequently the degree to which 
sovereignty was assumed by an outside power, was classified into three categories 
according, among other criteria, to the “stage of the development of the people” 
(League of Nations 1919: Art. 24). The Mandate System emphasized that the ultimate 
goal was to lead the mandates into independence but there were no set time frames for 
its achievement (Anghie 2005). In fact, even among the ‘Class A’ mandates of more 
‘advanced’ peoples, only Iraq was able to achieve independence by the time of the 
outbreak of the Second World War (Springhall 2001: 23). 
Thus, while it contained the long-perspective of overcoming colonial structures, 
the Mandates System had the immediate effect of translating the primary institution of 
gradual sovereignty into specific rules and procedures. The privileged position of the 
members of the League Council,46 meanwhile, fostered their dominant position in the 
concert of empires. Similar institutional linkages to the institutions of gradual 
sovereignty and concert of empires can also be found in other secondary institutions. 
For example, the formal rules regarding security cooperation of the Four Power Treaty 
are connected to an assertion of the major powers’ claims to imperial territorial control 
in the periphery.47 
However, when it comes to horizontal linkages between primary institutions, a 
fundamental tension existed between the institutions of gradual sovereignty and the 
concert of empires, on the one hand, and national self-determination on the other. The 
                                                 
46  Similar to the UN Security Council, the League Council was formed by four permanent and four non-
permanent members. The permanent members were the UK, France, Italy and Japan. The U.S. was not 
a member of the League because Congress refused to ratify the Versailles Treaty establishing the 
League. 
47  The preamble describes the parties as acting “with a view to the preservation of the general peace and 
the maintenance of their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the 
region of the Pacific Ocean [...]” (Four-Power Treaty 1921). 
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constitutive logics of these institutions are ultimately irreconcilable: while the former 
enabled actors of the core to restrict self-government in the periphery, the latter bound 
the right to exert authority to the will of local political communities. As the further 
analysis will show, anti-colonial actors drew on this tension as a source to legitimize 
their calls for a demise of the stratified institutions of the colonial international society. 
5.1.2 Institutional change 
The preceding account shows that there were limits to the stabilizing effects 
surrounding the institutions of the colonial international society. However, it took a 
major shock, namely the Second World War, to finally dismantle the stratified global 
international institutions. The complex dynamics surrounding this process led to the 
emergence of distinct regional international societies but at the same time 
fundamentally transformed the institutional configuration on the global level. Due to 
this parallel manifestation on different levels, decolonization can be analyzed from a 
variety of different angles, depending on the preferred level of analysis – domestic, 
regional or global (cf. Springhall 2001: 4–17). The following analysis focuses on the 
challenges to colonial institutions emerging from actors in two regions, Europe and 
Southeast Asia. In this, I will take domestic or global discourses into account where 
they help to explain institutionalization practices on the regional level. This is an 
analytical choice based on the overarching goal of explaining the emergence and 
institutional transformation of regional international societies, and should not be 
understood as an argument that domestic or global dynamics had no bearing on the 
process of decolonization. 
Early anti-colonialism 
Discursive interventions in favour of decolonization were frequent already in the 
interwar period. The first half of the 20th century saw the emergence of a variety of anti-
colonial mass movements in the dependent territories in Southeast Asia.48 While these 
were of a diverse nature, three main currents can be identified: Islamic reform 
movements such as the Sarekat Islam in what was then the Dutch East Indies 
(Indonesia), nationalist movements such as the Dong Du Movement in the Vietnamese 
part of Indochina and the socialist parties which were springing up in nearly all the 
                                                 
48  With the exception of Siam/Thailand, all of today’s Southeast Asian nation-states had been part of the 
colonial empires of Europe and, in the case of the Philippines, the U.S. 
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colonial dependencies of the European powers. While each of these strands drew on 
earlier epigones and intellectual forerunners (Mishra 2013), and there had been revolts 
against Western rule before, it was only after the turn of the century that mass 
mobilization was truly taking root in Southeast Asia. Their political demands were 
obviously diverse but often focused on concrete practices that were perceived as unjust, 
and which had their roots in secondary institutions. For example, Vietnamese socialist 
leader Ho Chi Minh (1961) criticized exploitative working conditions, repressive legal 
systems and the League of Nations, which he saw as the ‘general staff’ of imperialism. 
Despite the fact that some of these movements represented explicitly 
transnational identities, they formed within the patterns of territoriality set by the 
colonial powers, and their political goals were mostly connected to national reference 
points. Therefore, their discourses did not primarily concern themselves with 
international society in its entirety but with local manifestations of an international 
order. Southeast Asia’s socialists, for example, were able to establish some fragile 
transnational ties, and delegations were sent to the 1927 Conference of the League 
against Imperialism from Indonesia, Indochina and the Philippines. However, while 
socialist discourses made use of a shared rhetoric, national independence of the 
respective polity was the paramount goal (see for example Indochinese Communist 
Party 1998). Lenin’s (1977a) works on Imperialism and Colonialism provided the 
ideological justification for this intersection between and amalgamation of nationalist 
and socialist thought, which later found its manifestation in united liberation fronts 
including communists, bourgeois and even the monarchy, as for example in the 
Vietnamese struggle for independence. In the context of the weak positional power of 
anti-colonial actors and the lack of a transnational infrastructure, such temporal 
alliances were very well justifiable. 
In Europe, anti-colonial positions were initially less pronounced. With the 
exception of some anti-imperialist and pacifist movements, most notably the 
Communist International and its League against Imperialism founded in 1927, a broad 
imperial consensus pervaded the political landscape of the major European states. This 
included Germany, which had lost its dependencies following the First World War but 
made efforts to reinstate its colonial claims throughout the Weimar Republic, e.g. 
through the Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft (Hansen and Jonsson 2014: 44–45). Even the 
Socialist International did not take a clear anti-imperialist stance at that time (Ho Chi 
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Minh 1998). If political actors did challenge the colonial system, it was with the 
geopolitical aim of perfecting territorial control and optimizing access to resources, 
rather than abandoning it. The first pan-European transnational advocacy groups 
connected this colonial reformism to their ideas about European integration. The most 
vocal of these demands came from Richard Coudenhove-Kalergiʼs Paneuropean Union, 
which in its call for a European union included the vision of a joint management of 
Europeʼs colonies, especially in Africa, for both economic and geopolitical reasons 
(Coudenhove-Kalergi 1923; Hansen and Jonsson 2014: 27–31). Similar ideas were put 
forth by the Federalist Union in the UK (Müller 2001). 
Tying up European integration to communitarized colonialism, these actors 
challenged the classical concert of national empires but did not call into question the 
institution of gradual sovereignty. While the Paneuropean idea and the closely related 
concept of ‘Eurafrica’ gained considerable support in diplomatic circles between the 
World Wars, it was opposed by a dominant discourse of national imperialism in the 
metropolitan governments (Hansen and Jonsson 2014: 55–56), especially in the UK, 
which had a strong preference for developing its relations with the Dominions and 
colonies within the Commonwealth framework, rather than in a joint European project. 
In sum, the initial discursive field in Europe was characterized by three main strands: a 
small faction promoting leftist anti-imperialism, integrationist reformists, and defenders 
of the established institutions of national imperialism. 
Anti-colonialists in both Europe and Southeast Asia tried to legitimize their 
claims by pointing to the institutional tensions outlined above. Communist anti-
imperialism was inspired by Leninist thoughts on the necessary connection between 
national liberation and social revolution in oppressed countries (Lenin 1977a). The main 
argument was that the application the right to national self-determination could not 
logically be restricted to the core of capitalist countries, which is why the institutions of 
gradual sovereignty and the concert of empires must be abandoned (Lenin 1977b). 
Expressing this view, Indonesian political leader Sukarno declared in October 1945:  
Indonesians will never understand why it is, for instance, wrong for the Germans 
to rule Holland [under wartime occupation] if it is right for the Dutch to rule 
Indonesia. In either case the right to rule rests on pure force and not on the 
sanction of the populations. (cited in Klose 2015: 51) 
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In response to this perceived hypocrisy, the peoples of the periphery should turn the 
institutionʼs claims against its inventors. The Manifesto of the Brussels Congress of the 
League against Imperialism (1927) reads: “In their inexcusable struggle against each 
other the imperialist powers were themselves forced to announce the solution of self-
determination. The oppressed, enslaved peoples took the Imperialists at their word 
[...].”49  
However, the feedback effects outlined above seriously limited the impact of 
these challenges to colonial institutions. This is particularly true for political activists in 
the colonial territories. Mobilization capacities were hindered by lack of material 
resources and low levels of literacy, but also by censorship and more physical means of 
repression, such as the crackdowns on the revolt initiated by the Partai Komunis 
Indonesia in the late 1920s and Sukarnoʼs nationalist movement in 1933, and the Saya 
San rebellion in Burma in 1930, which were often accompanied by the exilation or 
imprisonment of the movementsʼ leaders (Springhall 2001: 27–28). What is more, as 
most political entities were products of a colonial logic of territoriality, not all anti-
colonial movements could draw on a mobilizing narrative of a historical national 
collective to support their claims by appealing to the primary institution of national self-
determination.  
The Second World War and its impact on feedback effects 
The Second World War was the single-most important shock catalyzing 
decolonization as it fundamentally disturbed the feedback effects. First, it disrupted 
power effects by perfecting the ascendance of the declaredly anti-imperialist 
superpowers (Puchala and Hopkins 1983: 73). It was particularly the U.S. that put 
pressure on apologists of colonial institutions in Western Europe, be it by acting as a 
champion of sovereign equality through the new-founded UN – which enshrined 
national self-determination and indivisible national sovereignty in the Charter, and 
condemned Dutch repression of Indonesian independence movements in the infamous 
‘Police Actions’ – or by using Marshall Aid assistance as a bargaining chip (Garavini 
2012: 9–10; Springhall 2001: 36–37). While the European governments endorsed 
                                                 
49  As a further tension, the contradiction between the imperial competition for spheres of influence and 
the emphasis on peaceful dispute settlement was raised: “The sturggle [sic!] of the groups of 
imperialist powers for the last stretches of territory which had not yet been finally parceled out, for a 
fresh division of the world led finally to the greatest catastrophe and to the greatest crime in the history 
of humanity, to the world war” (League against Imperialism 1927). 
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efforts to establish a new global order in principle and quickly acceded to the UN, their 
attitudes towards emphasis in subsequent UN activities on the primary institution of 
sovereign equality remained lukewarm (Springhall 2001: 10–11). 
However, in a more immediate sense, the Second World War also disrupted 
power effects by radically altering the relative distribution of positional power from the 
colonial metropoles to the actors in the periphery. In the course of the Second World 
War, starting with the invasion of Indochina in 1940, Japanese forces occupied almost 
all of Southeast Asia. The Japanese actively supported the development of nationalist 
political activity in some countries – albeit within narrow confines and mainly as an 
anti-Allied instrument (Christie 1998: 88). When the Japanese retreated from the 
occupied territories in 1945, a political vacuum opened up in many places which could 
be filled by those nationalist movements. Where this opportunity was seized, a part of 
the broad front of nationalist movements could draw on a massive surge in authority 
virtually overnight. Starting in Southeast Asia, and spreading to other regions, the 
wartime events allowed nationalist liberation movements to occupy the political centre 
stage. The ensuing anti-colonial uprisings that drew European colonial powers into 
conflicts in places such as Indochina, Algeria and Egypt can be seen as aftershocks to 
the great catalyzing events of the war. 
The war also speeded up the deconstruction of reified colonial institutions by 
putting the atrocities of imperialist powers on display. Rather than appearing as the 
natural order of things, the expansion of German forces in Europe and Japanese 
occupiers in Southeast Asia highlighted the deeply inhumane character and potentially 
catastrophic consequences of foreign dominance. In Europe, the transnationally shared 
experience of wartime resistance to fascism and occupation served to partially 
delegitimize nationalism, racism and imperialism, at least in its most aggressive variants 
(Kahler 1984: 159; Springhall 2001: 29). The war also further contributed to the 
debunking of the myth of Western empires as benign protectors. The fact that the 
European occupants so easily surrendered their colonies and ‘protectorates’ to Japan 
served to further delegitimize their claim to act as guarantors of stability, a fact decried 
among others by Burmese leader Aung San (2010). 
The war also affected the preferences of actors that had hitherto been supportive 
of colonial institutions and therefore dissolved vested interests. In Europe, the 
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usefulness of a loose concert of national empires as a way of managing conflicts was 
put into question as threat perceptions were exacerbated. The Message to Europeans 
issued at the Council of Europeʼs Congress in The Hague in 1948 illustrates this point:  
Alone, no one of our countries can hope seriously to defend its independence. 
Alone, no one of our countries can solve the economic problems of today. 
Without a freely agreed union our present anarchy will expose us tomorrow to 
forcible unification whether by the intervention of a foreign empire or usurpation 
by a political party. (Congress of Europe 1948a) 
However, for the champions of the national empires, the experience of existential threat 
to their societies actually increased the rationale for clinging on to the overseas 
dependencies, especially in France, where the overseas territories had been a refuge for 
the Résistance (De Gaulle 1944; Springhall 2001: 9–10). Meanwhile, in the periphery, 
the colonial empires lost the support of and legitimization by local elites, whose 
preferences had shifted towards championing the nationalist cause (Springhall 2001: 
213–217). 
Discursive contestation and Asian decolonization 
In sum, the shock of the Second World War benefited anti-colonial actors in 
Southeast Asia more so than in Europe. Southeast Asian nationalism became the 
dominant stream of political discourse among local elites during the war. Shortly after 
the Japanese surrender, one Southeast Asian state after the other declared independence 
– as early as 1945 in the cases of Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos and Vietnam. The 
declarations reaffirmed the gradual move towards the institutionalization of an inclusive 
interpretation of national self-determination and sovereign equality. In this, the 
discursive actors continued to claim primary institutions that had previously applied 
only to the core of international society in order to overturn the stratified structure of 
international society and to achieve the status of a legitimate actor. 
By 1945, this de-hierarchization in primary institutions had been accepted in 
principle at the global level, as the UN Charter testifies. However, it should take some 
time until the asymmetries on the secondary level, embodied above all by the various 
bilateral treaties of cession, protection etc. and the multitude of informal rules and 
procedures governing colonial practices, should be fully eradicated. In fact, none of the 
1945 declarations of independence was recognized by the former colonial powers of 
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France and the Netherlands, which both embarked on bloody expeditions to re-establish 
their rule and keep up their grip on Indochina and the Dutch East Indies, respectively. 
Decolonization of British Malaya took until as late as 1957. 
European governments resisted decolonization because the attempts at 
secondary institutional change challenged their privileged position in the stratified 
international society. This was not a universal pattern, as the relatively straightforward 
transition of British Burma – which gained independence in 1948 – shows, but such 
individual cases do not mean that European imperial governments abdicated their role 
as colonial powers altogether (Springhall 2001: 62–64). Numerous authors have shown 
how the ‘colonial consensus’ in Europe broadly survived the Second World War and the 
initial post-war years even after the wave of decolonization had spread across Asia 
(Garavini 2012; Kahler 1984; Müller 2001). Even when the European empires granted a 
degree of self-government to their former dependencies, they made attempts to qualify 
independence, keep the polities in close political union and maintain ‘special ties’, as 
embodied by the constitutional frameworks of the Commonwealth, the French Union 
and the Netherlands-Indonesian Union.50 
However, by pointing to the obvious tensions between the new primary 
institutions of sovereign equality and the residual, now anachronistic secondary 
institutions, the new national movements had a strong discursive argument at hand to 
de-legitimize the practices of their opponents. Their cause was particularly supported by 
the ability to refer to the primary institutions of sovereign equality and national self-
determination enshrined in the UN Charter. In fact, the statements of the new Southeast 
Asian leaders disclose rather conservative views on international relations. Indonesia’s 
Sukarno (1974), for example, had promoted a pluralist understanding of international 
society even before his country declared independence:  
We have not only to establish the state of Indonesia Merdeka [independent 
Indonesia], we must also proceed towards the familyhood of nations. [...] When I 
say internationalism, I do not mean cosmopolitanism, which does not want the 
existence of nationalism [...]. Internationalism cannot flourish if it is not rooted 
in the soil of nationalism. 
                                                 
50  A similar pattern can be observed in the Philippine case, where the U.S. recognized the country’s 
independence in 1946 but made sure to keep a special relationship by asserting privileged access to the 
country’s natural resources through the so-called ‘Parity Amendment’. 
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Due also to this conservative argumentation, the Western powers found themselves in a 
sort of ‘rhetoric entrapment’ (Schimmelfennig 2005b). They had signed the UN Charter 
and consequentially endorsed the universality of the primary institutions of sovereign 
equality and national self-determination. If they wanted to retain legitimacy, they had to 
acknowledge that these principles would apply also to the nations beyond the Western 
core of international society. This change on the primary level formed a new 
constitutive context for the reproduction of secondary institutions. The maintenance of 
arrangements that impinged on the authority of local political actors against their 
express will did no longer appear as a legitimate option. Accordingly, they formally 
accepted the independence of all major Southeast Asian states within the first twelve 
post-war years, thereby effectively completing the de-colonization of Southeast Asia’s 
secondary institutions.51 
When the empires finally accepted the constitutional changes forced upon them 
in the Asian wave of decolonization, this marked a milestone in the division of the 
global colonial international society into geographically circumscribed spaces. The 
Southeast Asian polities that gained independence in the late 1940s and the 1950s began 
to form a genuine regional international society. The European empires – with the 
exception of the Netherlands – reacted to this by reaffirming their colonial claims on 
Africa (Waites 1999: 258). This geographically more circumscribed international 
society cannot be called global but neither was it genuinely European at that time – 
Euro-African might be the most adequate description, although its outermost periphery 
extended to some other parts of the world as well. In the following years, actors in both 
regions attempted to build secondary institutions in order to consolidate these new 
regional boundaries. An important element of these efforts was the definition of 
relations with external actors. The following two sections analyse how these processes 
were connected to the transformation of colonial primary institutions and the 
construction of post-colonial legitimacy standards in Europe/Euro-Africa and Southeast 
Asia. 
                                                 
51  The latecomers in this respect are Singapore, which entered the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 only to 
leave it again two years later, West Irian, which was annexed from the Netherlands in 1969, East 
Timor, which gained independence from Portugal in 1975, and Brunei, which gained independence 
from the UK in 1984. 
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5.2 The Association framework and the imperial question, c. 1945–1963 
The imperial origins of European integration have received increasing attention 
in recent critical EU Studies and historiography. In their pathbreaking study of the 
‘Eurafrica’ concept, Peo and Hansen (2014) describe the post-war ascendance of the 
notion of European cooperation on colonial questions. In their view, the building of 
regional organizations in Europe, in particular the EEC, was substantially driven by a 
shared concern of regional states to maintain a grip on their ‘overseas territories’. While 
offering a magisterial genealogy of how colonial ideas were inscribed into initiatives for 
European integration, the two authors tend to overlook how post-war discourse was 
actually torn between different visions of the relations of European states with external 
actors. The emerging European primary institution of pooled sovereignty came into 
clear tension with the established notion of a concert of empires. This tension heavily 
shaped the post-war discourses about potential regional organizations, and the 
vagueness and ambiguity of the first post-war documents of this regional discourse 
testify to the struggle between champions of nationalist imperialism on the one hand 
and integrationist imperialism on the other. 
As a concession to defenders of the national empires, advocates of integration 
argued that the pooling of sovereignty should and will be compatible with the parallel 
maintenance of national imperial ties. However, how this could be realized in concrete 
policies remained unclear. The resolution of the Congress of Europe at The Hague in 
1948 echoed the call of pooled sovereignty and a joint responsibility for the ‘overseas 
territories’52 but at the same time claimed that this should be done “without prejudice to 
the special ties which now link these territories to European countries” (Congress of 
Europe 1948b) – an ambiguous formulation that can in similar forms be found in many 
other documents of discourses on European order at that time (e.g. European 
Parliamentary Union 1991). The International Committee of the Congress resolved that 
“[t]he European Union must, of course, include in its orbit the extensions, dependencies 
and associated territories of the European Powers in Africa and elsewhere, and must 
preserve the existing constitutional ties which unite them” (Congress of Europe 1991). 
Even the Draft for a Federal Pact by the European Union of Federalists, one of the 
documents most clearly in favour of a communitarized empire, renounced the “era of 
                                                 
52  The term ‘overseas territories’ was used as a catch-all concept to designate the different peripheral 
territories with varying degrees of dependence, ranging from effectively self-governing dominions to 
colonies under direct rule. 
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national ownership of colonial territories” (emphasis added) but at the same time 
reaffirmed the special ties of these territories with their “mother countries”, leaving 
open how the competing claims of national and European empire could be reconciled 
(European Union of Federalists 1991). Similarly, the ‘Third Force’ project by then 
Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin imagined a close European cooperation but refrained 
from breaking up the national empires (Bevin 2007; Hansen and Jonsson 2014: 84–90). 
Thus, while there was a clear thrust towards pooling sovereignty within Europe, how to 
integrate the relations with the periphery into regional secondary institutions remained 
an open question.  
However, the Second World War had effectively strengthened the position of the 
reformist-integrationist strand. This development was abetted by the surge in 
importance of transnational interest groups in the post-war years, which by nature had a 
less national outlook than strictly domestic actors. Against nationalists championing the 
prestige of national empires, reformists interpreted the position of European states 
within the new, geographically more circumscribed boundaries of the Euro-African 
international society and their relations to the new superpowers, as an existential 
challenge. They soon rediscovered the ‘Eurafrica’ concept of the interwar period to 
frame their ideas of joint colonial undertakings as a geopolitical response. Only by 
joining forces could the Asian wave of decolonization be stopped from flooding Africa 
as well (Hansen and Jonsson 2014: 73). Generally, the idea of secondary institutions 
which pooled competences at home while retaining political control over the periphery 
gained traction. While the stratified nature of the Euro-African international society as 
such was not challenged, therefore, the organization of the centre was now a subject of 
debate. Meanwhile, supporters of unconditional and immediate decolonization remained 
marginalized. 
5.2.1 Building the EEC 
Initial attempts at building regional organizations in Europe, which emanated 
from a series of intergovernmental conferences in the late 1940s and early 1950s, were 
informed by this ongoing equivocality. For example, the Organization for European 
Economic Co-Operation (OEEC) contained secondary institutions which allocated 
funds to individual European states, the purpose being to support their colonial empires, 
but it also promoted European cooperation in the overseas territories. These ideas 
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influenced the Strasbourg Plan, which was prepared chiefly by the OEEC and adopted 
by the Council of Europe in 1952. A far-reaching project for joint development and 
exploitation of economic resources in the overseas territories, a European development 
bank and a preferential trade area, the Strasbourg Plan was never put into effect 
(Council of Europe 1952; Hansen and Jonsson 2014: 112–117). The ECSC included a 
most-favoured nation clause that extends preferences granted by one member state to its 
overseas territories to all ECSC members, but it did not include the overseas territories 
in the common market (Hansen and Jonsson 2014: 121–122). 
The EDC would have extended the ambiguities to the security sphere: the EDC 
Treaty – which never entered into effect – envisaged the creation of joint military forces 
and also their stationing on non-European dependent territories, but it claimed that any 
forces used in case of an emergency situation in these territories “shall cease to be 
subject to the authority of the Community until such time as they are once again placed 
at its disposal” (Treaty Establishing the European Defense Community 1952: Art. 13), 
thus designating the defence of colonial empires as an ultimately national responsibility 
(see also Müller 2001: 444–445). 
Even the institutionalization of the EEC through the Treaties of Rome in 1957 
did initially not resolve this issue. The Anglo-French fiasco of the Suez crisis is said to 
have put an end to French global power ambitions and turned its strategic attention to 
European integration as a means to retain geopolitical influence (Dinan 2004: 71–72). 
With this goal in mind, the French government, together with its Belgium counterpart, 
insisted during the EEC negotiations on institutionalizing rules and procedures for close 
association of the ‘overseas territories’. By consequence, the EEC provided secondary 
institutions that effectively communitarized economic relations with the dependencies 
of European states (Dinan 2004: 74; Hansen and Jonsson 2014; Rempe 2011; Waites 
1999: 273–278). What is more, the Treaties of Rome indirectly affirm the principle of 
sovereign equality by referring to the principles of the UN Charter (Treaty Establishing 
the European Economic Community 1957, Preamble). 
On the other hand, national colonial ties continued to determine the 
geographical extension of these relations, and constitutional questions of colonial 
relations remained a matter of national politics. For example, Algeria, by virtue of being 
legally part of the French Republic, was initially incorporated as EEC territory (Hansen 
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2002: 488).53 Other territories with constitutional ties to a European state were 
automatically included in the EECʼs preferential trading system. Only in case of 
independence from the metropolitan power should any continued association be 
conditional on explicit approval of the government in question. By linking the new 
economic framework to a classical imperial logic of territoriality, the secondary 
institution of the EEC translated the persistent tensions between pooled sovereignty and 
the national concert of empires into a secondary institutional framework. 
The argument that the colonial primary institutions still characterized the Euro-
African international society by the time of the ratification of the Treaties of Rome is 
evidenced by the European reactions to initiatives that aimed at advancing the 
decolonization of the global international society. When the Security Council adopted a 
resolution in support of Congolese independence in 1960 and called upon Belgian 
troops to withdraw from its territory (United Nations Security Council 1960), the 
permanent European members of the Council, France and the UK, abstained.54 
Similarly, when the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples later that year (United Nations General 
Assembly 1960), five European countries – including two EC members – abstained, 
thereby stating their reservations against an unconditional endorsement of the global 
primary institutions of national self-determination and sovereign equality.55  
5.2.2 African decolonization and the emergence of developmentalism 
Based on these observations, it can be argued that, in the short run, the 
institutionalization of the secondary institutions for association in the EEC formed a 
compromise between the competing logics on the primary level, rather than resolving 
them. In the medium to long run, however, the new secondary institutional framework 
further disturbed the feedback effects supporting the reproduction of gradual 
sovereignty and national imperialism as a primary institution. It did so primarily by 
changing the preference structures of the national governments and let unilateral 
imperialism appear as anachronistic. National imperial ambitions were harder to justify 
                                                 
53  A similar pattern can be found in the Euratom framework, which applied to all overseas territories 
(Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community 1957; Müller 2001: 445–446). 
54  Italy, by contrast, supported the resolution, pointing to crumbling intra-European support for continued 
colonial adventures. 
55  These were Belgium, France, Portugal, Spain and the UK, all of which were retaining colonial 
dependencies at the time of the adoption. 
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when the prospects of a common market promised security and prosperity in Europe 
(Holland 1985: 163; Waites 1999: 274). It also raised the imperative of securing 
influence on political developments in Europe, rather than in the empires. Holland 
(1985: 172–173) notes that, in an effort to secure French leadership in the EEC, the 
government reallocated political, economic and military resources from the overseas 
territories to Europe. On top of this, the prospect that preferential economic relations 
could be maintained by association with the EEC even if the ‘overseas territories’ 
gained independence weakened the argument of colonial possessions as a matter of 
national security and prestige. By consequence, the struggle between national and 
European orientations in France was decided in favour of the latter with the advance of 
the Fifth Republic in 1958 (Kahler 1984; Rempe 2011). 
The UK constitutes a special case in this respect as it was not a founding 
member of the EC, not least because of the significance of its preferential trading 
arrangements with the Commonwealth (Dinan 2004: 70; Hansen 2002: 492). Still, the 
creation of the EEC increased the rhetorical leverage of advocates of (regional) free 
trade over those favouring classical imperial trade relations, leading to a reorientation 
towards European markets and finally to a first, albeit unsuccessful, application to the 
EEC in 1961 (Holland 1985: 206–207; Schenk 2003; Springhall 2001: 15). Beyond 
purely economic arguments, Europe also served as a new source of international 
identity and status for the colonial powers. In this line, Kahler (1984: 134–135) writes 
that “Europe would become for the Conservatives the substitute for empire, a new 
source of international prestige and influence”, and Hansen (2002: 494) calls Europe  
a space in which ruling elites were provided an opportunity to trade the 
grievances over the loss of empire – and all that this would encompass in terms 
of damaged national pride, international prestige, sense of national direction, 
and, not the least, the humiliating experience of being defeated by peoples often 
designated as inferior races – for a new beginning, a new project, and a new 
national purpose in a ‘new Europe’.  
Against the background of such favourable conditions, European empires 
reacted differently to the wave of decolonization that spread the African continent in the 
early 1960s than to the earlier phase of decolonization in Asia. The challenge directed at 
constitutional secondary institutions by independence movements were more readily 
accepted and, in fact, entirely unilateral declarations of independence were the 
exception. Violent repression of independence was increasingly delegitimized, forcing 
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France to accept complete Algerian independence in 1962 despite its effective earlier 
military victory over the National Liberation Front forces. Arguments defending the 
notion of gradual sovereignty or the instrument of territorial control in relation to the 
non-European world all but vanished from the discourse. The well-known Wind of 
Change speech given by Harold Macmillan (1972) in South Africa in 1960, which 
acknowledges the strive for national self-determination in African dependencies, and 
the affirmation of a right to independence for the overseas territories in Charle de 
Gaulleʼs second Brazzaville speech in 1958, which evidenced the transition of Gaullism 
from an imperial to a “nationalism of the ‘hexagon’” (Kahler 1984: 99) during the 
French Fifth Republic, illustrate that this shift was also reaching the former colonial 
empires of the region.  
Subsequently, the primary institutions of gradual sovereignty and a concert of 
empires were replaced by a developmentalist discourse, which emphasized the 
sovereign equality of the developing countries and called for more symmetrical 
relations (Hansen and Jonsson 2014: 256). Interpretations of external relations in terms 
of development were not new at that time. The Strasbourg Plan had spoken of the 
development of the overseas countries as a goal of the Councilʼs economic cooperation 
(Council of Europe 1952: 127). In French politics, développement (and the roughly 
synonymous mise en valeur) had been a buzzword in discussions of colonial reform 
since at least the Brazzaville Conference in 1944 (De Gaulle 1944; Rempe 2011: 7). 
The concept can even be seen in the tradition of the mission civilisatrice idea dating 
back to the heyday of colonialism – in fact, the very term was used by the Dutch 
Foreign Minister Joseph Luns (1957, see also Hansen and Jonsson 2012: 1035) at the 
occasion of the signing of the Treaties of Rome. 
Until well into the 1950s, however, this goal of development was usually 
connected to a purported necessity to assume sovereign rights over the underdeveloped 
subjects. By contrast, the idea of sovereign equality became deeply inscribed into the 
new interpretation of development. Accordingly, the Yaoundé convention (1963) 
formalizing trade relations between the EEC and the newly independent African states, 
which was signed in 1963, explicitly affirms the principle of “complete equality” 
between the parties and makes reference to the principles of the UN Charter.  
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Thus, while it continued to develop the primary institution of pooled sovereignty 
internally, the European international society came to accept the principle of sovereign 
equality in its external relations. An argument can even be made that communitarized 
developmentalism became a new primary institution of the emerging European 
International Society replacing the concert of empires: it is a coherent set of principles 
and norms containing ideas about actorness – the EEC as a part of the developed world 
and its partners from the developing world – and legitimate practice, namely Europeʼs 
duty to assist the developing countries in their economic, political and cultural 
advancement. It also constitutes practices such as developmental policy and secondary 
institutionalization, e.g. the trade rules and procedures laid out in the Yaoundé 
convention and its successor agreements. 
The power positions constituted by this institution continued to be stratified and 
geographically distributed along the lines of Europeʼs former empires.56 The argument, 
made by some scholars (e.g. Galtung 1973; Hansen and Jonsson 2014; Müller 2001; 
Wæver 1996), that elements of an imperial or neo-colonial logic of dependence, control 
and centre-periphery structures have been a feature of European external relations even 
after formal decolonization certainly cannot be dismissed. Indeed, the secondary 
institutions of Yaoundé mainly contain the same rules and procedures as the association 
provisions for ‘overseas territories’ in the Treaty of Rome. However, these continuities 
should not lead researchers to overlook the important discursive changes that attest to 
changed beliefs about legitimacy that accompanied the decolonization of international 
society in Europe (cf. Diez and Whitman 2002a).  
5.3 ASEAN and the question of non-alignment, c. 1945–1967 
In the first post-war years, the decolonization discourses of local actors had 
primarily been concerned with achieving actorness, i.e. becoming fully-fledged 
members of international society. Therefore, they were national in form and substance, 
and emphasized primary institutions that had become established on the global level. 
The national format was also a natural consequence of the anti-colonial struggle and the 
endoscopic efforts at state- and nation-building, as well as of the suppression of 
independent diplomatic ties among regional countries in the colonial institution of 
                                                 
56  The Yaoundé convention and the subsequent agreements of Lomé and Cotonou extend to the EEC's 
(and EU's) relations to former dependent territories only and do not include other developing countries 
(Galtung 1973: 76–80). 
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diplomacy, deplored among others by India’s then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru 
(ARO 1948: 21). This limited the extent to which institutionalization could take place at 
the regional level. However, the more the new leaders were able to consolidate their rule 
against internal and external challengers, the more they came to ascribe an international 
and even global responsibility to their governments, and the more the political discourse 
became regionalized.  
The Asian and Asian-African conferences of the post-war period provided a 
format for a debate on the possible shape of a regional post-colonial international 
society. However, the question of building regional organizations was not the focal 
point of these gatherings. The Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in 1947 did in 
fact establish an Asian Relations Organization (ARO), but this was rather a secretariat 
for information-sharing than a truly intergovernmental body. The discourses instead 
focused on the primary institutional level, as they aimed to define the parameters of 
practice in the new post-colonial international society. 
5.3.1 New discursive arenas: the New Delhi conferences 
Although regional in format, the debates at the Asian Relations Conference were 
still rather inward-looking in substance and concerned mainly with the support for 
independence movements and questions of development and human rights within Asian 
countries, as is evident from the discussion reports (ARO 1948, see also Acharya 2009: 
34). If they did invoke international norms, speakers referred almost exclusively to 
general institutions of the global international society, both primary and secondary, as 
evident in the support for the fledging UN. Defence and security questions did feature 
on a preliminary agenda of the conference but they were later omitted by the organizers 
because “they raised controversial political issues which it was undesirable to raise at 
this first Conference.” (ARO 1948: 4). Moreover, it was argued at the preparatory 
meeting that 
the security of Asia had more than an Asian incidence as it was almost identical 
with world security. The view prevailed that in an Asian Relations Conference 
we should avoid on the one hand controversial issues relating to particular states 
and, on the other, issues which have more than an Asian incidence and can be 
solved only at higher levels. (ARO 1948: 4) 
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This reasoning is remarkable as it does not only preclude the institutionalization 
of distinctive regional institutions (primary or secondary) but may also be read as 
supporting the global institution of great power management, if the ‘higher levels’ to 
which authority is ascribed are taken to mean either the formal concert of the UN 
Security Council or the workings of superpower rivalry. In either case, intervention 
from outside is at least accepted, if not encouraged. It has to be noted that the gathering 
was organized and hosted by the Indian Council of World Affairs, not the Indian 
government, and was not an official intergovernmental conference. What is more, at the 
time of the conference, of the nine participating Southeast Asian countries,57 only the 
Philippines and Siam enjoyed full independence, and most high-level government 
representatives were participating as observers only. This naturally limited the ability to 
speak authoritatively on international matters and may have contributed to the inward-
looking focus of the meeting. Still, it was the first expression of a regional post-war 
discourse, which centred on the fully-fledged accession of the region and its countries to 
international society.  
The geographical boundaries of this discourse were still very indistinct. In fact, 
the organizers considered limiting the conference to Southeast Asia, reflecting a 
suggestion by Burmese leader Aung San, who argued that Southeast Asian nations 
“should form an entity” (cited in Wood 2014: 17; see also Acharya 2001: 71) before 
exploring wider, pan-Asian cooperation. However, they ultimately opted for a broader 
format including “all Asian countries”, which included countries as distinct and far 
apart as Georgia, Palestine and the Philippines. Additionally, Egypt was invited on 
grounds of its close ties to Middle Eastern countries. The decision was justified by the 
positive psychological effect of a larger gathering and the preliminary character of the 
conference, which would eventually clear the way for more confined fora (ARO 1948: 
4–5). Speakers also repeatedly emphasized that the conference was not the expression 
of a Pan-Asian regionalism directed against Europe or America (ARO 1948: 24). 
Although Asian narratives and identities were promoted, no distinctive perspective on 
international relations was advanced at the Asian Relations Conference. 
A second conference in New Delhi, this time convened as an official 
intergovernmental gathering by Prime Minister Nehru in 1949, had a similarly broad 
                                                 
57  These were Burma, Cochin-China, Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, the Malayan Union, the Philippines, 
Siam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. 
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range of participants58 but a more regional outlook, at least in principle. It met 
specifically to address the conflict between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Still, the 
resolution adopted deals with questions of sovereignty and self-determination rather 
than genuine (Southeast) Asian institutions. 
5.3.2 Non-intervention and anti-hegemonism 
This changed with the Colombo Conference of 1954, attended by representatives 
from Burma, Indonesia and other Asian countries. It was the first regional gathering that 
included an official reference to Southeast Asia, although the fact that the line-up differs 
significantly from today’s understanding of the region indicates that the boundary-
drawing efforts were far from definite.59 Again, the solution of a decolonization 
conflict, the First Indochina War, was one of the main items on the agenda. However, 
this time the positions of the participants were, for the first time, framed mainly in terms 
of non-intervention, as the minutes of Krishna Menon, an Indian delegate, show: 
“nonintervention in Indo-China in any form by the great powers, UK, USA, USSR and 
China” features as one of Nehru’s (1999: 425) five-point proposal on Indochina. 
Particularly advocated by Nehru, who also included it in his Five Principles of Co-
existence with China (Republic of India and People's Republic of China 1954), the 
norm was founded on the belief that a localization of conflicts such as that in Vietnam 
would heighten stability in the region. As such, non-intervention would reinforce a 
second primary institution, that of the peaceful settlement of disputes. As it was 
primarily directed against outside intervention, the idea had a clear anti-hegemonic 
undertone at this stage. 
The notion of non-intervention was reflected and at the same time reinforced by 
the secondary institution of the Geneva Accords of 1954, which brought the First 
Indochina War to an end. Apart from sealing the independence of Cambodia, Laos and 
Vietnam, the final declaration contains recognition of the will of the three states to expel 
foreign troops, abstain from military alliances – unless they are provided for under an 
UN framework – and renounce external military assistance. The connection made in the 
accords between the rejection of foreign troops, bases and assistance to the abstention 
                                                 
58  The conference was attended by representatives from Afghanistan, Australia, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen, with 
observers participating from China, Nepal, New Zealand and Siam (International Organization 1949).  
59  The official title of the meeting was ‘South East Asian Prime Ministers Conferenceʼ. It was attended 
by representatives from Burma, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 
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from alliances reinforce the point that, initially, a clear anti-hegemonial logic was 
underlying the idea of non-intervention. Despite these developments on the global level, 
non-intervention was initially not translated into regional agreements. 
The institutionalization of primary institutions was further advanced at the Afro-
Asian Conference of Bandung in 1955. It was here that the emerging principles and 
norms were most comprehensively and explicitly stated as a regional approach to 
international politics (Acharya 2009: 54–55). Apart from the not-yet independent 
territories, all Southeast Asian nations were present, with a Malayan delegation 
attending in the capacity of an observer.  
Throughout the conference sessions, and in the final communiqué, the right to 
national self-determination was reaffirmed. Apart from that, the reaction of the Asian 
and African states towards continued colonial practices, and towards the intrusive power 
politics of the Cold War was the main issue. In his opening speech, Indonesian 
President Sukarno promoted the ideas of non-intervention and non-alignment as a 
reaction to neo-colonial phenomena:  
Colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, 
intellectual control, actual physical control by a small but alien community 
within a nation. [...] Wherever, whenever, and however it appears, colonialism is 
an evil thing, and one which must be eradicated from the earth. (cited in Kahin 
1956: 44) 
From the point of view of the post-colonial international society, the global institution 
of great power management manifested itself in neo-colonial practices of political 
interference, ‘special relations’ and economic dependence, and cultural hegemony. 
As an alternative to the power-political approach to international politics, 
Sukarno advocated a particular regional approach based on the peaceful and non-
confrontational settlement of disputes. Exemplifying this through the response of the 
Colombo Powers to the Indochina conflict, he said:  
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They [the Southeast Asian Prime Ministers] issued no ultimatum, they mobilized 
no troops. Instead they consulted together, discussed the issues, pooled their 
ideas, added together their individual political skills and came forward with 
sound and reasoned suggestions which formed the basis for a settlement of the 
long struggle in Indo-China. [...] those five Prime Ministers brought a fresh 
approach to bear on the problem. […] They had no axe of power-politics to 
grind. They had but one interest – how to end the fighting in such a way that the 
chances of continuing peace and stability were enhanced. [...] They spoke on a 
subject of immediate concern to Asia, and in doing so made it quite clear that the 
affairs of Asia are the concern of the Asian peoples themselves. (cited in Kahin 
1956: 46) 
Especially the last phrase stands in remarkable contrast to the strong regional-global 
security nexus purported ahead of the Asian Relations Conference. In fact, they can be 
seen as an implicit rejection of the two global primary institutions of the balance of 
power, embodied by the Cold-War superpower rivalry, and the notion of collective 
security, which was at that time being reinvented within the UN framework on the 
global level.  
The principles of non-intervention and peaceful settlement of disputes outlined 
by Sukarno explicitly found their way into the list of principles of the Declaration on the 
Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation that emerged from the conference, which 
can be seen as marking their institutionalization as primary institutions. Notably, they 
resonated substantially with Nehru’s (and Chou En-lai’s) Five Principles – mutual 
respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference, 
equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence – which were also explicitly 
invoked by speakers such as Cambodia’s Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Thailand’s Prince 
Wan Waithayakon and Burma’s U Nu (Kahin 1956: 13, 21). 
Despite the fact that non-intervention had initially carried anti-hegemonic 
connotations, the question of relations with major external powers was a difficult 
subject and in fact a contested issue in Bandung. A number of participating countries, 
such as Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand, entertained military ties with Western 
states60 or even hosted foreign bases on their territories. In Bandung, the representatives 
of these states postulated a right to collective defence, referring among others to 
corresponding UN Charter provisions (Kahin 1956: 23). Others, led by Nehru and 
supported by Cambodia’s Norodom, who had already made his stance on the issue clear 
                                                 
60  The most important multilateral of these, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), is briefly 
discussed below. 
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during the negotiations in Geneva, argued that to succumb to power-politics by aligning 
with one of the two blocs would cause armed conflict (Kahin 1956: 23). They therefore 
promoted the idea of non-alignment as a guideline for extra-regional relations. 
However, the pro-Western bloc could fence off their criticism by evoking the 
norm of non-intervention: after all, the formulation of foreign policies was a national 
matter and should not be subject to external interference. This argument marks a 
reinterpretation of the primary institution of non-intervention, which is now seen to 
apply also to intra-regional relations. To mark this transition, I call this new 
interpretation non-interference. Non-interference and non-alignment could no longer 
be seen as mutually reinforcing but in fact potentially conflicting ideas. How could one 
norm make certain prescriptions with regard to regional states’ foreign policy conduct if 
another explicitly bars such interference? Eventually, the Declaration formulated an 
ambiguous compromise between proponents and opponents of the principle: while it 
acknowledged the “right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively”, it 
declared the intention to abstain “from the use of arrangements of collective defence to 
serve the particular interests of any of the big powers.” The non-alignment principle was 
thus institutionalized, but in a narrow sense of implying only the rejection of great-
power dominated collective defence mechanisms (Acharya 2009: 55–56). Anti-
hegemonism may be a more exact term for this primary institution. 
5.3.3 Building ASEAN 
Apart from the already quite firmly established institutions of sovereign equality 
and national self-determination, thus, Bandung served as a forum to institutionalize 
peaceful dispute settlement, non-interference and anti-hegemonism as primary 
institutions of the post-colonial international society. This primary institutional context 
was fairly consolidated but displayed certain ambiguities, as is evident in the equivocal 
interpretation of non-alignment and its tension with the principle of non-interference. 
While this emerging society slowly began to take contours through the formulation of 
distinctive primary institutions, it was not yet consolidated and its geographical outlines 
still quite blurred, constructed as it was in various formats of discourse production 
ranging from the Indian Ocean-rim format of the Colombo Powers to the vast extension 
of the Asia-Africa conference. One reason for these poorly defined boundaries was a 
lack of secondary institutionalization. 
Decolonization 
135 
 
The first attempt at building a regional organization was SEATO, a counter-
piece to the North Atlantic pact, including Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand.61 
Notably, it was established in 1954, that is, prior to the Bandung conference. The 
institutionalization of anti-hegemonism clearly constituted a primary institutional 
context that delegitimized SEATO’s rules and procedures, which provided for close 
cooperation with major external powers. As a consequence, SEATO cooperation never 
gained serious traction and became insignificant in Asian security affairs. There was 
less and less commitment to practices reproducing the organization until it was formally 
dissolved in 1977. 
Evidently, the regional conferences had established an effective regional primary 
institutional framework that set certain limits for the range of possible secondary 
institutionalization. For one, anti-hegemonism and the implied rejection of great power 
management made it virtually impossible for any great power to become a member of 
such an organization. For those with a more rigid interpretation of the norm, it also 
precluded the establishment of an organization with a clear anti-communist stance, as is 
evidenced by the lukewarm reception of the proposal by the then Malayan Prime 
Minister Tunku Abdul Raman in 1958 to establish a Southeast Asian Friendship and 
Economic Treaty (SEAFET), which was to codify cultural and economic cooperation in 
the region. One of the reasons of SEAFET's failure was that the Philippines insisted on 
an institutional linkage to SEATO, an idea opposed by the Indonesian government, 
which subsequently abandoned the project. The remaining states involved in the debate 
over SEAFET – Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand – eventually moved on to create 
an Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) (Jetschke 2009: 414). All three member states 
had a declared anti-communist outlook, which strengthened perceptions by other 
Southeast Asian governments that ASA constituted a pro-Western bloc. Encumbered by 
the Philippine-Malayan conflict over Sabah in Northern Borneo, the organization was 
all but stillborn (Narine 2002: 10–11). 
Only the initiative for the establishment of ASEAN, which was not susceptible 
to being a security alliance or overtly pro-Western, eventually proved to be sustainable. 
                                                 
61  The other member states were Australia, France, New Zealand, the UK and the U.S.. 
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Statements by the foreign ministers at ASEAN’s founding meeting in Bangkok in 1967 
attest the anti-hegemonic sentiment of its member states’ governments:62 
Indonesia always wants to see Southeast Asia develop into a region which can 
stand on its own feet, strong enough to defend itself against negative influence 
from outside the region. (Adam Malik, Indonesia) 
If there are people who misunderstand the proposed grouping, or manifest 
hostility towards it, […] it can only be because […] outside powers have vested 
interests in the balkanisation of this region. We ourselves have learnt the lessons 
and have decided that small nations are not going to be balkanised so that they 
can be manipulated, set against one another, kept perpetually weak, divided and 
ineffective by outside forces. (Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, Singapore) 
Even ASEAN’s translation of primary institutions into a secondary institutional 
framework was far from perfect, though. The references to the primary institutions of 
non-interference and anti-hegemonism in the Bangkok Declaration remain quite vague, 
mostly because of different interpretations of the primary institutions. Indonesian 
Foreign Minister Adam Malik had pushed for a formulation prohibiting great power-led 
collective defence in the region (Sucharitkul 2015: 4). The other states shared 
Indonesiaʼs scepticism towards external powers in principle but were factually reliant 
on them in the foreseeable future, as they all entertained some kind of security ties with 
great powers, and consequently opposed Malikʼs proposal (Narine 2002: 13–14). 
The eventual text merely states the founding membersʼ resolve “to ensure their 
stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation” and that 
“all foreign bases are temporary”, without setting a clear timeframe for their 
termination.63 The non-intrusive and ambiguous rules and procedures, which form part 
of what should later become known as the ASEAN Way (Narine 2002: 31–33), served 
as a way of mediating the tensions between the primary institutions of non-alignment on 
the one hand and non-interference (into national security policies) on the other. The 
formal statement but lack of enforcement of non-alignment through secondary 
institutions can be seen as a political compromise acknowledging the heterogeneity of 
                                                 
62  The quotes are taken from Jorgensen-Dahl (1982: 73–74). 
63  A similar ambiguity can also be found in ASEAN's Declaration on a Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality of 1971, which rejected great power interference in the region but stopped short of 
formalizing actual neutralization and was declaratory, rather than legal, in nature (Narine 2002: 19–
22). 
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member statesʼ positions towards the institutional configuration.64 The fact that close 
security cooperation with the West persisted throughout ASEAN’s history despite the 
continued proclamation of ideas of neutrality, non-alignment and anti-hegemonism 
demonstrates that this institutional solution created a pathway that accommodated a 
considerable amount of ambiguity in the institutional configuration of Southeast Asia’s 
international society. 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the emergence of regional organizations in Europe and 
Southeast Asia in the context of decolonization processes in the mid-20th century. It 
started from the assumption that one – though not the single – condition for their 
coming-into-being was the creation of primary and secondary institutions regarding the 
relations between intra- and extra-regional actors, and made the case that the discursive 
processes surrounding these institutionalization processes were heavily informed by the 
legacy of colonial primary and secondary institutions. The Second World War was the 
main exogenous source influencing the discursive power position of actors challenging 
or defending certain institutions. While Southeast Asian discourses of decolonization 
were rather pro-active, institutional change in Europe was carried out in response to 
declining relative power and in an attempt to ward off further challenges to the 
legitimacy of European actors. Actors in both regions partially endorsed global primary 
and secondary institutions, but they also drew substantial boundaries delimitating their 
regional international societies from the global level. 
The narrative illustrates that the normative context of building EC and ASEAN 
rules was more complex than existing accounts of the imperial origins of European 
integration and the postcolonial literature on early Southeast Asian regionalism suggest. 
In both instances, secondary institutionalization was carried out in an ambiguous and 
contested primary institutional context. However, a main difference can be discerned: in 
Southeast Asia, the creation of vague rules regarding member states’ external relations 
in the Bangkok Declaration reflects a changed interpretation of the non-interference 
norm that brought it into tension with non-alignment, which was itself a contested 
                                                 
64  Acharya (2001: 55) points at another aspect of the half-hearted institutionalization of non-alignment: 
Indonesian policy-makers feared that a highly formalized declaration of neutrality would make the 
regional states dependent on guarantees of the great powers. Thus, a stronger institutionalization of 
non-alignment would have resulted in practices inconsistent with the primary institution of 
sovereignty. 
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notion and eventually was institutionalized in a more vague interpretation as anti-
hegemonism. However, secondary institutionalization did not subsequently prompt 
further change on the primary level (Figure 2). Organizational traits of the ambiguous 
norm of anti-hegemonism can still be found in today’s ASEAN: the formal 
enshrinement of the imperative of ‘ASEAN centrality’ in official documents65 and the 
incorporation of the Declaration on a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality 
(ZOPFAN) in ASEAN’s (2009) white paper on the Political-Security Community 
demonstrate a persistent concern about the potential domination of regional affairs by 
foreign actors. 
 
In Europe, meanwhile, the relation between primary and secondary institutions 
was more dynamic. The development of early secondary institutions relating to the 
external relations of EEC member states unfolded in a primary institutional context 
informed by the tension between colonial institutions that had survived the wave of 
Asian decolonization and integrationist institutions. Subsequently, these secondary 
                                                 
65  Art. 41 para. 3 of the ASEAN Charter (2007) demands that ASEAN be the “primary driving force in 
regional arrangements that it initiates and maintain its centrality in regional cooperation and 
community building”. The Concept Paper of the ASEAN Regional Forum (1995: Art. 3–4), a sort of 
cooperation blueprint for the grouping, ascribes to ASEAN the “obligation to be the primary driving 
force of the ARF”. 
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Figure 2: Change in Southeast Asian institutions relating to external relations 
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institutions catalyzed the dismissal of those colonial institutions by altering preference 
structures, and led to the emergence of developmentalism as a new primary institution 
governing external relations. Eventually, the boundaries of the regional international 
society were redrawn and the Euro-African became a genuinely European international 
society. The notion of developmentalism reinforced these boundaries, as it constituted a 
distinct set of principles and norms that differed from the global international society 
and was based on a clear inside-outside distinction. Thus, while the EECʼs secondary 
institutions were themselves informed by institutional tensions on the primary level, 
they also served to transform primary institutions and contributed to the consolidation 
of a decolonized European international society. 
That being said, institutional ambiguities persist. The primary institution of 
developmentalism reproduces notions of inequality that may be understood as 
(post-)colonial undertones and display a certain tension with the declared promotion of 
sovereign equality in the EEC’s external relations since the Yaoundé Convention. 
Hovering over these issues is the perennial tension in the European international society 
between the primary institutions of pooled sovereignty and national self-determination.  
The EEC’s association framework translated this ambiguous context of primary 
institutions into secondary institutions that are characterized by specific rules and 
procedures that emphasize the community aspect of dealing with former colonial 
territories (Figure 3). Relics of European colonialism, such as the EUʼs Cotonou 
Agreement on development cooperation with the ACP countries and the treaty 
provisions regarding its ‘Outermost Regions and Overseas Countries and Territories’ 
can be seen as the contemporary heritage of the institutional pathway adopted in the 
early days of regional organization-building (Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community 1957, Part Four and Art. 227; see also Müller 2001). 
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The analysis of the dynamic relation between primary and secondary institutions 
contributes to Comparative Regionalism literature by showing that normative arguments 
connected to decolonization processes set the regional organizations in Europe and 
Southeast Asia on specific pathways. The institutional legacies pointed out in this 
conclusion demonstrate that the results of the discursive struggles at these critical 
junctures have a bearing on the shape of the contemporary regional organizations. The 
English School-based approach also brings into focus that the institutionalization 
practices in both regional international societies did not imply a complete de-
stratification and institutional ambiguities and tensions persisted. In the case of Europe, 
the institution of developmentalism created an exclusive identity based on ideas of 
inequality, which left it in unclear relation to the EEC’s proclamation of sovereign 
equality as a guiding principle of external relations. In Southeast Asia, meanwhile, the 
continued contestation of the primary institution of anti-hegemonism, its unresolved 
relation to the primary institution of non-interference and its vague translation into 
ASEAN’s secondary institutions indicate a continued dependence, actual or 
apprehended, of internal on external actors. In this sense, both regional international 
societies are essentially post-colonial phenomena. 
Constitution Constitution 
Constitution Institutionalization Institutionalization 
Institutionalization 
Yaoundé 
Convention 
Developmentalism 
Pooled 
sovereignty 
Gradual sovereignty 
Concert of empires 
Pooled sovereignty 
Regional practices 
EEC 
Association 
framework 
Figure 3: Change in European institutions relating to external relations 
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6 Regionalization: legal integration and new hierarchies 
The preceding chapter showcased that the processes of building regional 
organizations in Europe and Southeast Asia were tightly linked to efforts of 
consolidating the decolonization of the two regional international societies. While the 
EC and ASEAN were fundamentally different, they both subsequently underwent quite 
fundamental changes in their legal framework. The EC successively developed a set of 
rules that granted individuals of its member states certain rights and therefore 
constituted them as legal subjects of the European regional international society. These 
rules were extended and formally enshrined in the Treaty of Maastricht signed in 1992, 
which simultaneously transformed the Communities into the EU. Roughly fifteen years 
later, ASEANʼs legal framework also underwent a process of formalization, which 
culminated in the signing of the ASEAN Charter in 2007. The Charter endowed 
ASEAN with legal personality, and reformed and strengthened existing mechanisms for 
dispute settlement between its member states. 
As Alter and Hooghe (2016) note, legal integration is “a game changer in 
regionalism that stands for more than just a commitment to use legal means to resolve 
[…] disputes; it signals a commitment to uphold specific community values.” As such, 
it is part and parcel of a broader process of regionalization of the European and the 
Southeast Asian regional international societies. I use the term regionalization in a 
narrow sense to describe institutional changes that lead to significant transformations of 
the structure of a regional international society once the regional organizations are set 
up. The term is also used in Regionalism literature, especially by Hettne and 
Söderbaum, where regionalization denotes a process of increasing ‘regionness’. 
Regionness is the degree to which “a geographical area is transformed from a passive 
object to an active subject capable of articulating the transnational interests of the 
emerging region” (Hettne and Söderbaum 2002: 461; see also Warleigh-Lack 2006).66 
A number of Comparative Regionalism authors have paid attention to legal 
aspects of regionalization. For example, they noted that Asian regionalism is less 
‘legalized’ than that of other regions, meaning that agreements are generally less 
                                                 
66  On the one hand, this is a broader definition of the term than that employed in much of the New 
Regionalism literature, where regionalization is used in a more narrow sense to distinguish societal, 
bottom-up processes from the conventional, more top-down oriented notion of regionalism. On the 
other, it is narrow in that it excludes initial processes of institutionalizing regional primary and 
secondary institutions, which I deal with in this thesis under the rubric of decolonization. 
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formalized and less binding in character (Higgott 2014).67 In some cases, this leads to 
an almost ideal-typical juxtaposition of European ‘strong’ legalistic versus Asian 
‘weak’ non-legalistic regionalism, where the actual developments towards 
regionalization for example in Southeast Asia are brushed over for the sake of 
sustaining a neat typology or theoretical argument (Kanthak 2012; Katzenstein 2005). 
I already outlined the various explanatory approaches to these very general 
differences in Section 2.2. For the purpose of this Chapter, I am more interested in how 
and why specific legal secondary institutions developed at the regional level. In this 
context, Comparative Regionalism literature has focused on the study of regional courts 
and dispute settlement mechanisms. Most of this literature is concerned with the general 
rise in the use of more formal judicial dispute settlement across the globe and argues 
that the European model diffused to other regions (Alter 2012). The proliferation of 
dispute settlement mechanisms has also been described as a sort of spillover resulting 
from the increasing use of multi-purpose international organizations on a regional scale 
(Alter and Hooghe 2016: 541). In this respect, Southeast Asia is more of an outlier case, 
as its dispute settlement mechanisms, while growing, are less judicialized than those of 
other regions (Alter and Hooghe 2016).  
There are also approaches explaining variation in legal integration. Those paying 
attention to domestic factors argue that formal dispute settlement is more common 
among democracies (Jo and Namgung 2012) or states with a civil law tradition (Duina 
2006). Another line of argument is that differences can be explained via functional 
demands or institutional links, in the sense that stronger dispute settlement will be set up 
in regions that display either high economic interdependence (Haftel 2013; Korte 2012) 
or ‘deep’ regional trade agreements (Allee and Elsig 2014). Alter (2012: 145; see also 
Korte 2012) connects this idea to the diffusion concept, arguing that regions with a free 
trade agreement, such as ASEAN, tend to ‘download’ dispute settlement mechanisms 
from the global script embodied by the WTO, whereas common markets like the East 
African Community rather emulate the regional court model of the EU. However, she 
also concedes that this theory does not apply to all cases, and as ASEAN launched its 
                                                 
67  For an early statement of this finding, see Kahler (2000). 
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common market initiative, the ASEAN Economic Community, in 2015 without 
establishing a regional court, the argument has become even less convincing.68 
What the Comparative Regionalist study of legal integration lacks, so far, is an 
account of the discursive processes leading to the establishment of rules and procedures 
in the legal realm, and how these were informed by common normative considerations 
(Alter and Hooghe 2016: 550–553). Insofar as norms are acknowledged, scholars 
usually refer to legalization as a means of increasing international legitimacy, as Korte 
(2012) does for the case of ASEAN. However, these arguments assume that there is 
only one, global normative point of reference, whereas distinct regional normative 
patterns are left out of the picture.  
The analytical approach of this thesis can fill these gaps, as it draws attention to 
how legal integration is connected to the fundamental normative constitution of regional 
international societies. In English School terms, regionalization implies a move away 
from the institutions of the classical Westphalian international society and is its 
anarchical structure, where states are by and large the only legitimate actors. Using 
Watsonʼs (1992; see also Diez and Whitman 2002a) terms, higher levels of regionness 
imply a move from independent constituent units to a more hierarchical or imperial 
international society. It therefore goes beyond the notions of ‘solidarization’ and 
stratification in that it implies a relocation of legitimate actorness at the aggregate 
regional level, while solidarization and stratification happen among basically like units, 
usually states. Since ideas about legitimate actorness and appropriate behaviour are 
condensed into international institutions, regionalization from an ES perspective is a 
process of change in and of primary and secondary institutions that gradually relocates 
authority on the regional level. 
In the legal realm, this implies changing norms and rules that impinge on the 
role of the nation-states as the sole source of judicial authority. Using this process-based 
concept helps in two ways: first, it allows me to subsume institutional dynamics that 
may run at different speeds and intensities under the same concept and render them 
comparable by placing them on a continuum from weak to strong regionalization. It 
therefore acknowledges that all regional organizations contain elements of relocating 
                                                 
68  Other cases are also hard to explain with this theory, such as that of Mercosur, which has only made 
minor steps towards a formal judicial body since its creation in 1991 (Alter 2014: 86, 374). 
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authority, but some do so more than others. In this way, I can circumvent the ideal-
typical juxtaposition of legalist European vs. non-legalist Southeast Asian regionalism 
evident in many Comparative Regionalist studies and focus instead on actual 
institutional changes towards legal integration in both regions. And second, it puts the 
focus of attention on the practices – in particular, discursive practices by dominant and 
oppositional actors – that lead to such changes. 
Based on these conceptual considerations, the following two sections present a 
comparative study of regionalization in Europe and Southeast Asia in the legal terrain. 
In this sense, I use the terms of legalization and legal integration interchangeably to 
denote regionalization in those realms of international society that are concerned with 
the ‘sanctity of agreements’ (2004: 189; see also Bull 1977: 16–20) and the definition of 
binding rights and obligations. Legalization is thus understood in a broader sense than 
just instances of the formal codification of rules (Goldstein et al. 2000), which would 
imply that the study could be limited to secondary institutions. Taking up Finnemore 
and Toopeʼs (2001: 749–750) claim that the legitimacy of law may also depend on less 
formal institutionalization practices, and that it needs to be compatible with “the larger 
moral fabric of society”, I also examine the context of primary institutions and how it 
was connected to the secondary institutionalization practices. 
6.1 Towards citizenship: legal integration in Europe, c. 1961–1992 
This section examines the process of legalization from the initial Community 
years until the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, focusing on the introduction of 
rules on European citizenship as a new feature of the organization’s secondary 
institutions. Part two of the Treaty formalizes the status of Union citizen for all citizens 
of EU member states, and confers rights of free movement and residence, voting in local 
elections in the country of residence (in loco), petition and diplomatic protection beyond 
EU borders. In addition, it creates the position of an ombudsperson, who is to act as a 
representative of the Union citizensʼ interests at Community level. Maastricht can thus 
arguably be seen as the (preliminary) culmination of legal integration in the European 
international society, as it created a secondary institution constituting rights for 
individuals vis-à-vis the EU as a supranational regional organization (O’Leary 1996: 
21). It thereby supplemented the established horizontal structures of co-existing national 
constitutional orders and international law with a more hierarchical legal construct. This 
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process began with first discursive interventions in favour of a Community citizenship 
in the 1960s. At that time, there were already some provisions in place concerning the 
free movement of people and rights of residence; however, being conceived as they 
were as means to implementing economic integration, they were restricted to the 
Communityʼs working population. 
The existing approaches to legal integration in Comparative Regionalism do not 
deal with citizenship, as only the EU has developed substantial rules in this area. 
However, the following analysis can draw to some extent on insights from EU studies. 
Most of these focus on dynamics on the secondary level and present neo-functional 
(Burley and Mattli 1993; Stone Sweet and Caporaso 1998), intergovernmental (Garrett 
1995), legal-rationalist (Weiler 1991) or rational institutionalist (Alter 2009b; Weiler 
1994) accounts. There is, however, also research pointing at broader changes in 
European conceptions of sovereignty and international law (Diez et al. 2011), and how 
these might affect notions of citizenship (Linklater 1996). There is also a 
comprehensive study by Wiener (1998) on the citizenship discourse in the EC/EU. The 
following analysis expands on these works by systematically asking how the 
development of secondary institutions of legal integration was linked to general 
understandings about legal authority on the primary level.  
6.1.1 Institutional context 
The following two sections provide an account of the genesis of an institutional 
framework for European citizenship. As I am dealing with regionalization in the legal 
field, I employ a rather narrow, classical definition of citizenship in the sense of “a 
juridical condition which describes membership of and participation in a defined 
community or state”, and which “carries with it a number of rights and duties which are, 
in themselves, an expression of the political link between the state and the individual” 
(O’Leary 1996: 13). It thus comprises institutions defining a legal status for individual, 
which may be associated with political, social and economic rights and obligations vis-
à-vis an administrative entity, and which are based on a sense of equality. In contrast to 
Wienerʼs (1998) more expansive conception, this definition excludes notions of 
collective identity. As pointed out above, early figurations of the discourse on 
citizenship emerged in the 1960s, only a few years after the creation of the EEC. To 
start the analysis, the context of primary and secondary institutions at that time needs to 
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be outlined. Rather than offering a full inventory, I will focus on those institutions that 
were connected to the problem of the ‘sanctity of agreements’ and the definition of 
binding rights and obligations.  
Primary institutions 
On the level of primary institutions, the notion of pooled sovereignty formed 
part of the dominant discourse of European international society by the time the Treaties 
of Rome were signed (Diez et al. 2011). Departing from both the gradual conception of 
sovereignty of the Colonial era and the sovereign equality doctrine of the contemporary 
global international society, European international society was founded to a large 
extent on the construction of an authoritative supranational actor, which was legitimized 
by reference to both economic and security concerns. 
However, this reallocation was only partial. Instead of reconstituting 
unpartitioned sovereignty at a regional level, national self-determination remained an 
important primary institution (cf. Milward 1992) and was in fact reasserted as a main 
reference point for the development of the ECʼs political framework throughout much 
of the 1960s and 1970s, as the rhetoric of an Europe des patries during the ‘Empty 
Chair Crisis’ demonstrates. The idea of national self-determination constituted 
individuals as holders of rights in their state of citizenship, but not in the region as a 
transnational whole.  
Finally, even with the institutionalization of the EC, the legal doctrine of the 
European international society initially remained dedicated to positivist international 
law. States could only enter into obligations set freely amongst themselves, thus the 
regional legal order above the state-level could only be based on interstate conventions. 
Accordingly, the rules and procedures of the EC were the result of interstate treaties. 
The fact that non-state actors such as the ECJ could serve as a source of jurisdiction 
does not contradict this notion, as international courts have been a common feature of 
pluralist international societies. Individuals, meanwhile, could only acquire legal status 
by virtue of being a citizen of a nation-state. Therefore, their claim to legal rights was 
directed at those states and could not be extended to supranational bodies.  
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Secondary institutions 
The fact that Europe hosted a multitude of regional organizations with different 
secondary institutions, functional scopes and overlapping memberships affirms 
arguments about the fragmented and layered character of the European international 
society (Diez et al. 2011; Diez and Whitman 2002a; Wæver 1996). Aside from the EC 
established by the Treaties of Paris and Rome, organizations such as NATO, the 
Western European Union and the Council of Europe formed essential elements of the 
secondary institutional framework. For the purpose of this study, however, I will focus 
on the EC as they were the principal theatre of legalization dynamics in Europe.  
The EC combined elements of centralized and dispersed authority through the 
parallel existence of supranational and intergovernmental structures. In the legal realm, 
the most notable supranational feature were the rules and procedures of the ECJ, which 
was created in 1952 as part of the Treaty of Paris and had the authority of jurisdiction in 
certain circumscribed areas. However, there were only rudimentary elements of a 
secondary institution of citizenship in its legal framework. Art. 48 of the Treaty 
Establishing the EEC conferred the right to free movement to individuals, but this 
provision was limited to the active and former workforce in the private sector (Baldoni 
2003), which means that the privileges were limited to a section of the population. The 
rationale behind the concept was to optimize the allocation of the factor work in the 
common market, not to ensure equality among citizens of European states. There were 
neither special rights for citizens of a member state in other member states nor 
fundamental rights granted to all citizens of member states. 
Feedback effects 
The institutional configuration in the early years of the Communities constituted 
a regional international society in which nation-states were still the main legal actors. 
This set-up was stabilized by certain feedback effects. Access to the main 
institutionalization mechanisms – to which one could count the intergovernmental 
conferences, meetings of heads of state and government, and the Council meetings – 
was restricted to state representatives, giving rise to strong power effects. However, the 
ECJ began to take on a more assertive position and actively tried to extend its role in the 
development of the legal framework of the Communities in the mid-1960s, thereby 
challenging the intergovernmentalist structure. 
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Regarding reification, the existence of the Community institutions certainly 
challenged traditional perceptions of international relations in which the nation-state 
was the paramount actor of international society and the only source of legitimacy. 
However, the subordinate role of the individual as a legal subject beyond national 
constitutions in traditional international law doctrine worked against the introduction of 
a transnational concept of citizenship. On the other hand, the objective of an ‘ever closer 
Union’, enshrined in the Treaty of Rome, already opened up a potential discursive space 
for de-naturalizing the role of the nation-state in this respect.  
Feedback effects were arguably the weakest in terms of vested interests. A 
number of sub-national actors could expect to benefit from closer legal integration and a 
weakening of national legal authority: lower-level national courts saw the prospect of 
building coalitions against the predominance of supreme courts; and individuals and 
companies expected enhanced possibility for litigation and more favourable jurisdiction 
(Alter 2009b; Stone Sweet and Caporaso 1998). Of course, national supreme courts 
were anxious to safeguard their important position. But even a number of nation-state 
governments, namely those with a more federalist outlook, such as Italy and the 
Benelux countries, had a certain preference for legal integration. 
As regards institutional linkages, there were strong vertical connections 
between the secondary institutions of the EC and the regional primary institutions. The 
provisions for free movement made the principle of pooled sovereignty in the economic 
realm actionable, but the very limited extension of individual rights paid tribute to the 
institution of national self-determination. The ECʼs legal foundations were also in line 
with the positive law doctrine since they were founded by intergovernmental treaties. It 
becomes clear, thus, that the EC institutions were firmly linked to the main legal 
primary institutions of Europeʼs international society. Even the ECJ fits into this 
assessment, as it was originally set up for the purpose of sanctioning the Community 
institutions if they overstepped their narrow competences.69 Horizontally, however, the 
primary institutions of pooled sovereignty and national self-determination constituted 
fundamentally conflicting expectations about the location of legal authority. 
                                                 
69  See Chapter IV of the Treaty of Paris (1951), which almost exclusively refers to infringements by the 
High Authority, see also Alter (2009d: 112). 
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6.1.2 Institutional change 
Contrary to what neo-functionalist theories suggest, those arguing for more far-
reaching integration in the legal field did not execute an automatic integration logic but 
used specific discursive strategies to advance their agenda. As the following analysis 
reveals, specific features of the secondary institutional legal framework and tensions in 
the primary institutions of Europeʼs international society were conducive to their goals, 
as they increased their positional power in the discourse and allowed them to make 
strong claims about the legitimacy of sub- and supranational actors. 
The institution of democracy 
As possibly the first vocal advocate of a European citizenship, Lionello Levi 
Sandri, then Commissioner for Social Affairs, made several attempts to put the issue of 
individual rights on the Community agenda in the 1960s (Levi Sandri 1961, 1966; see 
also Maas 2005: 4). Departing from a purely economic rationale in legitimizing the free 
movement for workers, he stated before the EP in 1961: 
Je ne conçois pas la libre circulation des travailleurs comme un simple moyen 
dʼobtenir une combinaison optimale des facteurs de production, une 
combinaison optimale du facteur travail avec les autres facteurs de la production; 
je la considère en réalité comme le premier aspect dʼune citoyenneté 
européenne. (Levi Sandri 1961: 135) 
At the intergovernmental level, the idea was first taken up at the 1972 Paris Summit of 
Heads of State and Government, where the Italian Prime Minister of the time, Giulio 
Andreotti (1972; see also O’Leary 1996: 18), stated that 
we could as of now decide to establish a European citizenship, which would be 
in addition to the citizenship which the inhabitants of our countries now possess. 
It should permit the citizens of the Community countries, after a stay of certain 
length in one of our countries, to exercise some political rights, such as that of 
participating in communal elections. 
Andreotti was seconded by Sicco Mansholt, then Commission President, who echoed 
Levi Sandri by including the free movement of persons to the short list of possible 
rights of political participation for Community citizens. At the 1974 Paris Summit, the 
EC leaders established working parties on a potential passport union and ‘special rights’ 
(Wiener 1998: 74). The Tindemans Report of 1975 called for the recognition of citizen 
rights and the abolition of border controls, and in 1978, the EP held a Roundtable on 
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Special Rights and a Charter of Rights of the Citizens of the European Community. 
Despite these initiatives, attempts at formalizing citizenship rules in the 1970s and early 
1980s provided few tangible results. 
Things looked different on the primary level, however, as that period saw the 
emergence of two important primary institutions: liberal democracy and Community 
constitutionalism. The story of the first one is quickly told: principles of liberal 
democracy were not a part of the Treaty of Rome, but the Birkelbach Report of 1962 as 
well as the Luxembourg (or Davignon) Report of 1970 contributed to their elevation to 
a primary institution (Diez et al. 2011: 131).70 The Luxembourg Report was adopted by 
the foreign ministers, and the Declaration on European Identity by the heads of state and 
government at the 1973 Copenhagen Summit affirmed democracy as a basic element of 
the Communityʼs set of values. In conjunction with the frequent invocation of the 
concept in subsequent documents such as the Tindemans Report (1976: 26), this 
provides evidence for the firm institutionalization of liberal democracy as a primary 
institution of the European international society by the mid-1970s. The European 
Councilʼs Declaration on Democracy (1978) provides additional evidence. Although 
explaining the emergence of democracy as a primary institution is not my chief concern 
here, the fact that all member states were liberal democracies certainly contributed to 
the swiftness of this process: there was simply no real opposition by any key actor to 
enshrining democracy as a principle.  
Drawing on these developments, advocates of European citizenship started to 
link their arguments to a call for democratization of the EC in the 1970s. This is 
exemplified in the Bayerl Report of the European Parliamentʼs legal affairs committee: 
“Only equal treatment of citizens in every member state can guarantee in the long term 
a democratization of the Community and contribute to its further development” (Legal 
Affairs Committee 1979; see also European Commission 1976; European Parliament 
1979). This runs counter to Wienerʼs (1998) claim that early European citizenship 
discourse was concerned above all with creating a European identity, while legitimacy 
concerns only entered the picture in the course of the 1980s. 
                                                 
70  A more detailed account of the institutionalization of democratic principles as part of the EC’s 
standard of membership will follow in Section 7.1.2. 
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However, the strategy of legitimizing citizenship with democratic principles in 
the 1970s suffered from one major drawback, namely that the traditional notion of 
democracy was tied to national constituencies. Liberal democracy as a primary 
institution of the European international society initially was an attribute of the member 
states. Consequently, pro-citizenship actors like MEP Bayerl, had to reassure more 
conservative stakeholders that nation-states would remain the only legitimate sources of 
citizen rights:  
Nobody wanted a ‘superconstitution’, and no Member of the European 
Parliament who supported the idea of drawing up rights for the Communityʼs 
citizen wanted to take from national authorities the powers which devolved on 
them in the field of fundamental rights. (European Parliament 1979: 44) 
However, it was hard to see how citizenship could acquire a distinct European 
dimension under these circumstances. It was only in connection with the emerging 
primary institution of Community constitutionalism that the notion of democracy 
acquired a meaning beyond the nation-state level. 
The constitutionalization of Community law 
The constitutionalization of the Community legal order, the second important 
development on the primary level, was heavily influenced by ECJ activism. As pointed 
out above, the ECJ was initially set up by the contracting parties as a means of 
safeguarding the member states against excessive interpretation of competences by the 
High Authority. National governments thus saw the Court as a secondary institution that 
should help resolve potential tensions between pooled sovereignty and national self-
determination in favour of the latter. However, by including a preliminary ruling clause 
in the Treaty of Rome (Art. 177), the governments unwillingly created a secondary 
institution that should transform itself from a guardian of nationalism to an ally for 
those in favour of federalism. The preliminary ruling clause increased the positional 
power of national courts in favour of legal integration, as it allowed them to refer cases 
touching upon EC law to the ECJ in circumvention of national high courts, which 
generally upheld the institution of national self-determination and were critical towards 
legal integration (Alter 2009c; Weiler 1994). For the ECJ, in turn, the complicity of 
national courts was beneficial in that they could ensure compliance with its rulings 
(Alter 2009c). By making governments liable for infringing prior Community decisions 
before national courts, the clause imposed a legal logic of discourse upon issues that had 
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hitherto been subject to diplomatic rationality. This restricted the argumentative leeway 
of governments, as it increased the self-binding nature of their speech-acts (Weiler 
1994: 519) and restricted the use of means such as ambiguous language in order to 
advance their interests. The preliminary ruling clause also expanded the ECJʼs authority 
by effectively allowing private individuals access to Community jurisdiction (Burley 
and Mattli 1993).  
The Court, meanwhile, did not merely use the case references to create 
expansive interpretations of EC law. The leading political science scholar of European 
legal integration, Alter (2009d), argues that the well-known early rulings such as Van 
Gend & Loos or Costa v ENEL did not interpret EC rules in a way that fundamentally 
impinged on nation-state interests in the specific cases at hand. Their real significance 
lay in the construction of a legal doctrine establishing the principles of direct effect and 
the supremacy of EC law. To this end, the ECJ pointed to an essential tension on the 
primary level, namely the contradiction between the legal implications of pooled 
sovereignty on the one hand and the provisions of conventional international law on the 
other. If individuals hold rights against their sovereigns and if interstate treaties create 
bodies of authoritative decision-making beyond the state that affect the lives of 
European citizens, then this creates a new kind of legal order which must provide for 
individual rights vis-à-vis the new sovereign, even if this sovereignty is only partial. The 
ECJ expressed this view in its judgment in the important Van Gend & Loos case: 
[The Treaty of Rome] is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual 
obligations between the contracting states. This view is confirmed by the 
preamble to the Treaty which refers not only to governments but to peoples. It is 
also confirmed more specifically by the establishment of institutions endowed 
with sovereign rights, the exercise of which affects Member States and also their 
citizens. […] states have acknowledged that Community law has an authority 
which can be invoked by their nationals before [national] courts and tribunals. 
(European Court of Justice 1963) 
In areas where Community goals are affected, the Treaties effectively 
established a legal order bestowing individuals with rights that go beyond those granted 
by the respective national constitutions (European Court of Justice 1963). Such a view 
inversed “the public international law assumption that legal obligations are addressed to 
states only, and do not create direct effect for nationals of that state” (Haltern 2004: 180; 
see also Mancini and Keeling 1994: 183). This argument was further strengthened by 
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the parallel development of the principle of supremacy, which established the 
paramount authority of law on the supranational level (Weiler 1994). 
Assisted by transnational organizations of ‘Euro-law scholars’ such as the 
Fédération Internationale de Droit Européen, which created a persuasive narrative of 
ECJ authority (Alter 2009a), the practices of the ECJ and lower national courts pushed 
for the institutionalization of a new primary institution, namely that of Community 
constitutionalism.71 Governments opposing the development were in a bad position, as 
decisions by the ECJ could only be overturned by Treaty revisions, which would have 
required unanimity (Stone Sweet and Caporaso 1998: 96–97, 105) – for once, this 
procedure played into the hands of pro-integrationist actors. 
However, in the 1970s, this institutionalization was far from complete. While 
former Commission President Walter Hallstein (1972: 37) was adamantly affirming that 
“the Communityʼs legal system conforms to the fundamental principles essential to a 
free democratic constitution”, he had to admit that the “thesis of the superiority of the 
law of the Community over national law is not accepted by everyone” (Hallstein 1972: 
34). The most reluctant actors in this respect were a number of national High Courts, in 
particular the German Bundesverfassungsgericht,72 the French Conseil dʼEtat and the 
Italian Corte Constituzionale (Kwiecień 2005: 1487). It took the Corte Constituzionale 
until 1984, the Bundesverfassungsgericht until 1986 and the Conseil dʼEtat until 1989 to 
fully recognize EC law supremacy – although not without the reservation that 
Community law supremacy was derived from the provisions of their national 
constitutions (Alter 2009c: 104; Craig 2004: 37–39). Due to the influence of the Courts 
on the legislation of three major member states, these rulings can be seen as benchmarks 
in the institutionalization of Community constitutionalism.  
Towards European citizenship 
It should not surprise, then, that the discourse on European citizenship regained 
momentum in the late 1980s. The development of community constitutionalism created 
a new constitutive context for subsequent institutionalization on the secondary level. 
The new primary institutions of liberal democracy and Community constitutionalism 
                                                 
71  Although not using the exact term, Weiler (1994: 514) speaks of a “constitutionalized” EC law. 
72  In fact, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (1974) explicitly opposed the principle of EC law supremacy in 
the Solange I ruling. 
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disturbed the power effects supporting existing institutions as they constituted 
individuals as legitimate actors of the European international society by making them 
“the principal ‘guardians’ of the integrity of the Community legal order” (Haltern 2004: 
180, see also Burley and Mattli 1993: 60–61). It increased the relative authority of both 
the Community institutions and individuals. Weiler (1994: 513) notes that the number 
of individual appeals to the ECJ increased significantly with the progressive 
constitutionalization. The new primary institutions also provided a new basis of 
legitimacy for the EP, which had always nurtured a self-understanding as a champion of 
individual rights in accordance with its by and large federalist outlook. At the same 
time, it also further deconstructed the notion of the state as the constituent unit of 
international relations, thus disturbing reification effects. 
The Parliamentʼs Draft Treaty on European Union (1984), masterminded by 
Altiero Spinelli and published in February 1984, affirmed the ideas of an EC law with 
direct effect and supremacy (Art. 34–44), as well as the principles of democracy and 
individual rights. This was connected to rules that were to establish a European 
citizenship: 
The citizens of the Member States shall ipso facto be citizens of the Union. 
Citizenship of the Union shall be dependent upon citizenship of a Member State; 
it may not be independently acquired or forfeited. (European Parliament 1984, 
Art. 3) 
The proposed framework was directed against proponents of a Europe des patries but it 
also paid respect to national legal traditions by deducing individual rights from “the 
common principles of the Constitutions of the member states and from the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” (European 
Parliament 1984, Art. 4.1). Thus, the Draft Treaty took up the qualified interpretation of 
Community constitutionalism by the national High Courts in an attempt to mediate the 
tensions with the institutions of national self-determination and international law.  
In what seemed to be a prompt reaction to the publication of the Draft Treaty, 
the European Council of Fontainebleau in June 1984 decided to set up a committee that 
was to concern itself with how to promote the identity of the Community among its 
citizens. The Addonino committee, interpreting this mandate quite broadly, published 
two reports in which citizenship rules are suggested that largely reflect the ultimate 
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framework of the Maastricht Treaty. The reports use different justifications for these 
proposals: for example, the freedom of movement is described as a “necessary corollary 
of the programme for the completion of the internal market which has received, rightly, 
the highest priority”, echoing the market logic that is inscribed into the primary 
institution of pooled sovereignty (Wiener 1998: 191). On the other hand, citizen rights 
are seen as a means to defend the principles of the EC, among which representative 
democracy features prominently, and to make it more credible and responsive 
(Adonnino 1985: 9, 19).  
There were also some setbacks. Advances in the realm of free movement peaked 
in the Schengen Agreement of 1985, which remained ineffective because it lacked 
specific provisions for implementation. The Single European Act signed in 1986 did not 
contain any provisions on citizenship. By consequence, the Commission criticized the 
Council for failing to take action on the recommendations of the Adonnino reports. 
Referring to the institutions of Community constitutionalism and democracy to 
legitimize its call for formalizing citizenship rules (but also disclosing a discomforting 
gender bias in its citizen concept), it stated: 
After thirty years of European integration, the steady – and sometimes 
spectacular – development of Community law has produced a legal order which 
affects the whole of society: those in business, industry and commerce just as 
much as the ordinary citizen in his [sic!] day-to-day life. Community legislation 
offers him new opportunities, opens up new perspectives and confers on him 
specific rights which he may exercise both in his private and in his working life 
if he so wishes. But in order to do so he has to be aware of them. […] [The 
European people] should […] be made aware of their special rights as well as 
their economic and social rights, and in this connection, the right to vote in local 
elections for all Community nationals would be the best way of demonstrating 
the creation and existence of a Peopleʼs Europe. (European Commission 1988: 
26–27) 
If ordinary citizens are to be involved in the building of Europe, they must 
gradually be granted at European level the political rights enabling them to do 
so. (European Commission 1988: 34) 
Maastricht 
These efforts ultimately proved to be successful, as citizenship rights came to 
figure high on the agenda of the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union, 
which resulted in the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (1992). From the memoranda of 
the national delegations on the matter, it becomes clear that it was particularly the 
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smaller and medium-size member states that pushed for the inclusion of some sort of 
citizenship concept in the Treaty, although there was no consensus on the kind of rules 
to be considered.73 Some member states rejected the idea of including citizenship 
provisions in the Treaty altogether. The Belgian, Danish and Greek delegations pursued 
a rather minimalistic concept centred on the in-loco right to vote in local elections 
(Belgian Memorandum 1992; Greek Memorandum 1992; Memorandum from the 
Danish Government 1992). The Portuguese went beyond this in adding free movement 
for all citizens and diplomatic protection in third countries to the list of potential rights 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1992). The proposals by the Italian and Spanish 
representatives were most extensive, including broader political and social rights such 
as the freedom of expression and association (European Commission 1990). The 
Spanish proposals were distinct in that they contained 
 a provision obligating the Union to guarantee equal opportunities for all citizens; 
 the notion of obligations such as military service, rather than just the conferral of 
rights; 
 the possibility to extend the rights to further areas of EC policies in the future; 
 the possibility to extend the rights to non-Community citizens (Délégation 
espagnole 1991; Permanent Representation of Spain to the European 
Communities 1990; see also Wiener 1998: 262–265).  
In that, they were quite close to the ideas of the EP, which also favoured a more 
comprehensive approach, which included citizensʼ duties (European Parliament 1991; 
see also Wiener 1998: 270), rights to petition and information, and the possibility of 
extension to non-Community citizens (Bindi 1991). 
The justifications for these suggestions varied. Some pointed to contemporary 
events: German reunification and post-Cold War uncertainties increased the need for a 
more integrated treaty framework (European Commission 1990; Greek Memorandum 
1992: para. 1.3); and the increased migration flows accompanying globalization made 
exclusive citizenship concepts appear outdated (Bindi 1991: para. 1.a). This indicates 
that external shocks created new preference structures which worked against the vested 
                                                 
73  For a detailed overview of the delegations’ positions, see also O’Leary (1996: 23–30). 
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interests of the national governments. Others displayed citizenship as a necessary 
consequence of previous integration efforts: 
The move towards Political Union, including a common foreign and security 
policy and Economic and Monetary Union, radically changes the existing 
situation and requires the creation of an integrated common area in which the 
European citizen occupies a central and fundamental position. On the way to 
European Union it is therefore necessary to establish a citizenship of European 
Political Union […]. (Permanent Representation of Spain to the European 
Communities 1990, emphasis in original) 
Most often, however, the memoranda depicted citizenship rules as a question of 
democratic legitimacy of the EC (O’Leary 1996: 23, 30). One of the Spanish notes is 
exemplary here as it outlined 
an integrated area serving the citizen, which will be the very source of 
democratic legitimacy and a fundamental pillar of the Union, through the 
progressive constitution of a common citizenship, the rights and obligations of 
which derive from the Union. (Délégation espagnole 1991) 
Thus, the memorandum links citizenship rules to the primary institutions of democracy 
and, by describing the Union as the source of citizenʼs rights and obligations, 
Community constitutionalism. The EP endorsed a similar view. In her report on behalf 
of the Committee on Institutional Affairs, MEP Bindi based her arguments on 
legitimacy demands, comparing the Community institutions to a democratic 
government: 
government must derive its legitimacy from a mandate given by citizens, and, in 
particular, laws must stem from institutions democratically elected by citizens 
[…]; citizens must, in their own right enjoy specific rights – including political 
rights – vis-à-vis the institutions of the Community and each of the Member 
States; those rights must enjoy full protection of the courts in the Member States 
and, by extension at Community level […]. (Bindi 1991: para. G)  
The report also explicitly cites ECJ case law as a source of these considerations (Bindi 
1991: para. L). This line of reasoning subsequently became the mainstream of the EC 
discourse. For example, the foreign ministers of the Community took up the idea of 
citizenship rights, noting in a reflection paper that  
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[l]e transfert progressif de tâches à la Communauté et lʼaccroissement 
correspondant des compétences et des responsabilités de ses institutions 
nécessitent un renforcement du contrôle démocratique. (Foreign Ministers of the 
European Community 1990)  
Here as in other cases, arguments about democratic legitimacy could not be separated 
from functional ones (Belgian Memorandum 1992; Permanent Representation of Spain 
to the European Communities 1990; see also Maas 2005: 10), echoing the original 
argument of the ECJ that the constitutional character of EC law results from the 
effective political authority that had been transferred to the Community institutions. 
The linkages to the primary level provided a strong legitimizing basis for the 
introduction of citizenship rules. By the start of the Intergovernmental Conferences in 
December 1990, the citizenship agenda had also been adopted by the European Council 
(1990b), albeit in a form that mirrored the more minimalistic concepts of the reluctant 
states. This line was to dominate the conference debates, and it is also represented in a 
number of draft treaty texts issued by the Luxembourg Presidency in the first half of 
1991. These texts contain all the elements that would ultimately be included in the 
Maastricht Treaty and only differ in details. For example, an early draft of April 
contains a provision that member states will ensure a fair distribution of the burdens 
imposed by establishing free movement for all citizens, and it makes the right to vote in 
other member states conditional on having the right in the country of origin, as well as 
on a minimum period of residence (Conference of the Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States 1991a), elements that were excluded in later 
versions (Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 
1991b; Présidence Luxembourgois 1991). The drafts also contained specific time 
frames for implementation. It is unclear why these dates were omitted in the ultimate 
treaty text. 
Building on these developments, the treaty signed in Maastricht in February 
1992 established rules of a common European citizenship, which included free 
movement of all persons, the right to vote in municipal and EP elections at their place of 
residence, diplomatic protection by other member states in third countries, and the right 
to petition at the EP (Treaty on European Union 1992, Part two). It did not make 
reference to any more far-reaching political or social rights, and neither did it confer 
obligations on Union citizens. Providing linkages to the primary institutions of 
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conventional international law and national self-determination, on the one hand, and 
Community constitutionalism on the other, the treaty defined national constitutional law 
as a source of Community law (Art. F) and based European citizenship on national 
citizenship in the member states (Art. 8.1). 
Despite these limitations, the legal integration achieved in Maastricht was a leap 
in the regionalization of European international society as its principles, norms, rules 
and procedures constituted a more hierarchical legal order. The relative positional 
power of the nation-state vis-à-vis the supranational institutions and the individuals in 
terms of legal authority was weakened. The boundary-drawing dimension of 
regionalization was mainly effectuated through the secondary institutions: by defining 
who was eligible to benefit from the citizenship rights, the Union attained more 
exclusive borders – an effect that is most tangible in the realm of the free movement of 
persons, where the internal abolition of border controls is accompanied by more 
restrictive control of the Unionʼs external borders, and in municipal elections, where 
local residents from a non-EU country of origin are excluded from the right to vote. 
These borders might have acquired a different character had the Intergovernmental 
Conference adopted the EPʼs idea of including the possibility of extending citizenship 
rights to non-Community citizens.  
As the analysis has shown, the EUʼs new legal secondary institutions were not 
the simple consequence of functional necessities, nor the mere result of rational 
negotiations between governments, but depended on the discursive action of pro-
integration actors who benefited from a changed constitutive context on the primary 
institutional level that disturbed the stabilizing feedback effects. As such, it supports 
accounts arguing that the introduction of citizenship rules was connected to specific 
legitimization strategies (Wiener 1998), but it shows that the ability to draw on specific 
argumentative patterns depended on the discursive resources provided by the broader 
normative context of primary institutions of the European international society. 
Bringing the argument full circle, the dynamics in this primary institutional context 
could in turn only have occurred because specific secondary institutions provided 
structures conducive to change. 
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6.2 Dispute settlement in ASEAN, c. 1976–2007 
This section follows the legal integration process in Southeast Asia from the 
institutionalization of ASEAN until the adoption of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 and the 
related protocols. While the signing of the Charter accompanied a process of 
Community-building in ASEAN, which is supposed to deepen cooperation in the 
politico-security, economic and socio-cultural domains, developing a concept of 
Community citizenship was not part of this process. Still, the Charter marked a key 
event in legal integration, not just because it conferred a legal personality on the 
organization but also because it introduced provisions for legal dispute settlement that 
went significantly beyond existing standards, as ASEAN traditionally emphasized non-
legal forms of dispute settlement, such as confidence-building, consultation and 
mediation (Caballero-Anthony 1998). By contrast, the provisions of the Charter also 
provide for elements of compulsion and binding arbitration in dispute settlement. This 
development will be the focus of my analysis of legal integration in Southeast Asia.  
Apart from the sparse Comparative Regionalism literature on the issue, my 
account can draw on a small number of non-comparative studies analyzing legalization 
in ASEAN. There are some works written from a legal perspective. Insofar as these 
offer explanatory approaches, they take recourse either to neo-functional arguments 
(Ewing-Chow and Tan 2013) or see the nature of legal secondary institutions as a direct 
reflection of the principles and norms of Southeast Asiaʼs international society, with its 
emphasis on national sovereignty (Desierto 2011: 317–318). Of course, there are 
numerous IR contributions on the development of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 and also 
to the specific aspect of dispute settlement. However, these are largely written with a 
focus either on the economic or security aspects of regional cooperation (Caballero-
Anthony 1998) and see its legal implications as a by-product of these dynamics. I argue 
that my analysis can offer a more differentiated account of legalization in Southeast 
Asia by tracing the accompanying political and discursive processes and illuminating 
the primary institutional context in which they unfolded. 
6.2.1 Institutional context 
In principle, dispute settlement mechanisms had been a part of ASEANʼs 
secondary institutional framework since 1976; however, as we will see, they were only 
of marginal significance for the first two decades. In the 1990s, a discourse on 
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strengthening legal integration through enhanced dispute settlement emerged. I will 
briefly describe the institutional context of that period. As in the section on Europe, I 
will focus on those primary and secondary institutions with a clear relation to legal 
questions. 
Primary institutions 
To a large extent, the Southeast Asian international society reproduced primary 
institutions of the global international society. It rested on the closely linked institutions 
of sovereign equality, national self-determination and non-interference. Taken 
together, the latter three implied that states were the only sources of legal authority both 
internally and internationally. Being much less compromised by other institutions than 
in Europe, the principles of national sovereignty constituted an essentially pluralistic 
international society. In distinction from the global level, the Southeast Asian discourse 
connected the sustainability of national self-determination to the idea of ‘regional 
resilience’, which denotes the building of regional institutions to fend off security 
threats. Unlike pooled sovereignty, however, regional resilience did not imply a 
qualification of national self-determination but, on the contrary, a way of strengthening 
it: national and regional resilience were mutually reinforcing concepts.  
Another way in which the Southeast Asian international society was indistinct 
from the global level was in its adherence to positive international law. Even more so 
than in Europe, region-building was seen as the result of a self-binding commitment of 
independent states. As exemplified in the ASEAN Declaration (1967) and the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976), the regional states expressly 
acknowledged the “rule of law” in the sense that their interactions were bound to a set 
of legal provisions, but these were conventions agreed upon freely – at least in principle 
– by the states themselves and did not constitute an independent legal entity. 
Finally, the primary institution of peaceful dispute settlement embodied the 
conviction that power politics inevitably result in imperial tendencies and are not 
conducive to the regionʼs peace and prosperity. It implied the “[r]enunciation of the 
threat or the use of force” (Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia 1976). 
As such, the commitment to peaceful means was one of the very few of voluntary self-
restraint by state actors institutionalized in Southeast Asia. While per se also a global 
primary institution, in Southeast Asia peaceful dispute settlement connoted a specific 
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interpretation: here, ‘peaceful’ meant non-confrontational, based on accommodation and 
without any kind of coercion that impinged on the sovereignty of its member states 
(Boyce 1973: 175–178). This could easily be understood to exclude the option of legal 
coercion – in contrast to conventional international law, where sovereignty has for a 
long time been seen as compatible with formal arbitration (Naldi 2014: 3). This 
regionally specific adoption underscores claims about the ‘polysemy’ (Costa Buranelli 
2015a; see also Acharya 2009) of primary institutions, i.e. the fact that globally shared 
concepts may be localized in specific ways. For this reason, peaceful dispute settlement 
could only be achieved through conventional interstate diplomacy.  
Secondary institutions 
ASEANʼs legal basis was not a legally binding treaty but the Bangkok 
Declaration (1967), which was an intergovernmental agreement that did not establish 
any centralized source of legal authority nor, in fact, a legal entity (Ewing-Chow and 
Tan 2013: 11; Lin 2010: 824). Subsequent intergovernmental agreements such as the 
Declaration of ASEAN Concord (1976) had advanced the institutionalization of the 
grouping and created something like an ASEAN acquis (Naldi 2014) but they were not 
legally binding in character. Also, ASEAN lacked a judiciary authority for dispute 
settlement such as the ECJ. Therefore, even when ASEAN states started entering into 
legally more binding economic agreements from the late 1970s on, compliance could 
not be enforced (Desierto 2011: 286; Ewing-Chow and Tan 2013: 5–6).  
The voluntary nature of ASEAN cooperation was also reflected in the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) of 1976, which sought to establish a 
regional security framework based on the primary institutions of sovereignty, non-
interference and peaceful dispute settlement. The machinery of the TAC echoes the 
regionally specific interpretation of peaceful dispute settlement outlined above: as an 
embryonic dispute settlement mechanism, the framework provided for a High Council 
which was supposed to take on matters of dispute by offering various non-legal 
instruments of settlement, such as good offices, mediation, inquiry and conciliation – 
but not legal arbitration (Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia 1976, Art. 
14–15). What is more, the Councilʼs mandate was compromised from the outset by the 
procedural requirement that it could only be activated by unanimous member state 
consent (Art. 16) and that its personal composition must not be based on legal expertise 
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but could be subject to political considerations (Caballero-Anthony 1998: 50). It should 
come as no surprise that, to date, its services have never been invoked and regional 
governments have preferred to refer their disputes to global dispute settlement 
mechanisms (Ewing-Chow and Tan 2013: 23; Kahler 2000: 564–565). While it 
continued to exist de jure, the TACʼs dispute settlement mechanism was never actively 
reproduced through effective operation, which means that its institutionalization 
remained very weak. 
Feedback effects 
The strong emphasis on national sovereignty, in combination with the consensus 
rule, constituted a regional international society with a clearly pluralist, horizontal 
structure, in which states acted as the single source of authority. Non-state actors, which 
played such an important part in European legal integration, were virtually excluded 
from the institutionalization practices, which took place in arenas of classical 
multilateral diplomacy, such as intergovernmental conferences. These power effects 
had a strong stabilizing effect on the institutional configuration. 
They were reinforced by strong narratives of national liberation and post-
colonial discourses that reified the nation-state as the paramount international actor and 
guarantor for stability and independence. Against this background, any infringement on 
the stateʼs internal or external authority must appear as a threat to hard-fought political 
freedom. That being said, the governments of ASEAN member states did acknowledge 
the UN as an important source of adjudication in international disputes at the global 
level and called upon it in cases where they saw international norms violated, as during 
the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia from 1977 to 1991.  
The institutions were also strengthened because the absence of stronger dispute-
settlement mechanisms provided certain benefits to the Southeast Asian governments, 
leading to vested interests. In the economic realm, it enabled them to protect important 
domestic industries if necessary. An independent mechanism for solving investment 
disputes, for example, would have seriously impinged on this ability. The economic 
dirigisme that dominated many ASEAN economies meant that a large number of 
domestic economic actors were benefiting from this policy and that domestic pressure 
for legalization of regional economic relations was lower than in the European case. In 
security issues, it ensured that they were able to conduct an independent foreign policy 
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that maximized their freedom of action. It also excluded the possibility of losing 
international prestige by losing a case before an international court. 
Finally, the institutional configuration as outlined above displays strong 
institutional linkages. Vertically, ASEANʼs decidedly intergovernmental set-up and 
consensual decision-making procedures linked up to the primary institutions of 
sovereign equality, national self-determination and non-interference. They also ensured 
that the management of inter-state conflicts proceeded within the comfort-zone of 
member states. The same can be said for the procedures of the TACʼs High Council, 
which ensured that all parties involved had to consent if a case was to be handed over to 
its jurisdiction, so that the primary institution of non-interference would be respected. 
Horizontally, the primary institutions displayed a high degree of consistency. As the 
institutional configuration constituted a virtually ideal pluralist international society, 
hardly any tensions provided oppositional actors with potential attacking points for a 
contestational discourse. In principle, the emphasis on dispute settlement could have 
been interpreted in a way that put into question national sovereignty and non-
interference: if sovereign acts of one or more states threaten the peaceful resolution of a 
conflict, this could be seen as calling for actions that curtail its ability to act as a 
sovereign. This is a core idea of collective security. However, as pointed out above, the 
regionally specific interpretation of peaceful dispute settlement was so strongly based 
on the idea of non-coercion that it excluded the possibility of judiciary coercion. 
Insofar, the potential for tensions between the primary institutions of peaceful dispute 
settlement on the one hand and national sovereignty and non-interference on the other 
was quite low.  
6.2.2 Institutional change 
During the first twenty-odd years after the signing of the TAC, there were only 
marginal changes in the legal institutional configuration of Southeast Asiaʼs 
international society. In the legal field, secondary institutions were built in a gradual 
process of accumulating treaties and cooperation agreements, which did not imply any 
qualitative change. Starting in the late 1970s, the ASEAN member states entered into 
economic agreements covering specific aspects of trade and financial policies, which 
led to the harmonization of laws and the gradual creation of an ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA) (Desierto 2011: 284–285). These secondary institutions remained firmly 
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within the parameters of conventional international law. While some of the obligations 
were binding in principle, the member states did not create strong independent bodies to 
interpret them and monitor or enforce compliance (Ewing-Chow and Tan 2013: 5–6).  
Nevertheless, in response to the institutionalization of these economic secondary 
institutions, the 1990s saw a slight move towards legalization. Under the 1992 
Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Integration, which also 
provided an action plan for the AFTA, the ASEAN Secretariat assumed a minor role in 
monitoring the implementation of the agreement and developing recommendations on 
further institutionalization (Kahler 2000: 554), but it had to do so hand in hand with 
national ASEAN bureaucracies, while the intergovernmental ASEAN Summit remained 
the paramount decision-making body (Desierto 2011: 286; Lin 2010). Dispute 
settlement was designated the responsibility of the involved member states. 
In 1996, ASEAN leaders signed a Protocol on Dispute Settlement, which 
covered potential non-compliance with the organizationʼs economic agreements. This 
mechanism was established in response to pressure from industry representatives but 
ASEAN leaders were reluctant to establish far-reaching rules and procedures (McCall 
Smith 2000: 168). They limited the Protocol to good offices, mediation and conciliation, 
rather than adjudication, which means that their decisions were non-binding and 
political – i.e. based on the reconciliation of interests – rather than based on legal 
procedure (High-Level Task Force on ASEAN Economic Integration 2003). While the 
agreement envisioned third-party arbitration by ad-hoc panels, it vested adjudicative 
decision-making capacity in decidedly intergovernmental bodies, namely the Senior 
Economic Officials Meeting and the ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting as a final 
appellate body. In addition, panels could only be established after a unanimous decision 
of all member states including the dispute parties (Korte 2012: 109). Just like the TACʼs 
High Council, the Protocol remained inactive because its use was non-compulsory and 
subject to bilateral consensus (Lin 2010: 835). 
In contrast to the European case, thus, there were no developments 
fundamentally disturbing the feedback effects in Southeast Asia. Institution-building at 
the early stage of regionalization had not included the establishment of an authoritative 
supranational entity like the ECJ, which could have participated in the regional 
discourse as an autonomous actor, changed the preference structures of actors and 
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created a regional legal doctrine (Ewing-Chow and Tan 2013: 18). The interpretation 
and application of rules remained subject to national administration, legislation and 
jurisdiction, and, by consequence, national constitutional traditions. The absence of a 
supranational court also implied that the positional power of sub-national actors that 
might have a preference for legal integration, such as lower-level courts and certain 
private actors, remained unchanged. As the constitutive context for the 
institutionalization on the primary level remained unfavourable to discursive opposition, 
the institution of positive international law was not seriously challenged. 
Building momentum for legal integration 
This changed in the late 1990s, when pressure by pro-integration actors mounted 
to increase the legalization of Southeast Asiaʼs international society. I pointed out above 
that in Europe, decisive pressure for institutional change emanated from non-
governmental actors. This is also true for the regionalization process in Southeast Asia, 
albeit only with considerable qualifications. There were no influential transnational 
associations like the European Federalists, not least because the authoritarian nature of 
many of the member state regimes impeded the development of a transnational civil 
society – a state of affairs which was reinforced by the lack of democracy rules in 
ASEANʼs foundational documents.74 To the extent that non-government actors were 
able to penetrate the discourse of the regional international society, they were usually 
not entirely independent from their national governments. The consultation of ‘Eminent 
Persons Groups’ (EPG), usually former high-level officials appointed by incumbent 
governments, and High-Level Task Forces of senior officials, was a recurrent pattern by 
which ASEAN member state representatives sought to broaden the legitimate basis of 
their institutionalization practices while keeping a firm grip on the actual degree and 
direction of discursive contestation. 
Another channel of access for non-official actors was the advocacy by actors of 
the so-called ‘track-two diplomacy’ consisting of conferences, seminars and workshops 
attended by policy experts and decision-makers participating in a non-official capacity. 
                                                 
74  It is doubtful that a transnational oppositional advocacy network would have formed even in absence 
of repression because of the strong reification of the state through narratives of liberation and national 
identity present in all the Southeast Asian states. It might simply have seemed illogical to fight for 
independence only to give it up again so quickly and freely. In this sense, public opinion and the 
political preferences of the state leaderships coalesced in providing for feedback effects that stabilized 
the institutional configuration. 
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Academic institutions and think tanks like the ASEAN Institute of Strategic and 
International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), a regional association of research and policy-
consulting institutes, and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) in Singapore 
were important venues for such events and sources of publications championing the 
legalization of Southeast Asiaʼs international society (Soesastro and Hew 2003).  
Another pro-integration actor, the ASEAN Secretariat, was the only ASEAN 
body with distinctive supranational characteristics. The Secretary-Generals Rodolfo 
Severino, in office from 1998 to 2003, and Ong Keng Yong (2003–2007) gave 
important impulses towards further legal integration by using their informal agenda-
setting power and, in the case of the latter, by orchestrating the negotiations of the High-
Level Task Force drafting the ASEAN Charter (Chalermpalanupap 2009: 120–121). As 
one of the first to publicly urge for such regionalization, Severino (1998) declared: 
ASEAN may have to move toward the greater use of more formal instruments 
and binding commitments in the future, as developments like the financial and 
economic crisis [...] press ASEANʼs members to ever closer coordination, 
cooperation and integration. 
From this observation, the Secretary-General derived an ambitious agenda to reform 
ASEANʼs secondary institutional structure, including more binding agreements, 
effective enforcement and legal adjudication. “This would mean”, Severino (2002) 
assertively claimed, “voluntarily ceding a measure of sovereignty for regional 
purposes”. 
This was a direct challenge to the primary institutions of non-interference and 
sovereign equality. However, Severino wasnʼt able to link his agenda to an established 
primary institution, as European actors did when they derived the rules of European 
citizenship from the primary institution of Community constitutionalism. The existing 
primary institutions, such as positive international law, non-interference and the 
strongly pluralist interpretation of peaceful dispute settlement did not provide a source 
of legitimacy for his agenda. He also lacked a strong ally for his vision, as a 
supranational judicial body might have been. This was especially consequential since 
the Secretariat itself was notorious for its lack of resources and decision-making 
authority, which limited its influence. While the discourse was thus open to some actors 
beyond the official governmental realm who produced some pressure for institutional 
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change, access was generally limited to academic and meritocratic elites, and ultimate 
authority remained firmly vested in the government representatives.  
Although government positions were not uniform and the five ASEAN founding 
members75 (and Brunei) were willing to move beyond the minimalist configuration of 
Southeast Asiaʼs international society, the consensus-oriented procedures of the 
organization ensured that the newly acceded group of the CLMV states, which generally 
were more conservative, determined the pace of official discourse on legalization 
(Chalermpalanupap 2009; Koh 2009; Roberts 2005). After their accession, CLMV 
leaders made every effort to reaffirm the established primary institutions, often using 
culturalistic explanations that tied in with the ‘Asian values’ debate of the 1990s. Phan 
Van Khai (2004), then Prime Minister of Vietnam, exemplified this view in a speech on 
ASEAN Day 2004: 
We believe that, [sic!] ASEAN fundamental principles will still be the 
foundation for the existence and development of our Association in the long run, 
even when the ASEAN Community is materialized [...]. I would like to 
emphasize the importance of culture in maintaining the relevance of ASEAN 
and its fundamental principles. They are reflective of Asian values […]. They 
have been manifested as Asian way in international relations [sic!] [...].  
Thus, Khai expressed the resolve of the CLMV countries to move along with secondary 
institutional reform – the building of an ASEAN Community – in a cautious way that 
did not put into question the established primary institutions.  
Arguments for change 
The champions of legalization, on the other hand, used a number of different 
justifications for their claims. In contrast to the European case, none of the main 
justification strategies included references to a primary institution – it was in fact the 
conservative actors that used such a line of reasoning by reaffirming the principles of 
sovereignty, self-determination and non-interference. Instead, three lines of argument 
were particularly prominent in calls for change: the imperatives of globalization, the 
changing regional strategic context and functional requirements. First, it was claimed 
that economic globalization led to a need to increase competitiveness of the Southeast 
Asian economies, something that could be achieved through economic integration (Tay 
2008: 155–156). In the eyes of the advocates of change, the Asian financial crisis of the 
                                                 
75  These are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
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late 1990s reinforced the need to adapt. In December 1997, amidst financial turmoil in 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, ASEAN leaders presented the Hanoi Plan of Action 
as a sign of commitment towards closer integration:  
In recognition of the need to address the current economic situation in the 
region, ASEAN shall implement initiatives to hasten economic recovery and 
address the social impact of the global economic and financial crisis. These 
measures reaffirm ASEAN commitments to closer regional integration. (ASEAN 
1997c; see also Severino 1998) 
A neo-liberal economic agenda is clearly visible behind this argument, according to 
which regional integration would accelerate integration into the world market and, 
ultimately, economic growth (cf. Higgott 2014). Notably, however, the institutions in 
Southeast Asia had not been built on a strong consensus on the economic model of 
market liberalism. Unlike in the European case, free market principles and the goal of 
economic integration were not inscribed into the discourse on ASEAN cooperation from 
the outset. Without such a primary-institutional reference point, it was now hard to use 
economic imperatives as a justification for adaption on the level of secondary 
institutions.  
The second development affecting the discourse on regional international 
institutions was the rising influence of China and India. As the EPG report put it:  
The rise of China and India, coupled with the resurgence of Japan, is also 
changing the economic landscape of the region, with profound implications for 
the rest of the world. Southeast Asia is well-poised to benefit from these 
developments, provided that ASEAN Member States strengthen cooperation 
among themselves and with the rest of the region and the world. (Eminent 
Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter 2006: 14) 
The changing strategic context created additional pressure for ASEAN to increase its 
competitiveness by codifying the regional integration project, but also to bundle its 
resources and act in a more unified way so as to engage in the politics of the wider Asia-
Pacific region and possibly act as a mediator of tensions between the great powers (Tay 
2008: 156). 
These statements do not always specifically address the question of legal 
integration but mostly focus on the need to strengthen economic and security 
cooperation as such. However, and this brings us to the third argument, further 
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regionalization in the economic field was seen as dependent on the firmer legalization 
of regional interaction. Thus, the references to the exogenous shocks of globalization 
and the rise of regional competitors were ultimately also a strategy to push for change in 
the legal field. In this sense, spillover effects from the economic sphere resulted in a 
need for legal integration, including a move towards codifying international agreements, 
making them more binding and providing for effective enforcement, as can be seen in 
Secretary-General Severinoʼs (2001) argument  
that closer regional economic integration requires basing it on binding legal 
foundations if integration is to be stable, credible and effective. The 
commitments undertaken must be clear, firm and enforceable, and those making 
them cannot lightly back out of them. 
The need for enhanced monitoring and compliance to accompany economic 
integration was also stressed by his successor Ong (2003): “The existing economic 
cooperation schemes in ASEAN serve as a good foundation for an [ASEAN Economic 
Community]. What we need to improve on is to enhance implementation capability of 
ASEAN members and ensure compliance.” Enhancing the institutionalization of 
secondary institutions in this way was to provide the legal context believed to be 
necessary for an integrating regional economy dependent on foreign direct investments 
(Ewing-Chow and Tan 2013). Insofar, any argument for increased economic 
cooperation was ultimately also an argument for the legalization of the regional 
international society. This functional reasoning is taken up in the Vientiane Action 
Programme, a declaration by ASEAN heads of state and government that outlines the 
intent to create an ASEAN Charter:  
Deepening integration, especially in the economic sphere, will also require the 
Member Countries to […] make binding commitments, identify appropriate 
implementing timetables and mechanisms, extend national and regional 
capacities and competences, and develop institutional frameworks, responses 
and human resources in a range of areas that extend far beyond the existing 
scope of ASEAN integration. (ASEAN 2004a, Section 5) 
An agenda for reform 
On this basis, in the early 2000s, an agenda to reform the legal framework of the 
Southeast Asian international society materialized. Besides the campaigning of 
Severino and Ong, this was also due to the advocacy of non-governmental actors. Apart 
from publications of the ‘track-two’ actors mentioned above (High-Level Task Force on 
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ASEAN Economic Integration 2003; Soesastro and Hew 2003), an ASEAN-
commissioned study by McKinsey & Company (Schwarz and Villinger 2004) argued 
for more binding agreements to tap the full potential of regional economic integration. 
The recommendations relating to legal integration revolved around three aspects: the 
codification of ASEANʼs soft law, bestowing ASEAN with legal personality, and 
ensuring effective implementation and enforcement. Generally, the proposals focused 
on the economic realm while the security dimension became increasingly marginalized. 
Subsequently, these ideas entered the intergovernmental realm, buttressed by the 
member states’ decision in 2003 to create an ASEAN Community covering security, 
economic and socio-cultural cooperation by 2020. The Declaration of ASEAN Concord 
II by the ASEAN leaders contained commitments to improve dispute settlement 
mechanisms and the implementation of agreements (ASEAN 2003). In 2004, the 
Protocol on Dispute Settlement was reformed. The establishment of an independent 
appellate body could now only be prevented by member state consensus (Korte 2012: 
109). While this limited the power of the Senior Economic Officials Meeting, national 
governments maintained considerable influence over the procedure (Naldi 2014: 15). It 
was soon agreed that an ASEAN Charter should serve as the main instrument of further 
institutionalization (ASEAN 2004b), and that it should contain elements of legalization 
such as enhanced compliance mechanisms (ASEAN 2004a). 
However, the precise framework was still unclear. Some leaders, such as 
Malaysiaʼs then Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (2004), argued that “there 
should be capacity for enforcing Community decisions.” Others, such as Vietnamʼs then 
Prime Minister Phan Van Khai (2004), were more critical towards legalization 
altogether and expressed a preference for established practices “such as tacit 
consultations, closed door diplomacy, and not rushing to regionalize or internationalize 
disagreements or disputes among nations.” While Abdullah was not able to legitimize 
his argument for integration by referring to an established primary institution, Khai 
(2004) expressly linked his preference for non-legal, non-intrusive ways of dispute 
settlement to the principles of non-interference and sovereignty, reaffirming their 
validity despite the shock of globalization: 
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Globalization has increased interdependence among nations. A crisis or 
epidemic may erupt in a country or region, but their impact could quickly spill 
over to other countries and regions. [...] But we do not abuse regional 
cooperation to leverage pressure on other countries or use it as an excuse to 
interfere into otherʼs internal affairs. Thanks to this unique ‘ASEAN Way’, 
many issues facing the Association have been addressed successfully while 
ASEANʼs non-interference principle continued to be upheld.  
Even progressive actors such as Abdullah, however, did not call the ASEAN 
Way into question. From the very beginning, therefore, the Charter was supposed to 
reaffirm the established principles and norms of the regional international society. Thus, 
the ASEAN foreign ministers stated that the proposed Charter  
would, inter alia, reaffirm ASEANʼs goals and principles in inter-state relations, 
in particular the collective responsibilities of all ASEAN Member Countries in 
ensuring non-aggression and respect for each otherʼs sovereignty and territorial 
integrity […] (ASEAN 2004b; see also Acharya 2005).  
Advancing legalization on the secondary level but in a way that was consistent 
with, and would not threaten the existing primary institutional framework – this was 
basically the compromise found between the progressive ASEAN member states and 
the CLMV group. As a consequence, when the leaders tasked an EPG in 2005 to 
develop recommendations for a Charter, the groupʼs mandate was fairly circumscribed. 
The Kuala Lumpur Declaration (ASEAN 2005), which served as a kind of mandate for 
the EPG, stated that “the ASEAN Charter will codify all ASEAN norms, rules, and 
values” and “reaffirm […] the principles of inter-state relations in accordance with the 
UN Charter and established international law.” 
Thus, strong supra-national institutions like the ‘high-level judiciary body’ 
(Soesastro and Hew 2003) proposed in the ISEAS study were effectively ruled out 
before the EPG took up its work. Still, its report published in 2006 was quite far-
reaching in some respects, too far-reaching in fact for the more reluctant national 
governments. As the High-Level Task Force of government-appointed negotiators, who 
wrote up a draft Charter in the first half of 2007, operated by consensus, those more 
reluctant states were able to water down or simply omit some of the main suggestions of 
the EPG (Chalermpalanupap 2009; Ong 2009: 110). The fact that the new ASEAN 
Secretary-General Ong, a champion of further institutionalization, could only participate 
in the High-Level Task Force as an impartial ‘resource person’ and not as a negotiator 
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in his own right (Ong 2009: 111–112), and that the foreign ministers repeatedly 
intervened in the negotiation process to safeguard their governmentsʼ interests, further 
weakened the integrationist position. By consequence, the High-Level Task Force 
rejected the EPGʼs proposals on provisions for sanctions in case of non-compliance, as 
well as a clause inhibiting unconstitutional changes of governments (Koh 2009). 
Similarly, ideas for a formal court were discussed but eventually rejected (Woon 2009: 
74). 
The Charter – an ASEAN constitution? 
As a result of these developments, the Charter signed in 2007 displayed a mixed 
record in terms of legalization. Legal scholars are very cautious in their assessments 
whether and to what extent the document represents a constitutionalization of ASEAN 
law. Some analysts argue that it is a constitutional document in that it gives the regional 
organization legal personality (Desierto 2008: 428–429; Lin 2010: 825). This view is 
affirmed by the obligation established in Article 5 (2) that member states need to 
implement provisions of the Charter using “all necessary measures, including the 
enactment of appropriate domestic legislation”. On the other hand, ASEAN decisions 
have no direct effect as they have to be ratified by national parliaments under most 
member statesʼ constitutions and member states may invoke domestic law “to justify 
suspending, delaying or declining to comply with ASEAN Summit decisions, ASEAN 
Law and international law norms subsumed in the ASEAN Charter” (Desierto 2011: 
304). Chow and Tan (2013: 22) further qualify the nature of ASEANʼs legal 
personality: while the rules of the Charter establish ASEAN as an authoritative actor 
under the domestic laws of its member states, its personality remains weak in the 
international realm, where it can only act through representatives of its member states, 
therefore lacking independence from its constituent member states. 
This equivocal assessment also extends to the more specific rules and procedures 
regarding dispute settlement. The Charter calls for expanded dispute settlement 
mechanisms, which is to recognize the accumulated body of ASEAN law (ASEAN 
2007, Art. 12, 14, 25). This provision was implemented by a protocol in 2010. The 
protocol departs in some ways from the requirement of mutual consent that dominated 
earlier mechanisms (ASEAN 2010, Art. 9 (1)), but it leaves considerable freedom of 
choice for the member states and does not set up a formal, permanent court (Naldi 
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2014). Instead, supreme decision-making and enforcement authority in dispute 
settlement are vested in the ASEAN Summit, which creates a potentially powerful tool 
(ASEAN 2007, Art. 7 (2.e), 26; see also Lin 2010: 828), but also lets concerns about the 
political – rather than legal – nature of the regionʼs dispute settlement mechanisms 
resurface, especially because rules of procedure and potential sanctioning measures 
remain unspecified (Desierto 2011: 313–314; Ewing-Chow and Tan 2013: 25). The 
Secretariat is ascribed a monitoring role (ASEAN 2007, Art. 11 (2), 72 (1); see also Tay 
2008: 159), but it lacks any mandate to enforce compliance. This leaves effective 
judicial oversight to national courts (Desierto 2011: 313–317; Ewing-Chow and Tan 
2013: 16–17). Neither does the protocol contain a right to appeal for private actors 
(Naldi 2014: 19), thus avoiding any sense of an ASEAN citizenship.  
There are other aspects of the Charter with legal implications, such as its notable 
but qualified commitment to democracy and human rights (Naldi 2014: 10–11) and its 
call for a human rights body, which was eventually realized half-heartedly through the 
creation of ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights – a body 
criticized for its lack of independence from national governments and enforcement 
capabilities (Ewing-Chow and Tan 2013: 32). A detailed analysis of these aspects 
cannot be undertaken here but, in any case, such an examination would not 
fundamentally alter the assessment: the Charter represented a remarkable move towards 
legalization in the regionʼs secondary institutions as it created more binding 
commitments and enhanced dispute settlement mechanisms, but it fell short of 
aspirations to be a genuine regional constitution due to its largely non-intrusive 
character and half-hearted provision of enforcement capabilities. In this sense, it 
advanced the institutionalization of international law in Southeast Asia, but only 
tentatively regionalized it in the sense of creating legal authority at the regional level 
(Desierto 2011: 275–277; Naldi 2014: 8; Tay 2008: 158). 
My analysis contextualizes this mixed record within the broader normative 
context of Southeast Asiaʼs international society, which remained rather constant 
throughout the processes of institutional change on the secondary level. Those who 
would have liked to see further-reaching legal rules and procedures were not able to 
transform the primary institutions in a way that would have been conducive to further 
constitutionalization. What is more, the ASEAN governments were anxious to avoid 
creating a constitutive secondary context for the development of such principles and 
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norms in the future. This is evident in the 2010 Protocol on Dispute Settlement, which 
explicitly precludes the possibility of the development of legal doctrine through case-
law: “The award of the arbitral tribunal shall not add to or diminish the rights and 
obligations provided in the ASEAN Charter or any other relevant ASEAN instrument” 
(ASEAN 2010, Art. 15).76 In addition, the ASEAN Coordinating Council clarified in 
2012 that interpretations of the Charter by the ASEAN Secretariat “shall be non-binding 
and non-authoritative in nature and shall not be considered as representing the view of 
any Member State of ASEAN as an intergovernmental organisation” (ASEAN 2012), 
which undermines the Secretariatʼs potential to intervene as a progressive actor in the 
discourse on Southeast Asiaʼs primary institutions. 
6.3  Conclusion 
The analysis revealed that both the European and the Southeast Asian 
international society underwent a process of legalization but along different institutional 
pathways. In Europe, the institutional context at the outset was informed by strong 
tensions between the primary institutions of pooled sovereignty and positive 
international law, and relatively weak feedback effects. The main dynamic towards 
legal integration emanated from the institutionalization of liberal democracy and the 
constitutionalization of Community law. The primary institution of Community 
constitutionalism, advanced in particular by the ECJ in conjunction with national courts, 
replaced classical international law and provided pro-legalization actors with a 
normative template that allowed them to link democratization demands to the 
Community level. This legitimizing strategy resulted in the inclusion of rules for EU 
citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty (Figure 4). 
                                                 
76  Of course, as Naldi (2014: 32) correctly observes, it is far from clear whether such a view can prevail 
in practice. 
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In Southeast Asia, the primary-institutional framework lacked the strong 
tensions of the European case and consequently resulted in stronger feedback effects. 
The absence of a powerful supranational actor in the legal realm put pro-integration 
actors in a weaker position and thus worked against change in the primary institutions, 
which therefore remained constant. By consequence, the feedback effects remained 
largely unaffected and advocates of legalization had to rely mostly on functional 
arguments. However, lacking a firmly institutionalized primary institution of market 
liberalism, the construction of economic globalization as a shock requiring increased 
economic integration did not resonate strongly (Figure 5). Since recourse to principles 
and norms of centralized authority was not possible, progressive discursive positions 
had a hard stance in arguments about the possible legal features of the ASEAN Charter. 
Taking this rigid primary-institutional context into account, it is almost surprising how 
far the new legal framework actually went, even if the degree of regionalization was 
fairly limited. Given the strong opposition to integration by the CLMV states, a mere 
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Figure 4: Change in European institutions relating to legal integration 
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perpetuation of the existing institutional framework would appear as an equally likely 
outcome. 
 
 
Existing Comparative Regionalism accounts do not disclose how normative 
arguments shaped the discourses about legal integration. By contrast, a two-level 
analysis of change in primary and secondary institutions reveals that, while both 
European and Southeast Asian actors used functionalist arguments to advance legal 
integration, only in the European case was it possible to link these arguments to 
principles and norms which made a far-reaching redefinition of rules and procedures 
possible. At the same time, it is only possible to understand the emergence (or absence) 
of these principles and norms by referring to the secondary institutional context in 
which they have been institutionalized (or not). It is the co-existence of general and 
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specific institutional frameworks, and how these two levels are connected and mediated 
by discursive practice, that shapes processes of regionalization. 
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7 Enlargement: redefining regional boundaries 
Since the establishment of the EC/EU and ASEAN, their geographic boundaries 
have been pushed. By the mid-1980s, the ECʼs geographic extension had come to cover 
half of what was commonly understood as the European continent at best. Denmark, 
Greece, Ireland, the UK, Portugal and Spain had by then joined the six founding states. 
Turkey was aspiring to join, but to the east, the boundaries seemed fixed for the 
foreseeable future. ASEAN, meanwhile, had admitted Brunei Darussalam in 1984, but 
it, too, was far from being a pan-regional organization when measured against common 
geographical conceptions of Southeast Asia (Acharya 2001: 102). These limitations 
were hardly surprising given the ‘overlay’ of regional politics by global superpower 
rivalry (Buzan and Wæver 2010). However, with the end of the Cold War and the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, questions of boundary-drawing and membership in 
their respective regional international societies came to the forefront for both the EC 
and ASEAN. Who was in and who was out was suddenly up for debate, which 
eventually led to enlargements both through formal admission of new member states 
and the creation of new organizational frameworks beyond formal membership.  
Studies of enlargement are virtually absent from Comparative Regionalism, 
which means that I rely primarily on insights from idiographic studies of the respective 
regions.77 The only research I am aware of that works from within a principally 
comparative framework is a single case study of the accessions by Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar and Vietnam to ASEAN in the 1990s by Aschhoff (2012). He applies a 
framework developed initially for the EU by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002), 
which aims to explain preferences for membership by outsider states and not, as this 
chapter does, how inside actors made decisions on admitting new members. The 
explanatory variables of the framework – general systemic conditions such as a 
changing security environment, organization-specific systemic conditions such as 
external effects, and positional characteristics of the outside states such as expected 
economic gains – point to power-political, functional and domestic factors. Therefore, 
there is currently no comparative research on how fundamental norms have shaped the 
discourses of enlargement in different regions.  
                                                 
77  An overview of existing non-comparative literature on enlargement of both regional organizations 
follows in the respective sub-chapters. 
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Against this background, the following chapter examines how the processes of 
redrawing institutional boundaries78 through secondary institutionalization were 
connected to discussions about the broader primary institutional fabric of the regional 
international societies of Europe and Southeast Asia. In terms of institutional functions, 
I look at those primary institutions that are connected to questions of membership. This 
is not to deny that geopolitical and economic considerations or identity politics have 
informed the decisions. However, these factors must be seen in the context of the 
construction of specific primary institutions that defined who could be seen as a 
legitimate member of the regional international society in question. 
As I flesh out in the section on the European case, these primary institutions 
serve as a ‘standard of membership’, which constitutes a discursive space within which 
concrete decisions about the institutional forms of enlargement are made. These 
decisions may concern the geographical scope as well as the differentiation of the 
borders, since institutional boundary-drawing by regional organizations need not take 
dichotomous forms but can also encompass the creation of new institutional frameworks 
that give certain actors a special status without granting them full formal membership. 
In this latter case, an actor becomes a member of the regional international society, but 
not of the regional organization around which this society is centred (Diez and Whitman 
2002a). Once these institutions are built, the enlargement practices revolve around 
socializing new actors into this framework (Sedelmeier 2011: 15–16; see also Risse and 
Sikkink 1999: 11), but this is not the focus of my analysis. Neither do I concern myself 
with the motivations of external actors to become members of a regional international 
society but see them as an exogenous stimulus, which can trigger changes in the 
primary institutions of the standard of membership in a regional organization.  
7.1 The enlargement of the European Union, c. 1973–2007 
The accession of twelve Central, Eastern and Southern European states to the 
EU in 2004 and 2007 marks the most comprehensive round of enlargement in terms of 
population, territory and number of states. Even while finalizing the accession 
negotiations with these countries, the EU launched the Stabilisation and Association 
                                                 
78  By institutional boundaries, I mean socially constructed principles, norms, rules and procedures about 
the inclusion and exclusion of actors in an international society, i.e. expectations about membership. 
They should be regarded as separate from geopolitical, transactional and cultural boundaries of a 
region (Smith 1996). 
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process with states from the Western Balkan that have expressed a wish to join the 
Union. As accession candidates or prospective candidates, these and other states enjoy a 
special relationship with the EU without having officially joined. Roughly in parallel to 
these processes of formal admission, the EU developed a political framework for its 
relations with those states on its newly extended borders that have not been granted a 
membership perspective. The participants in this European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP), officially launched in 2003, can participate in a number of important aspects of 
EU integration, ranging from free trade to security cooperation and, theoretically, full 
access to the Single Market. By consequence, they acquire an ambiguous status between 
formal membership and non-membership (Smith 2005). The overall picture of the EUʼs 
new borders is thus ‘fuzzy’ and the finality of its extension is unclear (Christiansen et 
al. 2000; Diez 2006; Tonra 2010). 
The Eastern Enlargement and the launch of the ENP mark a milestone in the 
pathway of the EC/EUʼs enlargement, which had started with the accession by 
Denmark, Ireland and the UK in 1973. In the attempts to explain this complex set of 
outcomes, the formal enlargement of the EU has been the object of much scholarly 
attention. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005b) have provided a comprehensive 
overview of this body of literature. Drawing on and expanding on their summary, one 
can find analyses from virtually all theoretical vantage points, including legal (Ott and 
Inglis 2002), institutionalist (Sedelmeier 2011), governance (Christiansen et al. 2000; 
Friis and Murphy 1999), realist (Skålnes 2005), political-economy (Mattli 1999: 80–
105; Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003), game-theoretical (König and Bräuninger 2004), 
constructivist (Fierke and Wiener 2005, Schimmelfennig 2005a, 2005b) and 
theoretically pluralistic (Smith 1996; Zielonka 2001, 2002a, 2006) perspectives. While 
some of these studies explicitly set out to explain enlargement processes from the EU 
macro perspective, others focus on the politics of individual applicant and member 
states, on specific policy areas or on the impact of enlargement (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2005a). A similar pluralism is also present in works on the ENP, as the 
edited volume by Whitman and Wolff (2010b) demonstrates.  
A few authors have also applied English School concepts to questions of EU 
enlargement; however, they largely focus on the consequences of enlargement for the 
structure of the European international society (Diez and Whitman 2002a; Stivachtis 
and Webber 2011) and hardly offer explanatory narratives. In this respect, 
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Schimmelfennigʼs (2005a: 47) conceptualization of enlargement as the ‘expansion of 
international community’ is more illuminating. Schimmelfennig maintains that 
enlargement followed an essentially normative logic: the EU expanded to include those 
states that best conformed to certain of its core norms. This resonates with the concept 
of the standard of civilization, which was famously introduced to the English School by 
Gong (1984a) as a means to analyze the accession of new states into international 
society. 
Picking up on this idea and linking it to the framework of primary and secondary 
institutions, I argue in this section that the specific trajectory of the EUʼs Eastern 
Enlargement, broadly understood, was informed by a set of primary institutions that EU 
actors constructed as a ‘standard of membership’. The individual institutions that made 
up the standard can be seen as ‘externalizations’ of certain internal institutions. This 
standard of membership constituted the context for the secondary institutionalization, 
which manifested itself in the diverse frameworks for preparing accession (the pre-
accession strategy and the Stabilisation and Association Process), realizing accession 
(the relevant articles in the EC/EU Treaties and the Accession Treaties) or providing 
alternatives to accession (the ENP and its Action Plans). The secondary institutions 
defining membership are thus shaped by the broader normative discourses surrounding 
a regional organization. 
Unlike Schimmelfennig, however, I do not conceive of the standard of 
enlargement as a fixed catalogue of unmalleable core norms, which are mainly an 
externalization of important domestic political principles. This essentialist assumption is 
problematic for two reasons: first, it ignores the historical political processes that have 
led to the formulation and interpretation of certain principles and norms as core 
conditions for membership in the ‘liberal community’ (Thomas 2006). After all, even 
the most fundamental of the EUʼs membership criteria, that candidates dispose of 
democratic institutions, was not an explicit accession condition from the start. Second, 
the description of this community as fixed and monolithic overlooks to what extent its 
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boundaries are in fact fuzzy and ‘fray out’ from an organizational core to the 
periphery.79  
7.1.1 Institutional context 
The European international society initially did not have very elaborate 
institutions with respect to membership. When the issue of British membership arose in 
the late 1960s, the EC could apply some basic conditions and procedures but the 
question was eventually resolved on political grounds, as de Gaulle, whose French 
government had rejected the first British application, left office. In this section, I outline 
the primary and secondary institutions with respect to enlargement as it existed around 
that time, as well as the feedback effects stabilizing this institutional configuration. The 
subsequent section then discerns different phases of institutional change in the 
enlargement process. 
Primary institutions 
This overview presents the ECʼs initial standard of membership, which 
encompasses those primary institutions that draw boundaries by explicitly describing 
qualities an actor must have acquired to be considered a potential member of the 
European international society in general and the EC as its main regional organization 
in particular. Not all of a regional international societyʼs internal primary institutions 
must form part of this standard of membership. For example, the notion of pooled 
sovereignty could not have become part of the ECʼs standard by definition as it 
consisted of principles and norms applying to the organizationʼs internal constitution. 
Hence, an actor could only be socialized into the principles and norms after being 
accepted as a member state. 
As the founding document of the EC, the Treaty of Rome is quite inclusive 
about who may accede, at least if taken by the letter. It describes membership as open to 
any European state. In that, it follows the Schumann Declaration, which foresaw the 
coal and steel organization as being “open to the participation of the other countries of 
Europe” (Schuman 1950; see also Hillion 2011: 188). As a principled expectation about 
legitimate actorness, this can be read as an expression of a primary institution of 
                                                 
79  From a comparative vantage point, one could add that the idea can hardly be applied to regional 
organizations with a membership that displays a large heterogeneity with respect to domestic political 
institutions such as ASEAN. 
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Europeanism, which defines the organization as the representative of an international 
society covering all of the region and, by consequence, as open to potentially all 
European states. This claim was upheld in principle despite the factual exclusion of 
Soviet bloc states from the very beginning of the ECʼs existence. The geographical 
dimension of this part of the standard became obvious when Moroccoʼs membership 
application was rejected in 1987. 
The second relevant primary institution is that of Community 
constitutionalism. I argued in the preceding chapter that, within the EC, the 
understanding of Community law as a genuine supranational legal order emerged as a 
primary institution from the 1960s onwards but was still challenged by certain national 
high courts in the late 1980s. Externally, however, the acknowledgement of EC law 
supremacy and direct effect were central conditions for accession from the very first 
round of enlargement. For example, the Commission (1972; see also Hoffmeister 2002: 
98; Ott 2002: 15) stressed in its opinion on the applications of Denmark, Ireland, 
Norway and the UK that  
it is an essential feature of the legal system set up by the Treaties establishing the 
Communities that certain of their provisions and certain acts of the Community 
institutions are directly applicable, that Community law takes precedence over 
any national provisions conflicting with it, and […] accession to the 
Communities entails recognition of the binding force of these rules, observance 
of which is indispensable to guarantee the effectiveness and unity of Community 
law. 
The later Commission opinions on Greece, Portugal and Spain reaffirmed this view, 
thereby defining the acknowledgement of Community constitutionalism a constitutive 
characteristic of any potential new member state. 
Although the term was yet to be established as a common EC colloquialism, the 
idea of an acquis communautaire to be accepted by aspiring members also figured 
prominently as a membership condition in these early documents on EC enlargement.80 
It was first introduced by the heads of state and government at the The Hague Summit 
in 1969, where they argued that applicant states needed to “accept the Treaties and their 
political finality, the decisions taken since the entry into force of the Treaties and the 
options made in the sphere of development” (The Hague Summit 1969; see also Hillion 
                                                 
80  On the acquis communautaire as an internal primary institution of the European international society, 
see Diez, Manners and Whitman (2011). 
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2011: 192). The Commission took up this notion by making it clear in its 1972 opinion 
that  
in joining the Communities the applicant States accept without reserve the 
Treaties and their political objectives, all decisions taken since their entry into 
force, and the action that has been agreed in respect of the development and 
reinforcement of the Communities. (European Commission 1972) 
Through this, the EC asserted that enlargement must not lead to a watering-down of 
previous integration by new members who might question certain parts of EC law or 
secure opt-outs from certain already established obligations. Candidate states were thus 
prevented from assuming the role of upstart revisionists. Since the factual acquis of the 
EC included the creation of a supranational legal order, it was closely linked to the 
institution of Community constitutionalism. 
Secondary institutions 
A look at the most relevant secondary institutions reveals that the rules and 
procedures for enlargement in the EC were of a rather generic nature and followed a 
dichotomous in-or-out logic. The Treaty of Rome provided for the possibility of 
accession of new members but did not specify any conditions, which made concrete 
decisions on membership applications almost entirely subject to immediate political 
considerations, as pointed out above. Neither was it determined how compliance could 
be measured or whether the principles had to be respected upon application or 
accession, or new member states could subsequently be socialized to adhere to them. 
The only way in which the membership criteria were formally specified and developed 
during this time was through the accession treaties with new member states, which set 
precedence for future candidates in terms of their obligations in the Community context.  
The enlargement procedures, i.e. the regular processes by which applicant 
states were considered as new members, were formalized but had no substantial 
provisions. Upon application, the Commission would draw up a recommendation, based 
upon which the Council would make a formal decision. The terms of the agreement 
were to be negotiated between the member states and the applicant (Treaty Establishing 
the European Economic Community 1957: Art. 273). The publicized assessment of the 
applicants by the Commission narrowed down the political leeway provided by the 
Treaty of Rome by clarifying the basic criteria on which decisions were to be based but 
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they did not follow a standard approach based on clearly operationalized benchmarks, 
so that politics between member states heavily shaped decision-making on enlargement 
(Hillion 2011: 190–191). 
Conspicuously absent from the secondary institutions at that time were rules and 
procedures providing forms of status in-between full membership and non-membership 
(Smith 1996: 19–20). Of course, the EC disposed of a framework for association but 
this was mostly reserved to its former colonies. As I have shown in Chapter 5, the EC 
actors had forfeited attempts to integrate their former dependencies into a Eurafrican 
international society by around 1963, which meant that the association framework did 
not imply a membership status or an enlargement perspective but was seen as a part of 
the ECʼs external relations.81 Even the states recognized as member candidates were not 
formally included in the pre-accession process and did not participate in 
institutionalized EC cooperation before their formal accession. The accession treaties 
reaffirm this picture of clear-cut, dichotomous borders: apart from certain transitory 
provisions, any new member had to fully comply with EC legislation upon accession – 
the treaties did not allow for opt-outs.  
Feedback effects 
This configuration of primary and secondary institutions was supported by a 
number of feedback effects. On a basic level, like the standard of civilization analyzed 
by Gong (1984b), the ECʼs standard of membership was constructed primarily by the 
‘insiders’ of international society. The main actors in this respect were the heads of state 
and government, acting through the European Council, and, to a lesser extent, the 
European Commission. Like the substance of the standard, the assessment of its 
fulfilment by individual countries was also reserved to the insiders. As evidenced by the 
French veto on the UK, the formal, state-centred enlargement procedure provided for a 
large number of veto-players and the absence of objective measurement left a lot of 
room for political considerations on the side of the ECʼs internal actors (Hillion 2011: 
191). This led to strong power effects. Because the relation between insiders and 
outsiders was usually asymmetrical, applicants did not challenge the standard as this 
would have reduced their chances of accession. That being said, the factual room for 
                                                 
81  Notable exceptions are the Agreements with Greece, signed in 1961, and Turkey (1964), which both 
contain a membership perspective. 
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manoeuvre of the EC actors was of course seriously compromised by the superpower 
overlay making expansion towards the East virtually impossible. As Smith (1996: 22) 
put it: “the initial drawing of the [geopolitical] boundary was a function more of 
superpower confrontation than of the ECʼs independent action; the EC in a sense had 
simply accommodated itself to the boundary […].” 
Reification is particularly apparent with respect to the geographical connotation 
of Europeanism. While there was no ultimate consensus as to the regionʼs – or the 
continentʼs – boundaries, the notion of ‘Europeanness’ as a necessary attribute for a 
member candidate denotes a seemingly natural quality. This stabilized the institutional 
configuration of the ECʼs boundaries because it prevented the accession of actors who 
could have challenged its self-understanding as a geographically defined entity, such as 
Morocco. However, the effective limitation of membership to Western Europe provided 
an alternative interpretative framework, which resonated with the widespread view of 
Europe as a divided continent and deconstructed pan-European sentiments. Thus, the 
reification of Europe as a geopolitical concept, and by consequence the notion of 
Europeanism as part of the standard of membership, was undermined to a certain extent. 
Another stabilizing factor was that the actors which defined the ECʼs standard of 
membership had strong vested interests in their reproduction. This can be seen on two 
levels: intra-institutional politics and the organizationʼs collective interests. First, the 
Commission, whose relative position in the EC polity vis-à-vis the member states was 
strengthened by the commitment of new member states to the existing level of legal, 
political and economic integration, benefited from an emphasis on Community 
constitutionalism and the acquis communautaire, both of which impinged on member 
state sovereignty. Through the ‘opinions’ on accession applications, the Commission 
ensured that these two institutions took pride of place in the standard of membership. In 
this, it was supported by pro-integrationist member states. These preferences are 
revealed in the admonition of EC institutions and integrationist EC governments that 
haphazard enlargement may lead to a backlash in the ECʼs internal institutional 
development (Schimmelfennig 2005b: 163).  
In addition to these mechanisms, institutional linkages provided for stability in 
the configuration. Horizontally, the different institutions of the standard of membership 
followed quite different logics – geographical (Europeanism), legal (Community 
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constitutionalism), administrative (acquis communautaire) and political (liberal 
democracy) – but they were complementary rather than contradictory: adherence to one 
did not preclude or complicate adherence to another. Put differently, the primary 
institutions of the standard of membership did not display any fundamental 
inconsistencies that could be used as a hook for arguments in favour of new boundaries. 
Vertical linkages were more problematic in that it was unclear how the standard could 
be translated into formal enlargement decisions: first, the existing secondary institutions 
lacked a clear operationalization of the standard that could serve as a basis for decisions 
on concrete cases; second, the question arose how applicant states should be treated that 
fulfilled the standard only partially. 
7.1.2 Institutional change 
The first important challenge to the standard of membership came as the use of 
Association Agreements with European non-member states raised the question of the 
EC’s relations with autocratic states, and triggered “a political struggle to set the rules 
by which the community would respond to applications for membership” (Thomas 
2006: 1191). First, plans of Francoist Spain to apply for association in 1962, which 
would have made possible eventual membership, met with strong resistance by the 
European Parliamentary Assembly and civil society actors. The EP’s Birkelbach 
Report, drawn up in response to the Spanish issue, struck a highly critical note. In the 
Parliament’s view,  
[l]a garantie de l'existence d'une forme d'État démocratique, au sens d'une 
organisation politique libérale, est une condition à l'adhésion. Les États dont les 
gouvernements n'ont pas de légitimation démocratique et dont les peuples ne 
participent aux décisions du gouvernement ni directement ni par des 
représentants élus librement, ne peuvent prétendre être admis dans le cercle des 
peuples qui forment les Communautés européennes. (Birkelbach 1961: Art. 25) 
To justify this assertion, the report connected it to the prevalence of democratic 
institutions in the current member states, arguing that non-democratic states would 
constitute “un corps étranger” in the Community (Birkelbach 1961: Art. 24). While 
most member state governments had publicly supported the Spanish initiative, the 
Council eventually gave in to mounting political and public pressure, and decided not to 
make any commitments to Spanish membership for the time being (Thomas 2006: 
1191). 
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Adding to these dynamics was the shock of Greece, with which the EC had 
concluded an Association Agreement in 1961, suffering a coup dʼétat in 1967. The 
subsequent assumption of power by a military junta was condemned by the EP, which 
immediately argued for a suspension of the Agreement: 
lʼaccord dʼassociation entre la Communauté européenne et la Grèce, qui prévoit 
lʼadhésion ultérieure de ce pays à la Communauté, ne pourra être appliqué dans 
ses différentes phases que si les structures démocratiques et les libertés politique 
et syndicale sont rétablies en Grèce […]. (European Parliament 1967) 
Subsequently – and certainly under the impression of the EPʼs strong rhetoric – the 
Commission decided to effectively put the Agreement, and with it the prospect of Greek 
membership, on hold “so long as democratic and parliamentary structures have not been 
reestablished in Greece.” (cited in European Commission 1975). The explicit 
application of conditionality with respect to democratic government is notable, since 
democracy was neither an explicit part of the accession criteria in the EC at that time 
(Thomas 2006: 1191), nor was it part of the initial Association Agreement. It was 
precisely for this lack of legal basis that the EC decided to only limit the application of 
– but not entirely suspend – the agreement, even though the EP had asked it to do so 
(Katselli Proukaki 2010: 119–120). 
The Greek question was resolved after the restoration of democratic rule in 
1974, following which the EC reactivated the Association agreement. A year later, the 
newly elected government applied to become a member of the EC in 1975, to which the 
EC eventually assented. However, the shock of the Greek episode had changed the 
preference structures – and thereby offset vested interests – of EC actors in that it had 
impressed upon them the urgent need to weigh potential economic benefits of 
enlargement against normative considerations (Thomas 2006: 1203). By consequence, 
they strove to institutionalize hitherto domestic principles of liberal democracy in a 
broad sense – including pluralist, representative political institutions, the rule of law and 
the notion of human rights – as part of the organizationsʼ standard of membership. The 
urgency of this was increased as Spain, this time together with Portugal, another 
formerly authoritarian state, applied for membership in 1977. The European Councilʼs 
Declaration on Democracy was an important response to these requests. It made the 
respect and maintenance of democracy and human rights “essential elements of 
membership of the EC” (European Council 1978). Subsequently, the European 
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Commission delivered a second opinion on Greece, which echoed this statement by 
emphasizing that  
the principles of pluralist democracy and respect for human rights form part of 
the common heritage of the peoples of the States brought together in the 
European Communities and are therefore essential elements of membership of 
the said Communities (European Commission 1979; see also Hoffmeister 2002: 
93). 
Subsequent EC documents consolidated the firm institutionalization of liberal 
democracy as a new primary institution of the standard of membership. The Single 
European Act, for example, listed it as part of the ECʼs principles in the preamble, 
although it did not explicitly make accession conditional upon the acknowledgement of 
these principles in the applicant country. 
By institutionalizing liberal democracy as a new primary institution of the 
standard of membership, the EC was able to exert a strong socializing and 
transformative power upon potential new members. Accession candidates had to 
subscribe to normative understandings that were compatible with the regionʼs internal 
institutions, reinforced the identities of the insiders and changed the ones of the 
acceding states in a way that stabilized the standard. By subscribing to the political 
norms and principles, states acceding the EC assumed a democratic identity that 
matched those of the established members. They were thus unlikely to challenge the 
criterion of liberal democracy once they had joined the EC – democratic states do not 
question democratic principles. In this way, the standard of membership tended to 
socialize new members into an identity that worked in support of its norms and 
principles. 
The end of the Cold War and the question of Eastern Enlargement 
The second decisive shock for the ECʼs standard of membership was the end of 
the Cold War. The events unfolding to their East from the late 1980s onwards took 
European actors by surprise. The detente in bloc rivalry and the democratic reforms in 
the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), which were soon to be followed 
by the end of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union, led to a 
fundamentally new geopolitical context. This shock affected the feedback effects 
surrounding the reproduction of the ECʼs boundary institutions in different ways. In 
Enlargement 
191 
 
terms of power effects, it removed the Cold War overlay of the discourse on the limits 
of the hitherto Western European international society and put the power to redefine the 
boundaries firmly within the hands of European actors (cf. Buzan and Wæver 2010: 
352). It also debunked the belief that Europe would, for the foreseeable future, remain a 
divided continent. As this view had reified the ECʼs boundaries to the East, the 
organizationʼs Western European nature was suddenly up for debate, and images of a 
(re-)united continent gained momentum in the discourse on European international 
society. 
The end of the Cold War also affected the preference structures of EC actors and 
therefore displaced vested interests: it was no longer a given that a rigid definition of 
the organizationʼs boundaries was conducive to the European international society as a 
security community. Most of the states to its east – the CEEC, the countries of the West 
Balkan and the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union82 – 
expressed a clear interest in close relations with or even membership of the EC, and it 
was assumed that some form of integration was needed to provide a stabilizing effect on 
the region and in particular to avoid mass migration from the CEEC to the EC (Mattli 
1999: 96–97). This view was expressed, for example, by then German President 
Richard Weizsäcker (1990) in a speech at the Collège dʼEurope. However, it was 
improbable that all of the CEEC and NIS would be able to fully meet the standard of 
membership as it existed at that point. This meant that the security interests of the EC 
actors, which called for an inclusion of the CEECs, and their preference for preserving 
the achieved level of integration through a rigid standard of membership were no longer 
aligned. 
As a further complicating factor, the impact of enlargement on the economic 
performance of the EC was all but clear. The standard did not have an explicit economic 
dimension at that time. Economic arguments had been used but only selectively, for 
example by the French government to reject the UKʼs application (Hillion 2011: 191). 
They did not feature as criteria in the Commissionʼs opinions on the early candidate 
states. Now, the EC faced the challenge of almost a dozen states in its neighbourhood 
whose economies lay in ruins, without clear principles and rules on how to deal with 
                                                 
82  For the purpose of this analysis, I count the former Soviet States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as 
part of the CEECs because of their eventual inclusion in the enlargement process. At the same time, 
the analysis only includes those NIS that eventually became part of the Eastern dimension of the ENP: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and the Ukraine. 
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their demands for closer ties with Western Europe. In light of this, the support for the 
existing standard of membership, which was equivocal on economic structures, through 
actorsʼ vested interests was diminished. The ensuing discourse on how to redefine the 
ECʼs boundaries was carried out on the primary as well as the secondary level of the 
ECʼs border institutions. 
In the first phase of change, the EC began to move from a policy of cooperation 
to one of enlargement. As Friis and Murphy (1999) observed, the initial reaction of the 
EC to the improved East-West relations was cautious at best. On the one hand, West 
European politicians celebrated the democratic reforms and the prospect of overcoming 
the East-West divide, thus underscoring the institutions of liberal democracy and 
Europeanism (European Council 1989b: para. 1.1.14; see also Schimmelfennig 2005b); 
on the other hand, the initial redefinition of relations on the level of secondary 
institutions did not raise prospects for enlargement. The European Council in Rhodes in 
December 1988 offered the CEECs undergoing democratic transformation enhanced 
cooperation and dialogue but no membership perspective (Friis and Murphy 1999: 218; 
Ingham and Ingham 2002). A clear preference for cooperation over enlargement also 
informed the creation of assistance instruments like PHARE83, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and the Europe Agreements concluded from 1991 on, 
starting with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. 
Several authors have shown how the EC, despite these signs of goodwill, soon 
came under increasing normative pressure to admit new members from inside and 
outside its own borders (Fierke and Wiener 2005; Schimmelfennig 2005b). Among the 
most fervent advocates of enlargement among political leaders was then British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher (1990), who suggested that  
the Community should declare unequivocally that it is ready to accept all the 
countries of Eastern Europe as members if they want to join, provided that 
democracy has taken root and that their economies are capable of sustaining 
membership. We cannot say in one breath that they are part of Europe and in the 
next our European Community Club is so exclusive that we will not admit them.  
The combination of security imperatives and moral appeals put the reluctant EC actors, 
who depicted widening as a threat to deepening (Schimmelfennig 2005b: 163), on the 
                                                 
83  The acronym stands for ‘Poland and Hungary: Aid for Restructuring of the Economies’, although the 
programme was later extended to other CEECs. 
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defensive so that the need to enlarge was essentially accepted by the early 1990s (Friis 
and Murphy 1999: 220–221). 
Towards Copenhagen: debating membership institutions 
However, this development presented the EC with a double dilemma. First, there 
were the already mentioned uncertain consequences of integrating an array of 
economically weak countries, which was not a possibility accounted for in the existing 
standard of membership. Second, even when judged against the existing standard, the 
eastern neighbours performed quite unfavourably: the CEECs were clearly European 
but their democratic transformation was far from consolidated, and while they may have 
accepted the supremacy and direct effect of EC law, they were at that time clearly not in 
a position to adopt the acquis communautaire. The Commission had made it clear in its 
opinion on the accession of Portugal and Spain that a mere partial adoption of the 
acquis was not enough to warrant accession (European Commission 1985). Generally, 
there had been a consensus that all of the accession criteria had to be met by applicant 
countries. According to the standard, therefore, the CEECs did not fully qualify as 
prospective members, and could not be admitted under the rules and procedures of the 
secondary institutions, which applied a dichotomous membership concept and did not 
provide for any intermediate form of membership. The overall institutional 
configuration surrounding the ECʼs boundaries thus appeared to be inadequate to deal 
with the complexities of the situation. Against this background, the ECʼs reluctance to 
offer a definite membership perspective was quite comprehensible.  
The need for the ECʼs institutional actors and member states to respond to the 
normative demands and the security context while safeguarding their economic interests 
and the institutional achievements made apparent a need to reform the institutional 
configuration of its membership concepts. This discourse targeted both the primary and 
the secondary institutional level. 
On the primary level, it became apparent that the existing standard had to be 
complemented by economic conditionality. A decisive moment in the development of 
this discourse was the Bonn Conference on Economic Co-operation in Europe hosted in 
April 1990 by the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). In the 
final document, the representatives of the attending states – which included the EC 
members, five CEECs, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia – acknowledged an intrinsic 
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connection between democratic institutions and conditions of market liberalism. Taking 
up this idea, the Dublin European Council of the same month explicitly connected the 
prospect of membership in the European international society to the adoption of a 
liberal economic order.  
This process of change brings ever closer a Europe which, having overcome the 
unnatural divisions imposed on it by ideology and confrontation, stands united in 
its commitment to democracy, pluralism, the rule of Law, full respect for human 
rights, and the principles of the market economy. (European Council 1990a, 
emphasis added) 
The summit also noted that the conclusion of the Europe Agreements was conditional 
upon the transition to a market economy. While a primary institution of market 
liberalism was thus being constructed as part of the standard of membership, it only 
partially found its way into the Treaty of Maastricht. Article 3.a.1 does specify “an open 
market economy with free competition” as one of the newly founded EUʼs principles. 
However, Article O., which was specifically concerned with accession, maintains the 
indeterminate language of the Rome Treaty by stating that “any European state” was 
eligible to join without laying down any further conditionality. Due to this ambiguity, 
the Maastricht provisions concerning enlargement were still too vague to effectively 
institutionalize market liberalism as part of the standard of membership. 
On the level of secondary institutions, there were two discursive positions about 
wider borders of the European international society. The first one was that of a new 
organizational framework for partial integration of the Eastern neighbours into the 
European international society separate from the EC/EU. The first vocal supporter of 
this idea was then French President François Mitterrand (1989; see also Smith 2005: 
761), who floated the idea of a European Confederation distinct from the EC, “which 
will unite all states of our continent in a common and permanent organisation for trade, 
peace and security.” Mitterrand made it clear that membership of the Confederation 
would only be possible “after the establishment of party pluralism, free elections, a 
representative system and freedom of information.” He thus proposed an organizational 
system of concentric circles, where all states fulfilling the prerequisite of liberal 
democracy could join the ‘outer circle’ of European political structures while 
membership in the EC remained conditional upon the full standard of membership. 
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Mitterrandʼs idea was taken up by the Institutional Committee of the EP. In a report 
from 1992, the Committee clarified that it  
[d]oes not believe that it is possible or desirable for all the nations of Europe or 
those which feel themselves to be European or are allied with Europe to be 
gathered together at some future point into a union […] (Hänsch 1992: 15)  
However, 
the Union must beware of entering a cul-de-sac at the end of which the European 
countries will be faced with the stark choice between accession and exclusion. 
European countries (and countries which feel European) that cannot become 
members of the European Union, or do not wish to join, must not be excluded 
from European cooperation. The Union must offer these countries new forms of 
cooperation outside the Member States. (Hänsch 1992: 23) 
It therefore proposed to create a pan-European system of ‘confederative cooperation’ in 
multiple functional fora on security, environmental, health and other issues. This system 
would be based on intergovernmental decision-making driven by the EU (Hänsch 1992: 
24–25). Despite these proposals, the idea of organizational differentiation did not yield 
any results at that stage. The ECʼs heads of state and government simply stated that the 
existing institutional frameworks of the CSCE and the Helsinki Final Act could 
adequately deal with the security implications of the transformations in Central and 
Eastern Europe, implying that no new institutions were needed (European Council 
1989a: para. 1.1.16; European Council 1990a: Annex 1). 
The second proposal was to create new forms of association with the EC/EU. A 
motion for a resolution in the EP in 1990 proposed the concept of a two-tier Community 
as a “transitional solution to the aspirations for membership of new countries” (Hänsch 
1992: 28). Thatcher (1990) took a similar stance, emphasizing that these associations 
should contain a clear membership perspective: 
Of course it will be some time before they are ready for membership, so we are 
offering them intermediate steps such as Association Agreements. But the option 
of eventual membership should be clearly, openly and generously on the table.  
In the same line of thinking, then Commissioner for trade and external relations, Frans 
Andriessen (1991; see also Smith 2005: 761), introduced the concept of ‘affiliated 
membership’ of the EC, where neighbouring states would be co-opted in certain policy 
fields as a transitory measure, but not granted access to decision-making. The idea 
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resonated with a report by the Parliamentʼs Institutional Committee, which suggested 
that the Europe Agreements be revised to provide for an association of the partner 
countries with the CFSP. The Commission suggested a European Political Area that 
involved the inclusion – without voting rights – of ‘partner-members’ in certain EU 
policies (European Commission 1992: 18). However, most EC actors rejected the idea 
of formal part membership on the grounds that this would cause “institutional, political, 
and psychological problems” (Hänsch 1992: 16). Similarly, Thatcher (1990) warned 
that  
introducing the concept of first and second-class membership of the Community, 
which would be divisive and defeat much of the purpose of bringing [the Eastern 
European] countries into Europe. 
These remarks may seem odd as the proposed forms of association factually implied 
partial membership, but they can be read as a means to emphasize the temporary nature 
of the desired framework and delineate it from any permanent two-tier system. 
This second strand of discourse eventually became dominant. From the point of 
view of the EC/EU, the association model had the advantage that it could display a 
degree of openness while at the same time maintaining control over the conditions of 
membership and the eventual contours of a wider Europe. As a Commission report put 
it: 
The term ‘European’ has not been officially defined. It combines geographical, 
historical and cultural elements which all contribute to the European identity. 
The shared experience of proximity, ideas, values, and historical interaction 
cannot be condensed into a simple formula, and is subject to review by each 
succeeding generation. The Commission believes that it is neither possible nor 
opportune to establish now the frontiers of the European Union, whose contours 
will be shaped over many years to come. (European Commission 1992: 11) 
On the other hand, it was clear that for practical reasons, such associations preparing for 
membership would need to specify accession conditions and procedures. A first move 
into that direction was made by the Commission report, which called for a clear 
roadmap towards accession in the Europe Agreements (European Commission 1992: 
18–19). By that time, however, the heads of state and government still struggled to 
make a commitment to Eastern enlargement. At the Lisbon European Council in June 
1992, which saw the decision to open accession negotiations with the countries of the 
European Free Trade Area, they declared their intent to develop an enhanced 
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partnership with the CEEC, but at that point, they could not bring themselves to commit 
to a clear membership perspective, as pro-enlargement and more reluctant governments 
failed to reach an agreement (Schimmelfennig 2005b).84 
The Copenhagen European Council a year later marked an important moment of 
institutionalization, which consolidated the discursive developments of the previous 
years. The Copenhagen criteria are a concise statement of the primary institutions of the 
standard of membership (Hillion 2011), including market liberalism as a new 
institution, which had two dimensions: “the existence of a functioning market economy 
as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the 
Union” (European Council 1993). This alleviated concerns of several member states 
such as France, Italy, Spain and Portugal, who were sceptical about the economic 
capabilities of the CEEC and feared that unconditional accession might lead to an 
economic periphery within the EU (Michalski and Wallace 1992: 54). The Copenhagen 
summit saw a firm commitment to an institutional framework for expanding the EUʼs 
borders to the East by incorporating the CEEC. Accession was defined as the ultimate 
goal of association and a roadmap towards full membership was outlined, which 
included trade concessions and a ‘structured relationship’ consisting of high-level 
dialogue with representatives from the candidate countries. Through a combination of 
primary and secondary institutionalization, the EU thus managed to reform the 
institutional configuration in a way that both responded to enlargement demands and 
preserved its interests in political and economic stability.  
Putting enlargement into practice 
In the years following Copenhagen, the focus of the EUʼs enlargement activities 
was on putting the Copenhagen agenda into practice through secondary institution-
building. Besides internal reform to build capacities for dealing with an enlarged 
membership (Dinan 2004: 283–297), this meant putting the accession roadmap into 
practice and ultimately deciding on membership applications. To this end, important 
questions regarding the standard of membership had to be resolved. In particular, the 
EU actors faced two problems: first, the standard had to be specified and 
operationalized in order to make concrete decisions possible. The most important 
                                                 
84  A detailed analysis of member statesʼ positions was presented by Michalski and Wallace (1992: 54–
59). 
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document in this regard was the European Commission’s Agenda 2000, released in 
1997, which developed indicators for the assessment of individual applicant states 
(Hillion 2011: 195). Despite providing supposedly objective criteria, these rules still left 
room for political considerations (Zielonka 2002b: 8), as the disagreements between 
different EU actors over the eligibility of individual countries shows. 
Second, the rigidity of the standard was up for debate. The Luxembourg 
European Council in December 1997 opined that fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria 
was in fact a prerequisite for the opening of negotiations. This restrictive interpretation 
was criticized by the Commission because it risked alienating aspiring members 
(European Commission 1999; Prodi 1999). In light of this pressure, the Helsinki 
European Council in 1999 gave up its tough stance, making the opening of negotiations 
conditional upon meeting the political criteria only, whereas the full adherence was only 
expected upon accession proper. This effectively implied the recognition of an 
intermediate membership status: accession candidates that partially fulfilled the 
membership could not at present become formal members of the EU but they were 
regarded as legitimate actors of the European international society. In line with this 
interpretation, the EU bodies created secondary institutions that provided rules and 
procedures for incrementally socializing potential member states into full adherence to 
the standard of membership. The ‘pre-accession strategy’ that offered privileged 
relations for candidates before actual accession and a gradual intensification of 
cooperation in exchange for improved performance are a case in point (Christiansen et 
al. 2000: 390–391; Inglis 2002), as are the Stability and Association Agreements with 
the West Balkan states, which included an eventual membership perspective and created 
an intermediate membership position (Prodi 2002). 
Dealing with a new neighbourhood 
These secondary institutionalization practices culminated in the signing of the 
Accession Treaties with the CEECs (plus Malta and Cyprus) in 2003. However, the 
question of how to define the EUʼs boundaries was not settled through these changes. 
Once the decision to enlarge had been made in principle, the discourse on the EUʼs 
borders merely started to shift further towards the periphery of the European 
international society. With the impending accession of the CEECs, the status of the NIS 
and the West Balkans came into focus, not least because enlargement was seen as 
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producing externalities in the adjoining countries both in the realm of security 
(European Commission 1999; Prodi 1999) and Economic and Monetary Union 
(European Commission 2003: 6). In that sense, endogenous institutional dynamics 
induced the next phase of institutional change: the neighbourhood problématique was 
an unintended consequence of formal enlargement as the latter shifted the interests of 
the main EU actors away from support of the existing, dichotomous configuration of the 
borders of the European international society. 
Adding to this dynamic, external shocks rendered the question of how to deal 
with the new Eastern neighbourhood particularly urgent. The violent conflicts in the 
collapsing Yugoslavian Republic provoked the question of whether excluding the West 
Balkan from the EU was in its security interest (Prodi 1999), while the EU simply had 
failed to formulate an adequate response to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
Thus, the existing membership institutions came into question, starting in fact at the 
very sidelines of the Copenhagen summit, where then French Prime Minister Edouard 
Balladur – echoing Mitterrandʼs earlier Confederation plans – presented a plan for a 
European Pact including the Western States, the CEEC, Belarus, Moldova, Russia and 
the Ukraine (Agence Europe 1993). Against the background of the Balkan Wars, the 
goal of the proposal was to formulate new principles on borders and minority rights for 
an inclusive post-Cold War European international society. Consequentially, 
participation was to be conditional on resolving border conflicts and minority issues.  
Besides reaffirming the notion of liberal democracy, therefore, Balladurʼs plan 
implicitly invoked classical institutions of international society such as national 
sovereignty and peaceful dispute settlement as a standard of membership. Respect for 
the more EU-specific institutions of Community constitutionalism or the acquis 
communautaire did not feature in this proposal. In Balladurʼs idea, the outer circle of 
the European international society clearly was to take more conventional forms than its 
post-Westphalian EU core. The concept of a separate standard for the periphery also 
informed the approach initially taken towards the Balkan states: from 1996 on, the 
Council developed a policy of closer cooperation with the Southeast European 
Countries that was conditional on  
 the respect for democratic principles, human rights, and the protection of 
minorities;  
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 the development of regional economic cooperation; 
 the liberalization of the economies; 
 and the peaceful settlement of disputes through the adherence to peace 
agreements and peace processes (Council of the European Union 1997: 
Annex III). 
While the Balkan countries eventually moved to the accession track of the EU’s 
boundary policies, this general idea of a peripheral standard of membership survived. 
With this differentiation on the primary institutional level came first attempts at creating 
differentiated secondary institutions. The European Commission proposed a European 
Conference in 1997, which was to bring together all European states which aspired 
membership in, or were associated with, the EU, to discuss issues of CFSP and Justice 
and Home Affairs. The European Council took up this idea and connected it to a 
reformulation of the standard of membership for the broader regional international 
society by connecting participation in the Conference to the respect for certain shared 
principles:  
The members of the Conference must share a common commitment to peace, 
security and good neighbourliness, respect for other countriesʼ sovereignty, the 
principles upon which the European Union is founded, the integrity and 
inviolability of external borders and the principles of international law and a 
commitment to the settlement of territorial disputes by peaceful means […]. 
(Council of the European Union 1997: 5) 
Like Balladurʼs plan, this paints the picture of a rather conventional international 
society based on national sovereignty, international law and peaceful dispute settlement 
– apart from the vague invocation of EU principles, which was most likely a reference 
to the reiteration of liberal democratic standards in Art. F of the new Amsterdam Treaty. 
It is consequential, then, that the European Councilʼs initial approach of inviting only 
the Central and Eastern European accession candidates to the conference was dismissed 
in 2001 and replaced by a more comprehensive format including, among others, 
Moldova, Russia, the Ukraine and the West Balkan states (Smith 2005: 762). This was 
more in line with the Commission’s intentions, which had thought of the Conference as 
separate from the enlargement process, and in fact with those of a majority of the 
member states (European Parliament 2000: para. I. (a), (c)). 
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The eventual enlargement of the European Conference demonstrates that the 
new standard of membership for a wider European international society, which was less 
exclusive than that for formal accession to the EU core, made it harder to justify the 
continued exclusion of the Eastern neighbours from organizational frameworks, as most 
of them fulfilled the standard more or less clearly – especially as the Council had 
declared that participation was not conditional upon ex-ante fulfilment of the standard, 
but that the aspiration towards them would be sufficient for participation (European 
Parliament 2000: para. I. (c)). This enhanced their positional power and their claims to 
admit them to the regional international society through organizational participation 
consequently had a stronger legitimacy. 
Launching the European Neighbourhood Policy 
It was not long, therefore, before the neighbourhood issue reappeared in the 
discourse on the EU’s position in the region. Proposals for new institutional frameworks 
were made in letters to the Council Presidency in 2002 by the then British Foreign 
Minister Jack Straw, the Swedish government, and the then High Representative for the 
CFSP Javier Solana and the then Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten 
(2002). Citing the security implications of a new EU border with Belarus, Moldova and 
the Ukraine, Straw (2002) called for a “‘special neighbour status’ rooted in a 
commitment to democratic and free market principles” for these three countries that 
would allow them to participate in certain Community policies, but not grant them 
membership. The suggestions by the Swedish Foreign and Trade Ministers at the time, 
Anna Lindh and Leif Pagrotsky (2002), focused on economic cooperation with all of the 
EU’s neighbours and a potential free trade area “from the Sahara to Vladivostok”, 
conditional on the endorsement of WTO principles by those countries. Upon invitation 
by the April General Affairs Council, Solana and Patten (2002) presented ideas about a 
comprehensive EU approach to ‘Wider Europe’, which included political dialogue, 
financial assistance, economic cooperation and partial integration into EU policies in 
order to avoid a ‘negative spillover’ of political, economic and security issues especially 
from the new Eastern neighbours. They argued that  
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[t]he starting point should be that relations with all our neighbours should be 
based on a shared set of political and economic values. […] Looking to the 
medium and longer term, we could foresee a gradually evolving framework for 
an economic and political space surrounding the Union, which would 
nevertheless stop short of full membership or creating shared institutions. 
(Solana and Patten 2002) 
They thus evoked the notion of a wider European international society, which 
did not manifest in EU membership but an upgrading of bilateral relations within a 
“new proximity policy initiative” (Solana and Patten 2002). The Council’s ‘Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia’ Working Group (2002; see also Permanent Representatives 
Committee 2002) responded positively to Solana’s and Patten’s letter, emphasizing 
however that conditionality should play an important role in the process. They agreed to 
limit the framework to Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus and noted that the initiative 
should not raise “unrealistic expectations over the prospects of accession in the short 
term”, while not ruling out eventual membership in the future. Based on these 
recommendations, the Council eventually launched a New Neighbourhood Initiative at a 
meeting in November 2002 – the same gathering that saw the determination of May 1st 
2004 as the accession date of the new member states (Council of the European Union 
2002). 
In a speech in December of the same year, then Commission President Romano 
Prodi described the rationale of this idea: against the background of instability in the 
Middle East and the Balkans, the EU needed to strengthen its profile as an international 
actor and project the benefits of integration beyond its borders. “We need a debate in 
Europe”, he demanded, “to decide where the limits of Europe lie and prevent these 
limits being determined by others. […] Accession is not the only game in town” (Prodi 
2002). The EU was to assert itself as the hegemonic actor in drawing the European 
international society’s boundaries and determining its membership, but not through 
formal accession only. Consequently, Prodi outlined a conceptualization of the 
European international society as made up by an EU core and a peripheral 
neighbourhood. The EU’s task was to socialize the adjoining states into this society: 
“The aim is to extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles, values and 
standards which define the very essence of the European Union.” However, Prodi 
remained quite elusive both on which norms to spread, and on the composition of the 
neighbourhood and the precise status of the neighbours in this structure: “The quality of 
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our relations with them will largely depend on their performance and the political will 
on either side. Of course, geography will play a role too.” The only primary institution 
that is explicitly evoked here is that of Europeanism, although the reference to 
‘performance’ points to further conditions for membership. 
The Commission tried to become more specific in this regard with a 
Communication entitled ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood’. The paper develops the 
Neighbourhood Policy as a framework for bilateral Partnership and Cooperation as well 
as Association Agreements that aimed at graduated economic integration of the 
neighbourhood with the EU (European Commission 2003: 4; see also Whitman and 
Wolff 2010a: 5). It also touches upon questions of eligibility. Interestingly, it mentions 
“aligning legislation with the acquis” (European Commission 2003: 4) alongside 
political, economic and institutional reforms as one of the expected contributions of the 
neighbours. It also mentions the adoption of the acquis communautaire as part of the 
conditionality to be enshrined in bilateral Action Plans, though not as an ex-ante 
prerequisite for entering into any kind of structured relationship (European Commission 
2003: 16). In outlining its vision for the Neighbourhood Policy, the Commission thus 
effectively applied the full standard of membership to the neighbourhood countries, but 
defined it in more gradual terms, in line with the ‘everything but institutions’ slogan: the 
more a specific country adhered to the standard, the more would its status in Europe’s 
institutional structures be aligned to that of a full member – only falling short of formal 
accession.  
The Council eventually took up this idea, envisaging a differentiated ENP 
comprising bilateral Action Plans with Belarus, Moldova and the Ukraine – and 
possibly, at a later stage, the states of the South Caucasus – which specified incentives 
and conditions that made the depth of cooperation with the respective country 
conditional on meeting of certain criteria (Council of the European Union 2003). 
Reiterating and specifying this concept, the European Commission (2004: 3) stated in a 
strategy paper on the Neighbourhood Policy that 
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[t]he privileged relationship with neighbours will build on mutual commitment 
to common values principally within the fields of the rule of law, good 
governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the 
promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy 
and sustainable development. Commitments will also be sought to certain 
essential aspects of the EUʼs external action, including, in particular, the fight 
against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as 
abidance by international law and efforts to achieve conflict resolution. […] The 
level of ambition of the EU’s relationships with its neighbours will take into 
account the extent to which these values are effectively shared. 
This statement of the standard of membership reaffirms all primary institutions that had 
been constructed in Copenhagen a decade earlier – liberal democracy, market liberalism 
and, partly, the acquis communautaire – except one: Community constitutionalism. 
Instead, it demands respect for (conventional) international law, thus placing the 
neighbour states and EU-neighbourhood relations outside of the EU’s own legal order 
but tying them into the wider regional international society. The ENP, officially 
launched in 2003 with three NIS and later extended to the South Caucasus, provided the 
secondary institutional framework for this idea. 
In sum, the process of redefining the boundaries of the European international 
society to the East had two main dimensions. The first focused on the primary 
institutional level, where the standard of membership was consolidated, made more 
explicit and complemented by the primary institution of market liberalism. Secondly, 
the boundaries of the European international society were expanded but at the same 
time differentiated. This process had a primary and a secondary component. On the 
primary level, the EU constructed a standard of membership for the periphery of the 
European international society, which was less demanding than that for the core of full 
EU members in that it was ambiguous about the acquis communautaire and reverted to 
conventional principles of international law instead of Community constitutionalism (cf. 
Diez and Whitman 2002a). On the secondary level, especially from 1993 on, the EU 
build institutions that were based on an increasingly gradual instead of dichotomous 
interpretation of the standard of membership (Friis and Murphy 1999; Smith 1996; cf. 
Wæver 1996). This found its manifestations both in the ENP and in the association 
policies of the Union.85 
                                                 
85  Of course, these are not the only instances of gradual membership, as the opt-outs by several member 
states in various integration areas demonstrate. 
Enlargement 
205 
 
7.2 Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific, c. 1967–1999 
The 1990s marked a number of important changes in the institutional framework 
centred on ASEAN. On the one hand, ASEAN itself embarked on an enlargement 
process that resulted in the accession of Vietnam (1995), Myanmar and Laos (1997), 
and eventually Cambodia (1999). On the other hand, from the early 1990s, ASEAN 
pursued a strategy of extending the geographical scope of its institutions towards the 
broader Asia-Pacific region. In 1993, ASEAN officials and representatives of the 
organizationʼs dialogue partners decided to set up the ARF as a platform for interaction 
on conflict prevention among states with a stake in regional security. Since cooperation 
in the ARF was based to a large extent on the principles, norms, rules and procedures 
that also informed ASEAN, and since Southeast Asian actors have repeatedly claimed a 
leading role for their regional organization in the ARF, the institutionalization of the 
forum marks the expansion of primary and secondary institutions of the Southeast Asian 
international society into the wider Asia-Pacific region, which is taken to comprise the 
area of the Pacific rim (Acharya 2001; Wunderlich 2007: 129). The enlargement of 
ASEAN in the 1990s thus mirrors that of the EU in that it comprised both the 
acquisition of new members and the expansion of the boundaries of an ‘outer circle’ of 
its international society beyond its organizational membership. 
When it comes to explaining the ASEANʼs motivations for introducing these 
institutional changes, scholars have offered different perspectives.86 Most of these 
works focus either on ASEANʼs organizational enlargement or on the expansion of its 
institutional model into the Asia-Pacific region and the establishment of the ARF. With 
respect to the former, there is a variety of studies offering predominantly rationalist 
approaches. For example, Wesley (2003) sees ASEAN enlargement as the result of a 
favourable constellation of expected benefits and costs of expansion, while Amer (1999; 
see similarly Narine 2002) assesses the relative importance of security, economic and 
political considerations in the enlargement decision.  
Scholars adopting constructivist ideas have emphasized the role of rhetorical 
commitments to pan-Southeast Asianism as a legitimizing concept (Chin 1997; 
Severino 2006; see also Amer 1999: 1040–1041), or the desire of the original ASEAN 
                                                 
86  Besides these works on ASEAN's internal decision to enlarge, there is also scholarship focusing on the 
motivations of the acceding states to join ASEAN (Aschhoff 2012) and on the consequences of 
enlargement (Nesadurai 2006; Emmers 2005). 
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member states to socialize their neighbours into the ASEAN Way of regional 
cooperation as an exercise in security-community building (Acharya 2001). Nesadurai 
(2006: 202–203) argues that the accession of the Indochinese states was made possible 
by normative convergence on market liberalism as a provider of growth and social 
stability. However, neither of these approaches explains why Cambodiaʼs accession – 
originally planned to be completed together with Myanmarʼs and Laosʼs membership in 
1997 – was suddenly put on the backburner in 1998 despite the great symbolic 
importance ASEANʼs leaders attached to the goal of completing an ASEAN of Ten at 
the organizationʼs 30th birthday in 1997. There is no systematic discussion in the 
existing literature of how ideas about legitimate actorness shaped the concrete 
development of ASEANʼs membership.  
As to the emergence of an institutional framework for the wider Asia-Pacific 
region, scholars mostly make arguments based either on broadly constructivist or 
(neo-)realist tenets. Leifer (1996) and Severino (2006: 5–6) depict the 
institutionalization of the ARF as ASEANʼs response to the perceived instability of the 
post-Cold War security environment. Tan (2013) applies post-structuralist ideas, seeing 
the concept of the Asia-Pacific as the result of politics of representation unfolding in 
regional academic and policy circles. Like in his account of ASEANʼs enlargement, 
Acharya (1997; 2001: 165–193) sees the establishment of the ARF as a sort of 
community-building effort focused on the promotion of ASEANʼs security model in the 
wider Asia-Pacific. 
While his and other studies (Leifer 1996: 25) rightly emphasize the role of 
norms in the emergence of the ARF, Acharya is simplifying the matter by portraying the 
process as a one-to-one extrapolation of ASEANʼs institutions into the Asia-Pacific (see 
also Yuzawa 2012). In a similar manner, Nesadurai and Khong (2007) apply a 
simplistic interpretation of the concept of path dependence, claiming that the rules and 
procedures of the ARF are a result of ASEAN's institutional heritage.87 By emphasizing 
the similarities between ASEAN and the ARF, Acharya as well as Nesadurai and 
Khong (see especially 2007: 64–65) overlook that the institutionalization of the ARF in 
general and its membership scope in particular were in fact possible only through 
processes of normative contestation and change. They see it as unproblematic and in 
                                                 
87  By contrast, their brief account of the Forum’s membership is based on functionalist arguments 
(Nesadurai and Khong 2007: 60–61). 
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fact plausible that ASEAN, a Southeast Asian regional organization which hosted a 
long-standing discourse on non-alignment, neutrality and anti-hegemonism, as well as a 
scepticism towards explicit security cooperation, would found and assume the leading 
position in an Asia-Pacific security institution like the ARF, “with ASEAN being 
especially solicitous of the major powers” (Nesadurai and Khong 2007: 69). What is 
more, the layered institutional framework of the broader Asia-Pacific area reminds us 
that its regional international society is not monolithic but rather gradated. While 
members of ASEAN automatically become participants of the ARF, the reverse is not 
true because, as in the EU case, established actors apply a differentiated standard of 
membership when appraising the membership of a state that has hitherto been 
considered an outsider.  
This section analyses how this differentiated standard came into being, focusing 
again on the interplay of the two levels of international institutions. It first provides an 
overview of the existing standard of membership and the related secondary institutions, 
and displays the feedback effects that held this configuration in place. The subsequent 
sub-section presents the discursive developments in response to the end of the Cold War 
that led to changes in the standard and in ASEANʼs organizational framework.  
7.2.1 Institutional context 
In contrast to the EU, which constructed a standard of membership almost 
haphazardly with each new enlargement round, ASEANʼs founding fathers88 made sure 
to formulate conditions of membership from the very beginning. The Bangkok 
Declaration (ASEAN 1967) thus declares the Association open for participation by “all 
States in the South-East Asian Region” subscribing to certain principles. 
Primary institutions 
The principles spelled out in the Declarationʼs preamble contain commitments to 
“joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership” and “active collaboration and 
mutual assistance on matters of common interest”, which invokes the primary 
institution of multilateralism. The promotion of “peace and stability through abiding 
respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region” 
(ASEAN 1967) pays tribute to the institutions of international law and the peaceful 
                                                 
88  The non-gender neutral formulation seems justified here, as the Bangkok Declaration was in fact 
prepared and signed by an all-male group of foreign ministers. 
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settlement of disputes. I have already pointed out that the institution of peaceful 
dispute settlement was subject to a regionally specific interpretation in Southeast Asia 
in that it excluded the option of legal arbitration. In the context of the standard of 
membership, it is important to emphasize a closely related feature of peaceful dispute 
settlement à la ASEAN: conflict generally was to be resolved through informal 
practices of quiet diplomacy (Khai 2004). The implication was that disputes were best 
settled if all involved actors could act in their ‘comfort zone’ and build personal trust. 
Involvement of the public, by contrast, would provoke practices such as shaming, which 
were conducive to escalation, rather than effective settlement. This connotation of 
peaceful dispute settlement implied a rejection of formal fora of conflict prevention, 
management and resolution (Acharya 2001: 64–67; Haacke 2009).  
The Bangkok Declaration also contains a pledge to “ensure their stability and 
security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve 
their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples” 
(ASEAN 1967). The ASEAN member states thus based their interaction on non-
interference and national self-determination. In substance, these parts of the standard 
of membership directly reflect the pluralism of the global international society at that 
time, and the preamble in fact contains a reference to the UN Charter (cf. Leifer 1996: 
35). It is not surprising, therefore, that the association saw the primary institutions of 
non-interference and self-determination not only as an internal code of conduct but also 
projected it externally and judged its neighbours by them, as is evident from ASEANʼs 
vocal condemnation of the Vietnamese invasion and subsequent occupation of 
Cambodia between 1977 and 1991.89 
The only more restrictive criterion for participation spelled out in the 
Declaration is that the country needs to be located in Southeast Asia. Like in the EU 
case, therefore, the standard of membership sets geographical limitations, a primary 
institution of Southeast Asianism, for want of a better word. Despite the fact that 
Southeast Asia as a geopolitical concept was a rather recent invention, there was a broad 
consensus among political elites of the boundaries of this area as encompassing the 
continental states of the Mekong region excluding China and the states of the Malay 
                                                 
89  See for example the Joint Communiqué of the 21st Ministerial Meeting (ASEAN 1988), where the 
occupation is condemned as a “violation of the United Nations Charter and international law, of the 
right of the Kampuchean people to self-determination, and of the principle of noninterference in the 
internal affairs of a sovereign state.” 
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Archipelago. The only ambiguous cases were Papua New Guinea and Sri Lanka, the 
latter of which was even offered membership upon ASEANʼs establishment in 1967 
(Severino 2006: 46–47). Eventually however, the view gained hold that both countries 
lay outside Southeast Asian territory. By consequence, when Sri Lanka formally applied 
for ASEAN membership in the 1980s, its bid was rejected on the grounds that it lay 
outside the confines of the region (Chin 1997: 5). 
It could be argued that ASEAN’s standard of membership in fact contained an 
additional primary institution. I have already pointed out in Section 5.3 that a strong 
rejection of foreign power hegemony informed the regional discourse surrounding the 
establishment of ASEAN in the period of decolonization, but those arguing for a strict 
interpretation of non-alignment did not assert a dominant position. The vague assertion 
that “all foreign bases are temporary” in the Bangkok Declaration was an expression of 
the need to compromise between orthodox neutralists and those relying on defence 
cooperation with major powers. 
In 1971, this disputed notion of anti-hegemonism found its way into the 
Declaration on a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) (1971), which 
states that “the neutralization of South East Asia is a desirable objective” in order to 
bring about a region “free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers”. 
When Brunei acceded to ASEAN in 1984, it subscribed to endorsing “all the 
Declarations and Treaties of ASEAN” (ASEAN 1984). This suggests that the ZOPFAN 
institution of anti-hegemonism had become part of the standard of membership of 
ASEAN, although its exact meaning remained disputed. Just like it could easily 
accommodate members with a clear Western alignment such as Singapore, the 
Philippines and Thailand, ASEAN was never as firmly anti-communist as its actual 
membership during the Cold War suggests. In fact, when the war in Vietnam ended 
with the South’s defeat in 1975, the victorious communist government was offered 
ASEAN membership but declined (Anwar 2001: 28; Aschhoff 2012: 50).  
Against this background, it is not surprising that ASEANʼs initially limited 
geographical scope can hardly be attributed to a restrictive standard of membership but 
was due at least as much to a lack of interest among its neighbours. Vietnam, Laos, 
Cambodia and Myanmar were all traded as potential members at some point but their 
neutralist or isolationist foreign policy stance militated against participation (Chin 1997: 
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6–7). Generally, these four states were committed to a more radical interpretation of the 
institution of non-alignment, which made them sceptical towards the idea of becoming 
members (Aschhoff 2012: 50–51; Narine 2002: 40). As the principles of the Bangkok 
Declaration were so inclusive and the primary institution of anti-hegemonism so 
diffuse, Southeast Asianism virtually became the only relevant ‘principled’ criterion of 
ASEAN membership, as the Papuan and Sri Lankan cases illustrate.  
Secondary institutions 
In general, the degree of formalization of ASEANʼs ideas about membership 
was quite low. While the Bangkok Declaration did make accession conditional on a 
commitment to the organizationʼs principles and objectives, ASEAN lacked a body that 
could specify and develop these criteria, as the Commission did in the European case. 
The only formal enlargement document in the first 28 years of the Associationʼs 
existence, Bruneiʼs Accession Treaty, was so generic that it could not set any 
substantial precedence for subsequent enlargements. By consequence, ASEANʼs 
membership decisions were largely based on political considerations negotiated, in the 
end, between the foreign ministers of the member states. This sometimes led to flexible 
arrangements, as the opening up of the TAC to extra-regional states, or the granting of 
ASEAN observer status to Brunei in 1981, three years before its formal independence – 
quite a remarkable move for an organization emphasizing national sovereignty 
(Dhanabalan 1984).  
The conception of boundaries was fairly dichotomous: between full 
organizational members and non-members, the only intermediate position was the 
observer status just mentioned, which implied participation in some of the Associationʼs 
meetings but without access to decision-making. Observer status was granted without 
distinction to two types of countries: accession candidates, such as Brunei, and states 
with whom the maintenance of special relations was deemed desirable but membership 
not desirable, such as Papua New Guinea since 1976 (Chin 1997: 5). Apart from the 
informal partial inclusion in the organizationʼs operations through the granting of 
observer status, there were no enlargement procedures or a clear pre-accession 
strategy.  
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Feedback effects 
For the first 20-odd years of its existence, the institutions of ASEAN borders 
underwent very limited change only. Insofar as concrete organizational expansion is 
concerned, this stability can to some extent be attributed to a lack of opportunity, as 
neighbouring states repeatedly turned down invitations to join. This should not obscure 
the fact that, had Vietnam been willing to join after the start of the Cambodian crisis, it 
would certainly have been refused entry because, as a violator of non-interference, 
national self-determination and peaceful dispute settlement, it would have failed 
ASEANʼs membership test. The basic standard of membership – and the associated 
rules and procedures of accession – remained intact, which can partially be attributed to 
feedback effects that provided the constellation with stability. 
Looking at power effects, the enlargement discourse was effectively 
monopolized by government or government-affiliated actors of member states. The low 
degree of formalization of membership institutions was in line with their desire to 
maintain a maximum of political freedom in decisions about enlargement. However, 
this does not explain the maintenance of the specific, inclusive variation of the standard 
of membership in ASEAN. As all of the member states were to a certain degree 
factually aligned with the West, it would have been possible for their representatives to 
redefine ASEAN as an anti-communist club. As to external powers, it could be expected 
that the major power antagonism of the Cold War worked in favour of a continued 
exclusion of communist states from ASEAN. However, the various overtures and 
formal invitations by the existing member states towards Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, 
and Vietnam make evident that these states were not excessively concerned with 
possible impacts on their major power relations. On the whole, ASEAN remained a 
non-, rather than anti-communist regional organization. Taken together, this evidence 
suggests that power effects were present but not overly strong.  
References by ASEAN representatives to pan-Southeast Asian ideas reappear 
time and again throughout the Cold War (Severino 2006: 41–50). As the confines of this 
region were hardly ever problematized but rather taken for granted, a certain degree of 
reification existed, which marked the limited membership of the organization as a 
transitory deficiency. On the other hand, it could be argued that this very mismatch also 
served to somewhat deconstruct the idea of Southeast Asia as a natural entity. Still, 
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Southeast Asianism remained a strong symbolic concept, not least because the 
alternative framework of bipolarity was not able to capture the logic of membership in 
ASEAN either. The international relations of Southeast Asia were too complicated to be 
framed in a simple dualistic scheme of East-West alignments. The consequences of the 
Sino-Soviet rift on politics in Indochina as well as intra-Communist fighting in 
Cambodia thwarted attempts to naturalize the division of Southeast Asia into a Western 
ASEAN and a communist non-ASEAN camp. If anything, the imagery of all countries 
of the region jointly belonging to a Third World may have been more informative of 
boundary conceptions in Southeast Asia than the distinction of two ideological camps.  
Within the given framework of ASEAN, most national representatives were 
eager to avoid any appearance of ASEAN as a Western, anti-communist bloc with 
potential defence implications. Their vested interests thus militated against the 
construction of a more restrictive standard of membership. In the same vein, the 
rejection of great power involvement, however symbolic, was supposed to maximize 
ASEAN countriesʼ clout over regional affairs. The member statesʼ security rationales 
allowed them to limit the promotion of peaceful dispute settlement norms to the realm 
of Southeast Asia. There was no question of extending the boundaries of the regional 
international society further into the Asia-Pacific, where ASEAN member states could 
count on the stabilizing effect of the U.S.ʼs role as an ‘offshore balancer’.  
When it comes to institutional linkages, the picture is rather mixed. It has to be 
noted that the low level of formalization of enlargement rules and procedures sets limits 
to vertical linkages, i.e. logical connections between the primary and the secondary 
institutional level. However, some evidence can be found: when Papua New Guinea 
signed ASEANʼs TAC – which had initially only been open to Southeast Asian states, it 
did so by virtue of a protocol that was specifically established to allow the accession of 
extra-regional states. The ASEAN member states thus ensured that the secondary 
institution of the TAC remained aligned with the primary institution of Southeast 
Asianism. The acknowledgement of the established acquis of treaties and declarations 
by Brunei in its accession treaty – a secondary institution – ensured a commitment to 
the standard of membership and thereby reinforced its primary institutions. On the other 
hand, the treaty did not specify or operationalize these institutions. As far as concrete 
enlargement policies are concerned, I have already pointed out that ASEANʼs 
geographical scope remained very limited despite the maintenance of an inclusive 
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standard of membership. While this could be read as a sign of vertical tension between 
the primary and the secondary level of boundary institutions, ASEANʼs factual policy 
of sending out invitations to other Southeast Asian states refute this interpretation. 
Horizontal tensions were also not very pronounced, as the standard of membership 
combined primary institutions of a pluralist international society. The only exception to 
this was the persistent tension, already emphasized in Chapter 5, between the primary 
institutions of anti-hegemonism on the one hand and non-interference on the other. 
 7.2.2 Institutional change 
Like in Europe, the end of the Cold War had a profound impact on the 
institutional landscape in Southeast Asia, although through different pathways. One of 
the main results of the end of the superpower antagonism for regional politics was that it 
brought about an end to the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and rapprochement 
between Vietnam and the ASEAN member states (Chin 1997: 7–8; Wunderlich 2007: 
118–119). With dwindling support from the Soviet Union and a weak domestic 
economy, a new Vietnamese leadership introduced economic reforms in 1986 and 
consequently sought improved relations with its neighbours (Acharya 2001: 103–108). 
The shock of the end of the Cold War thus provided a changed external environment for 
the reproduction of ASEAN’s border institutions. It also had a considerable, though by 
no means fundamental impact on the feedback effects surrounding the institutional 
configuration. These effects were enough, however, to open up discursive space for the 
discussion of institutional change. 
There was no immediate impact on the power effects in the institutionalization 
processes, as the dominance of government representatives remained unbroken. The 
reification of Southeast Asia as a geographical point of reference, meanwhile, was 
clearly strengthened because its alternative, the image of a region divided by dualistic 
antagonism, appeared even more out of touch with reality than it had before. Those 
arguing for enhanced boundaries now unearthed – correctly or mistakenly – the aim of 
bringing together all of Southeast Asia as a primordial goal of ASEAN. Naturally, the 
window of opportunity to accomplish ‘One Southeast Asia’ also forced ASEAN leaders 
to think about questions that had not been mooted before: at what price were they 
willing to realize their objective of including the entire region under ASEAN’s wings? 
Could the Indochinese states and Myanmar accede in their present state? If not, how and 
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when could they join the organization? In other words: will the standard of membership 
and/or the enlargement procedures have to be adapted? 
With respect to ASEAN actors’ vested interests, the rapprochement brought 
with it a de-securitization of the neighbouring Indochinese sub-region. Instead, their 
perspectives on relations with Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam were increasingly 
dominated by an economic logic, although this was an uneven development. Thailand 
was particularly receptive towards Vietnamʼs overtures for better relations as they 
brought with them the prospect of a new area of economic cooperation, with Thailand at 
its centre. The prospect of turning Indochina “from battlefields into market places”, as 
Thai Prime Minister Chatichai put it (Australian Financial Review 1989; see also 
Narine 2002: 54), was backed by references to the mythical concept of a ‘Golden 
Peninsula’ under Thai hegemony. It lead to a pro-Vietnamese shift in Thailand’s foreign 
policy outlook, which had hitherto been particularly critical of the occupation of 
Cambodia, being as it was ASEAN’s frontline state to Indochina (Weatherbee 1990). 
Singapore’s leaders shared Thailand’s interest but the more distant member states did 
not see similar benefits for their economies.  
Against the reification of Southeast Asia as a geographical concept and the de-
securitization of Indochina stood developments that changed the security interests of 
regional actors in a way that made it desirable to reconceptualize the regional 
boundaries in less restrictive ways. The governments of ASEAN member states were 
fearful that, with their Cold-War animosities settled, the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
might rescind their military presence in the Asia-Pacific. Apart from the impact on their 
immediate national security relations, they also saw the possibility of a power vacuum 
and increasing instability in the region. This point was stressed, for example, by 
Indonesian then President Suharto (ASEAN 1990), his Foreign Minister Ali Alatas (Far 
Eastern Economic Review 1991) and Lee Kuan Yew (cited in Acharya 2001: 168), who 
was then Senior Minister in Singapore’s government. Their preference was to keep the 
U.S. engaged as a security player in the Asia-Pacific and to socialize China into 
behaviour that was predictable and consistent with their security interests (Nesadurai 
and Khong 2007: 59–60). However, to actively pursue such an engagement meant to 
break with the traditional perception of ASEAN as a primarily inward-looking 
organization with stakes only within Southeast Asia. It also put into question the 
established association of peaceful dispute settlement with informal diplomatic practices 
Enlargement 
215 
 
and the principle of rejecting hegemonial aspirations of major powers. There was thus a 
tension between new security preference structures and the existing standard of 
membership, which constituted ASEAN as an exclusively Southeast Asian organization 
that tried to minimize outside intervention. 
The ARF – from a Southeast Asian to an Asia-Pacific international society 
Proposals for an Asia-Pacific wide forum to discuss security matters first 
emerged in the late 1980s. These initial plans did not come from within ASEAN but 
from policy-makers from Russia, Canada, Australia and Japan (Acharya 2001: 166; 
Narine 2002: 102–104; Severino 2006: 6–10). At first, they were not warmly received 
by the governments of ASEAN member states because of their long-standing aversion 
to anything that might be perceived as a defence alliance (Fukushima 2003: 81; 
Severino 2006: 8–9) – which was in line with the dominant interpretation of the primary 
institutions of dispute settlement and anti-hegemonism.  
However, over time, a more positive stance towards the idea materialized in 
ASEAN circles and they began reinterpreting the institution of peaceful dispute 
settlement in a way that allowed for more formal diplomatic practices. The Indonesian 
government supported the idea of an Asia-Pacific security framework after Suharto’s 
visit to China in 1990 (Leifer 1996: 8). In particular, the initiative by Japan’s then 
Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama to establish a security dialogue based on ASEAN’s 
Post-Ministerial Conferences (PMC) with its dialogue partners resonated strongly with 
ASEAN’s leaders, as it ascribed a leading role in the process of institution-building to 
ASEAN and foresaw that ASEAN’s principles and institutional characteristics should 
serve as a model for the new cooperation format (Acharya 2001: 174; Severino 2006: 
9). In 1991, the ASEAN-ISIS network of Southeast Asian think tanks produced an 
influential policy paper including a proposal for an Asia Pacific Political Dialogue 
under ASEAN’s leadership. It suggested that “ASEAN must play a central role in 
whatever processes and mechanisms arise. It must do more. It should be creative 
initiator as well as active participant” (ASEAN-ISIS 2006: 171–172). Commenting on 
the wider Asia-Pacific region, the Joint Communiqué of the 24th ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting (AMM), which took place shortly after the ASEAN-ISIS report, takes the same 
view: 
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The Foreign Ministers took note of the increasing interest in issues relating to 
peace and security in the region. They were of the view that ZOPFAN, the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South East Asia and the PMC (Post 
Ministerial Conferences) process are appropriate bases for addressing the 
regional peace and security issues in the nineties. The Foreign Ministers 
reiterated that ASEAN, in responding to the challenges of the nineties, should be 
more dynamic and forward-looking. […] They also recognised that ASEAN and 
other countries in the East Asia region and the broader Asia Pacific should 
engaged [sic!] in regular constructive consultations. (ASEAN 1991) 
At the PMC immediately following this AMM, ASEAN officials and their counterparts 
from the dialogue partners decided to extend the PMC’s scope, which had hitherto 
focused on economic questions, to security matters (Singh 1992: 111). They thus linked 
the PMCʼs secondary institutions to the primary institution of peaceful dispute 
settlement. By adopting Nakayamaʼs idea and making it an ASEAN initiative, the intra-
ASEAN debate about security cooperation was reframed as a project of extending the 
scope of the institutions of its international society beyond the confines of formal 
ASEAN membership. 
As pointed out, these ideas also put further strain on the notion of anti-
hegemonism, which was already tainted by diverging interpretations. The security 
dialogue, whichever form it was to take, was an attempt to engage major players in the 
region. The fact that they were seen as potential members in an ASEAN-affiliated 
institution was a complete departure from the claim to rid Southeast Asia “from any 
form or manner of interference by outside Powers”, as the ZOPFAN Declaration 
demanded (see also Kraft 2012: 63). 
So how were the changed security preferences to be reconciled with the existing 
primary institutions? In an interview for the Far Eastern Economic Review, Indonesia’s 
Foreign Minister Alatas (Far Eastern Economic Review 1991: 13; see also Acharya 
2001: 172) offered a reinterpretation: “We can’t keep the four powers [the US, Japan, 
China and the Soviet Union] out of the region. But there must be equilibrium among 
them and between them and Southeast Asia.” According to this reading, the overarching 
objective of minimizing dependence on outside powers as articulated in the ZOPFAN 
Declaration was still valid but should be achieved through an active balancing policy by 
ASEAN’s member states, not by excluding major powers altogether (Singh 1992: 
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101).90 The Singapore Declaration (ASEAN 1992) by the ASEAN leaders adumbrates 
this reinterpretation by incorporating a commitment of ZOPFAN “taking into account 
changing circumstances”. This minimal shift in rhetoric provided the basis for the call 
in the same document that “ASEAN should intensify its external dialogues in political 
and security matters by using the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conferences”. The vague 
nature of the reference to the ZOPFAN norms indicates that this reinterpretation was 
disputed at first (cf. Acharya 2001: 172), but later documents referring to ZOPFAN also 
affirm the balancing dimension while abandoning the idea of neutrality (ASEAN-ISIS 
1993: 10, 16). 
As proposed by ASEAN-ISIS, the subsequent institutionalization of the ARF 
was based on the PMC. However, even before the first PMC meeting on the issue, the 
question of membership was posed. Departing from the original proposal by Nakayama 
to limit membership to the ASEAN and its dialogue partners (Severino 2006: 9), 
Singapore’s then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong noted that “flexible arrangements to 
bring in China and Russia are […] being explored” (cited in Kin 1993). When senior 
officials of the PMC states met in May 1993, they suggested to also include Laos, Papua 
New Guinea and Vietnam (Acharya 2001: 171). This proposal was based on practical 
considerations, as a Malaysian Foreign Ministry official noted: “If we are going to talk 
about political and security issues, it does not make sense if China and Russia and 
Vietnam and Laos are not included” (Wah 1993). In the context of the existing, highly 
inclusive standard of membership, these proposals posed no problem and they were 
swiftly implemented by inviting all of these states to the inaugural ARF meeting in 
1994. 
Soon, however, ARF participants felt the need to establish formal criteria for 
membership – not least in response to North Korean and Myanmar diplomats, who early 
on expressed a wish to participate in the ARF (The Straits Times 1994). While the 
North Koreans’ plea was turned down without any public statement – although the 
foreign minister of the Philippines at that time, Roberto Romulo, suggested to 
eventually include North Korea in the forum – Myanmar was invited as a guest to the 
                                                 
90  An early formulation of this interpretation was made by Malaysia’s Minister for Home Affairs, 
Ghazali Shafie in 1974 (cited in Singh 1992: 61), who described his idea of a Southeast Asian 
neutrality system as encompassing, inter alia, “the observance of a policy of strict equi-distance by 
Southeast Asian states in political-security terms in their relations with external powers as a means of 
reinforcing an equilibrium situation between them.” 
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inaugural meeting by the Thai host government against the express objections of the 
U.S. government representatives (Acharya 2001: 173; Fujiwara 1994).  
Against the background of these seemingly arbitrary decisions, the ARF 
participants charged the Indonesian chair to draw up a catalogue of membership criteria 
in 1995 (Leifer 1996: 48–49). This presented an opportunity to formulate a precise 
standard of membership for the emerging Asia-Pacific international society. However, 
of the four ‘principles’ eventually adopted by the Forum’s senior officials, only the first 
one can be read as a reference to primary institutions: 
The first principle should be that any new member must subscribe to and work 
cooperatively to help achieve ARFʼs key goals. […] the main challenge of the 
ARF is to sustain and enhance the unprecedented period of peace and prosperity 
now enjoyed by the Asia-Pacific region. All members should work to develop an 
agenda which focuses on the security concerns of the Asia-Pacific region. 
(ASEAN Regional Forum 1996) 
It becomes obvious here that the primary institution of peaceful dispute settlement is 
now associated with diplomatic practices that it, hitherto, could not have justified in its 
specific Southeast Asian interpretation. As a standard of membership, the references to 
multilateralism and peaceful settlement of disputes are highly inclusive, as both 
institutions are basic elements of the global international society (cf. Acharya 2001: 
173). The other principles are merely functional and procedural:  
The second principle should be that the ARF should only admit members that 
can directly affect the peace and security of the region on which the ARF shall 
focus its peace-building and peace making efforts. […] The third principle 
should be that the ARF should expand carefully and cautiously. […] The fourth 
principle should be that all membership questions should be decided by 
consultations among all ARF participants. (ASEAN Regional Forum 1996) 
The only limitation to the inclusiveness with major implications for the ARF’s 
membership configuration was that members “will all be sovereign states.” The obvious 
addressee of this formulation was Taiwan, which was denied entrance upon insistence 
of officials of the People’s Republic (Severino 2006: 24). Ironically, this principle was 
disregarded from the very beginning, as the EU participates in the ARF as a corporate 
entity. This provided for a certain amount of tension between the primary and the 
secondary level. Generally, the expansion of the ARF kept on following ad hoc political 
considerations even after 1996, whereas principled questions of a candidate’s legitimacy 
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were pushed in the background. For example, ARF participants introduced an expansion 
moratorium in 1998, so that even states that might actually fulfil the standard of 
membership would be denied entry into the Forum (ASEAN Regional Forum 1998; see 
also Wesley 2003: 103). Even North Korea’s eventual entry in 2000 was made possible 
not by a fundamental reassessment of the regime’s eligibility against the standard of 
membership but by considerations of political expediency. The U.S. and its allies had 
used the prospect of accession as an incentive for the regime to change its policy in the 
conflict over nuclear armament (Leifer 1996: 48), and the eventual admission was 
initiated by U.S. Foreign Minister Madeleine Albright in response to progress in inter-
Korean rapprochement (Agence France Presse 1999). 
In sum, the establishment of the ARF marked the expansion of the institutions of 
the Southeast Asian international society beyond the formal boundaries of ASEAN 
(Acharya 1997). However, it did not imply an unchanged extrapolation of Southeast 
Asian institutions but was in fact only possible by a reinterpretation of the primary 
institution of peaceful dispute settlement and the ceased reproduction of anti-
hegemonism. The new standard of membership of this wider Asia-Pacific region was 
inclusive to the point of being indiscriminate, so that concrete enlargement decisions on 
the level of secondary institutions followed a largely political logic. 
Market liberalism? Vietnam’s accession 
In parallel to this expansion of the international society beyond ASEAN’s formal 
membership, the organization itself departed on a path towards enlarged membership. 
Calls for expanding the organization date back at least as far as 1991 (Vatikiotis 1991). 
I have pointed out above that economic interests in closer cooperation with Indochina 
were unequally distributed among the ASEAN member states, and Leifer (1996: 47) has 
argued that the initial impulse emanated from Thai foreign policy circles. However, he 
provides no evidence for this claim. In fact, even Indonesia’s Alatas (1991: 13), whose 
country was not one of the primary expected beneficiaries, was positively inclined 
towards the idea of an ASEAN of Ten already in 1991: “Now that Cambodia can 
hopefully be resolved we will go back to our original blueprint: Southeast Asia must 
become one, not a region of two polarized mini-blocs.” Officials from other member 
states, such as the then Finance Minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim, and Singapore’s 
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then Second Minister for Foreign Affairs, George Yeo, also lobbied hard for an ASEAN 
of Ten (Choo 1993; Business Times (Singapore) 1993). 
It is safe to assume, therefore, that a general openness to the idea of enlarging 
ASEAN to include the CLMV states was widespread among representatives of the 
existing member states by the end of 1993. The question was, then, on what conditions 
this objective should be achieved. The existing standard of membership constituted 
ASEAN as a community of sovereign states in Southeast Asia sharing a commitment to 
non-interference, the peaceful settlement of disputes and, possibly, the rejection of great 
power hegemony. Measured against these criteria, the states of post-conflict Indochina 
and Myanmar all qualified for accession. However, the idea of introducing stronger 
conditionality soon entered the regional discourse and gave rise to some controversy. 
Interestingly, it was Thai and Singaporean officials who took a more demanding stance 
towards the accession candidates, especially regarding economic reforms. A Thai 
official stated that Vietnam must prioritize economic policies over political 
considerations and endorse economic interdependence as a condition for accession to 
ASEAN (Jayanama 1991). 
Singapore’s then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong (1991) seconded these 
thoughts by highlighting the importance of further reforms: “The doi moi reform 
program adopted by Vietnam in 1986 is a good beginning. Its successful 
implementation will broaden and deepen links between Vietnam and the other countries 
in the region.” During a visit to Vietnam in March 1994, Goh even proposed an 18-
month moratorium on the question of Vietnamese accession. Representatives of the 
other member states mostly argued for quick and unconditional accession. In stark 
contrast to Goh, Philippine President Fidel Ramos lobbied for a quick admission of 
Vietnam at his own visit to Hanoi later the same month (Isberto 1994).91 
Despite the concerns voiced by some actors, market liberalism did not become 
enshrined as a part of ASEAN’s standard of membership.92 Reluctance on the part of 
those seeing a potential tension with the other, non-intrusive institutions of the standard 
                                                 
91  On the other hand, Ramosʼ Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and later ASEAN Secretary-General, 
Rodolfo Severino (cited in Xinhua General News Service 7/30/1993) had cautioned that quick 
enlargement would threaten ASEAN’s efficiency, arguing that “we cannot open the dam to a flood of 
signatories.” 
92  For the broader East Asian region, this assessment is shared by Foot (2014: 191), who explicitly 
refrains from according primary institutional status to the notion of ‘market’. 
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may have been a decisive factor. In any case, the idea of an 18-month moratorium did 
not gain support and in July 1994, ASEAN’s foreign ministers signalled their readiness 
to admit Vietnam as ASEAN’s seventh member state. At the same meeting, they also 
pledged to enhance participation of Vietnam and Laos in ASEAN cooperation schemes 
so as to “facilitate […] their preparations for eventual membership in ASEAN” 
(ASEAN 1994). This not only indicates that the member states saw Laos as eligible for 
accession. In effect, it also represents a sort of a minimal, informal pre-accession 
strategy. 
Liberal democracy? The disputed case of Myanmar 
In some respect, Vietnam was an easy test for ASEAN’s boundary institutions, 
as the country had become an overall stable and well-recognized state by the mid-1990s. 
Myanmar and Cambodia should prove to provide a much more profound challenge 
because of the criticism their regimes faced from Western actors as well as their 
problematic human rights records and lingering internal instability. Accordingly, the 
question that ASEAN officials faced was whether liberal democratic standards, 
specifically respect for human rights, and/or the internal resilience of a country should 
play a role in the assessment of accession candidates.  
During much of the 1990s, the Myanmar military junta of the State Law and 
Order Restoration Council (SLORC) was the object of heavy criticism from the West 
for its disrespect of democratic and human rights principles. In ASEAN, meanwhile, 
liberal democracy played an ambivalent role. The organization first officially 
acknowledged the importance of human rights as a universal principle in 1991 but 
emphasized that their “implementation in the national context should remain within the 
competence and responsibility of each country” and “that the international application 
of human rights be narrow and selective nor should it violate the sovereignty of nations” 
(ASEAN 1991).  
Whether such vague and stunted statements are enough to see an embryonic 
primary institution of human rights in them is debatable, but it becomes apparent liberal 
democracy also had champions within Southeast Asia, and there was indeed a lively 
debate on how assertive the organization should be towards Myanmar. Against 
Philippine and Indonesian will, Myanmar was not invited to the 25th AMM in 1992. The 
granting of ASEAN observer status – originally planned for 1993 – was delayed until 
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1996 (Acharya 2001: 111–112). The Malaysian government urged Myanmar to move 
forward on political liberalization (Acharya 2001: 112), and when the military junta 
cracked down on the oppositional National League for Democracy in 1996 and 1997, 
this prompted Malaysia’s then Foreign Minister Abdullah to publicly put Myanmar’s 
planned accession by 1997 into doubt (Narine 2002: 115–116). The Thai foreign 
minister at the time, Amnuay Viravan, suggested that the SLORC should move ahead 
with the democratization of the country before it could be admitted to ASEAN (Chin 
1997), and his successor Prachuab Chaiyasan likewise argued that the domestic 
situation was an important factor to consider (Stewart 1997).  
However, these arguments never became a consensual view of ASEAN 
governments, let alone an official ASEAN position. Even critical member state 
representatives were sometimes reluctant to explicitly refer to liberal democratic 
standards when justifying their warnings. As Narine (2002: 115–116) points out, 
“[t]heir reservations were expressed as uncertainty over Myanmarʼs ability to meet the 
conditions of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), but they actually revolved around 
Rangoonʼs domestic conduct.” In other words, they used functional arguments for their 
reluctance while refraining from invoking legitimacy criteria that could be seen as 
compromising national sovereignty.  
As a consequence, liberal democracy did not become a part of ASEAN’s 
standard of membership, and Myanmar was admitted alongside Laos – which was never 
seen as a problematic case – in 1997. Officials justified this move by referring to the 
primary institution of non-interference. Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh argued that 
“we have always taken a position that the internal situation of a country is that countryʼs 
concern”, and then Philippine President Fidel Ramos stated that “as far as the internal 
politics within each country, well, we did not begin Asean by examining that and 
excluding those that had a different system from ours” (cited in Khandeparkar 1997).93 
The idea that ASEAN must not suddenly change its standard of membership so as to 
provide equal treatment was echoed by Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas (cited in 
Acharya 2001: 112), who argued that “it is impossible for Asean to apply criteria and 
conditions for Burma’s entry which have never been applicable for other members in 
the past.” At the same time, Western criticism was refuted as ‘meddling’ in Southeast 
                                                 
93  This latter quotation is falsely attributed to Goh by Acharya (2001: 112). 
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Asian affairs (Narine 2002: 114). Southeast Asia’s primary institution of anti-
hegemonism was thus used as a legitimizing source to ward off external calls for 
excluding Myanmar. 
Domestic political stability? Cambodia’s delayed entry 
Originally, ASEAN had planned to also admit Cambodia in 1997. However, on 
July 5th, just weeks before the planned accession, violent conflict broke out between 
supporters of the First and Second Prime Minister, Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen. The 
clashes resulted in the ousting of Ranariddh, who temporarily fled the country, the 
takeover of governmental control by Hun Sen and the suspension of constitutional 
bodies such as the Senate, which is why the events have widely been interpreted as a 
coup d’état. In an urgently convened meeting on July 10th, the ASEAN foreign 
ministers decided to delay Cambodia’s entry (ASEAN 1997a).  
This decision stood in stark contrast to Goh’s statement made only a couple of 
weeks earlier that “the internal situation of a country is that countryʼs concern.” How 
could the organization justify the move when it had just rejected the application of 
liberal democratic standards in the case of Myanmar? Looking at the documents related 
to the Cambodian question, it becomes apparent that issues of democracy and human 
rights are virtually absent. Rather, the criticism focuses on the instability of the 
domestic political order and the ensuing security threats. The meeting of the ASEAN 
Standing Committee just three days after the coup produced a statement that deplored 
the impact on the well-being of the Cambodian population: 
ASEAN is dismayed by and deeply regrets the unfortunate turn of events in 
Cambodia, resulting in the loss of innocent lives, both of Cambodian citizens 
and foreigners. ASEAN calls for an immediate ceasefire. ASEAN also calls 
upon the Government of Cambodia to take immediate steps to ensure the safety 
of foreign nationals and provide protection to their properties in that country. 
ASEAN further calls on the two co-Prime Ministers, the 1st Prime Minister 
Prince Ranariddh and the 2nd Prime Minister Hun Sen, to resolve their 
differences peacefully. The Cambodian people have suffered from conflicts for 
the past two decades. (cited in Severino 2006: 58). 
In subsequent statements, ASEAN officials described the peaceful resolution of 
the conflict and the return to constitutional politics as a precondition for resuming the 
accession process. Malaysia’s Foreign Minister Abdullah said: “All that we want to see 
is that the government is in place, the coalition will continue, that the national assembly 
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will not be dissolved” (cited in Agence France Presse 1997). Singapore’s then Foreign 
Minister Shunmugam Jayakumar condemned the use of force as a means of political 
contestation and demanded a peaceful resolution of the conflict as well as respect for the 
constitution (Acharya 2001: 116; Kassim 1997; see also ASEAN 1997b).  
Notably, this language refrained from using notions of liberal democracy or 
human rights, focusing instead on the need of ASEAN member states to be able to 
uphold the constitutional order, the rationale being that domestic unrest would 
eventually threaten the stability of all the regional states (Acharya 2001: 116–117). The 
notion that ‘national resilience’ – taken to mean domestic political stability – and 
‘regional resilience’ were intertwined had a certain tradition among ASEAN countries 
(Amer 1999: 1033; Leifer 1996: 14–15) and had first been officially acknowledged in 
the Declaration of ASEAN Concord:  
The stability of each member state and of the ASEAN region is an essential 
contribution to international peace and security. Each member state resolves to 
eliminate threats posed by subversion to its stability, thus strengthening national 
and ASEAN resilience. (ASEAN 1976) 
Initially, however, this did not imply any prescription for the way in which ASEAN 
member states were governed. For example, ASEAN had remained silent on the events 
surrounding Marcos’ rule under martial law and the blatant election fraud in 1986 in the 
Philippines. It also did not speak out against the coup d’état by the so-called National 
Peace Keeping Council in Thailand in 1991 (Chalermpalanupap 1999). All in all, the 
concepts of national and regional resilience had represented more of a security doctrine 
directed against the subversion of the established regimes, not an intrusive criterion of 
legitimacy. 
Only in the context of Cambodia’s accession did domestic political stability 
become elevated to a primary institution of the organization’s standard of membership. 
This implied in particular a proscription of unconstitutional changes of government. The 
ASEAN foreign ministers first expressed this view in 1991, when they demanded “that 
no Cambodian party should be allowed to seize or retain power through force of arms” 
(ASEAN 1991). After the 1997 incidents, ASEAN officials clearly depicted the 
violation of this principle as the primary reason for the delay of Cambodia’s entry into 
the organization. Singapore’s Jayakumar (1997; see also 1998) was most explicit about 
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this, counting the imperative of domestic political stability explicitly as one of the 
“essential principles” of ASEAN cooperation: 
Any unconstitutional change of government is cause for concern. Where force is 
used for an unconstitutional purpose, it is behaviour that ASEAN cannot ignore 
or condone. As a principled and constructive Organisation, ASEANʼs reputation 
will be diminished if does not register its dismay and displeasure at certain 
conduct unacceptable to the international community. […] Recently, ASEAN 
reaffirmed this position by its quick, collective arid unequivocal response to the 
recent events in Cambodia […]. The use of force to overthrow the established 
government is a legitimate concern of the international community because it 
can also pose a threat to regional stability – a matter of concern to ASEAN.  
Alatas (1997) supported Jayakumarʼs position, describing the “regrettable turn of events 
in Cambodia which significantly changed the governmental set-up and political 
situation in that country brought about, unfortunately, by the use of armed force” as a 
challenge to Southeast Asia as a whole. These statements are remarkable, given that 
historic evidence for a long-standing norm against coups is fairly weak. Rather, ASEAN 
leaders appear to have introduced the normative justification after the fact of 
Cambodia's temporary exclusion. Still, the notion resonated with the diplomatic 
community of ASEAN. In what may be the clearest sign of its recognition, the 
Cambodian representative94 at the July 1997 AMM, Ung Huot (1997), said:  
I would like to stress that the operation which took place on 5th and 6th July 
1997 were not a fighting between the 2 political parties CPP [and] 
FUNCINPEC, nor between the two Prime Ministers. It was not [a] so-called 
Coup dʼEtat [as] has been alleged, but a legitimate action to prevent Cambodia 
from slipping into anarchy and a possible second genocide. […] The Royal 
Government of Cambodia abides by the Constitution, promises to do everything, 
to maintain political stability, bringing about peace, democracy, the respect of 
human rights and the freedom of expression in Cambodia.  
Rather than rejecting the validity of domestic political stability as a criterion, Ung Huot 
chose to present his faction’s actions as a means to abide by it.  
In line with these developments, Cambodia was only allowed entry into ASEAN 
after elections were held in 1998 – an express demand by the ASEAN foreign ministers 
(ASEAN 1998) – and a new coalition government had formed. While representatives 
from Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar and Vietnam urged to admit the country at the 
Hanoi Summit in 1998, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand insisted to wait until 
                                                 
94  Cambodia was still allowed to participate in the AMM as a guest. 
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the Cambodian Senate was re-established (Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1998). 
As a result, Cambodia’s accession was further postponed until 1999.  
The new emphasis on domestic political stability was in obvious tension with the 
primary institution of non-interference: How could the politics of a state affect its 
membership prospects if ASEAN claimed that these were internal affairs not to be 
interfered with by others? In an attempt to solve this apparent contradiction, some 
ASEAN leaders tried to introduce legitimizing concepts like ‘constructive intervention’ 
and ‘flexible engagement’, which had different contents but converged on the notion 
that, in cases where the internal affairs of a member state threatened the security or 
welfare of the others, a deviation from the non-interference norm would be justified. 
Describing the rationale of his idea of constructive intervention, then Malaysian Deputy 
Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim (1997) wrote:  
We need to ‘intervene’ before simmering problems erupt into full-blown crises, 
like the one now unfolding in Cambodia. […] Our noninvolvement in the 
reconstruction of Cambodia actually contributed to the deterioration and final 
collapse of national reconciliation. […] That's why we need to consider the idea 
of ‘constructive intervention’. 
The concepts would thus have had a similar function as the R2P idea in the UN 
framework, which clarified that a right to intervene in a sovereign state when a state 
failed to provide adequately for the security of its population, and thus mediated the 
tension between the primary institutions of national sovereignty and humanitarian 
intervention. However, neither constructive intervention nor the slightly less intrusive 
‘flexible engagement’, a term introduced by the then Thai Foreign Minister Surin 
Pitsuwan (Acharya 2001: 152), were endorsed by the representatives of the other 
ASEAN member states. The insistence of the proponents that their ideas do “not violate 
the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of another state” (Anwar 1997) 
did not resonate with conservative governments (Acharya 2001: 118; Nesadurai and 
Khong 2007: 45–46). Furthermore, they were not able to establish horizontal linkages to 
the existing primary institutions of the Southeast Asian international society. On the 
other hand, the debate did not result in an easy reaffirmation of the established primary 
institutions, as Acharya (2001: 156) suggests. The construction of domestic political 
stability as part of the standard of membership in the Cambodian case could not just be 
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undone. Instead, without any concept clarifying the relation between the anti-coup norm 
and the primary institution of non-interference, the tension between the two persisted. 
In sum, the developments show that the established ASEAN actors rejected 
market liberalism and liberal democracy as membership criteria but applied the criterion 
of domestic political stability when assessing the eligibility of Cambodia as ASEAN’s 
tenth member. Since 2006, when the ASEAN Charter was signed, the requirement of 
domestic political stability is also legally enshrined as a principle of Southeast Asia’s 
regional international society. The Charter counts “adherence to the rule of law, good 
governance, the principles of democracy and constitutional government.” This 
development heightened the potential for tension on the level of primary institutions as 
it begs the question of how to mediate between the intrusive logic of the primary 
institutions of domestic political stability and the non-interference principle, which 
never ceased to play an important role in ASEAN’s enlargement practices. Even when 
putting off Cambodia’s accession, Alatas (cited in Agence France Presse 1997) 
emphasized – somewhat awkwardly – that ASEAN “did not pass judgement on who is 
right, who is wrong, who is legitimate or who is illegitimate, or whether there was a 
coup dʼetat.”  
In the EU case, we have seen that ambiguities in applying the standard of 
membership resulting from tensions between primary institutions can be mediated in 
different ways: by differentiating membership statuses, by operationalizing and 
specifying membership conditions, and by political negotiation. While the first two of 
these involve secondary institution-building, the third is an alternative to 
institutionalization on the secondary level. Looking at ASEAN, we can see that it used 
the strategy of differentiation to a certain extent. It created the ARF as the 
organizational embodiment of an international society of states that fulfilled ASEANʼs 
substantial standard of membership but not the geographic criterion of Southeast 
Asianism. The differentiation principle was taken even further in 1997 with the 
establishment of ASEAN+3, a grouping including the ASEAN states as well as China, 
Japan and South Korea. However, differentiation was also used in the framework of 
ASEAN itself. For example, Cambodia’s membership perspective was never revoked 
and it never lost its observer status between 1997 and its accession in 1999. As the 
observer status usually included a right for candidate states to participate in a number of 
ASEAN administrative meetings, this secured Cambodia a position between full 
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participation and non-membership. In another example, ASEAN member state officials 
pressured Myanmar, which faced domestic civil unrest, to abstain from taking up the 
rotating ASEAN chairmanship in 2006, effectively degrading it to a second-class 
member, although this was possibly at least as much a response to external criticism as 
it was an application of the domestic stability principle.  
In contrast to the EU, however, ASEAN’s secondary institutional boundary 
framework remains weakly specified. There was no attempt at operationalizing 
membership criteria and the Charter provisions also remained very vague in terms of 
membership conditions. This left a lot of room for political considerations, a fact that 
became obvious when ASEAN failed to produce a word of criticism, let alone impose 
sanctions or suspend membership rights, on Thailand after the coups d’état in 2006 and 
2014. This raises doubts how firmly the primary institution of domestic political 
stability is institutionalized. Looking to the future, the only ambiguous case remaining 
is that of tiny East Timor. While the countryʼs government has expressed a wish to 
become a member, ASEAN officials have been reluctant to come clean about its 
prospects. As long as its domestic political situation remains stable, other Southeast 
Asian governments can hardly provide convincing justifications why not to admit East 
Timor.  
7.3 Conclusion 
To date, Comparative Regionalism has largely neglected the issue of regional 
organization enlargement. Existing comparative research focuses on why outsider states 
chose to join regional organizations. The foregoing analysis expanded on this limited 
body of research by asking how inside actors redraw the boundaries of regional 
organizations in cases of enlargement. I argued that the respective regional discourses 
are connected to a normative process of redefining the regional standard of membership, 
which defines actor qualities as accession criteria. I found that EU and ASEAN 
enlargement displayed certain common traits. In both cases, the standard of membership 
was contested and changed over time. As a further commonality, the standards 
displayed some ambiguities, which derived from a lack of specification and the question 
what would happen if candidates only partially fulfilled the standard. This impacted 
upon the way in which the enlargement of the regional organizations found its 
expression in specific secondary institutions: the differentiation of membership was an 
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important way in which the regional organizations translated the ambiguities into 
concrete provisions. 
Apart from these general similarities, the narrative reveals regionally contingent 
pathways of enlargement. In the EC/EU, the clarity of accession conditionality was 
comparatively poor in the beginning. Instead, regional actors developed the standard 
successively as they were confronted with concrete cases of possible enlargement. In 
this process, the Commission took on an important role through its opinions, the 
substance of which then found its way into the accession treaties. The Copenhagen 
criteria were a milestone in the development of the standard; however, they had to be 
formalized and operationalized through secondary institution-building. The main 
problems for a translation into secondary institutions were not tensions between 
individual primary institutions of the standard but the question of partial fulfilment. The 
establishment of an accession process as well as the launch of the ENP can be seen as a 
way of resolving this issue by differentiating full organizational membership from 
membership in the larger European international society (Figure 6). 
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In the ASEAN case, the standard of membership was quite well developed and 
substantial before enlargement actually became an issue. This standard experienced two 
main challenges in the 1990s. First, the shock of the end of the Cold War prompted 
regional actors to debunk the remains of the primary institution of non-alignment which 
had put a brake on formal security cooperation on the regional level. In connection with 
this, the primary institution of peaceful dispute settlement was reinterpreted in a way 
that called for more extensive secondary institutions, which could provide an arena for 
formal diplomatic exchange on security issues. These changes made possible the 
institutionalization of the ARF on the secondary level, which – like the ENP in the 
European case – introduced a differentiation of membership in the regional international 
society. In the long run, this differentiation may serve to further undermine the existing 
primary institutions: despite all claims to ASEAN centrality, the new regional forum 
now includes actors in the discourse that may push for a solidarist revision of the 
existing standard of membership (cf. Foot 2014: 192–193). The second challenge came 
from the chance to incorporate the CLMV states into ASEAN. In the case of Cambodia, 
the regional actors made attempts at introducing a new primary institution of domestic 
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political stability to the standard, which had its roots in the idea of national resilience. 
However, the degree to which this norm has been institutionalized remains unclear, as it 
has not been invoked in response to the subsequent coup in Thailand (Figure 7). 
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8 Comparative summary  
This chapter presents the main findings from Part II in a comparative 
perspective. The empirical studies illuminate some of the specific pathways of the rules 
and procedures of regional organizations in Europe and Southeast Asia (their secondary 
institutions) by relating them to the parallel development of the respective region’s 
normative deep structure (its primary institutions). The underlying assumption is that 
the primary institutions inform the discourse on secondary institutions by constituting 
actors and basic ideas about international conduct and by providing a legitimizing basis 
for arguments about organizational change.  
Four main conclusions can be drawn from the analysis: first, change in primary 
and secondary institutions is interdependent; second, the logic of path dependence 
exerts a strong influence on the development of regional organizations; third, there are 
different strategies to deal with contestation and tensions in the framework of primary 
institutions; and fourth, despite these attempts, secondary institution-building itself 
always includes ambiguities and face contestation. The following sections elaborate on 
each of these points in turn.  
8.1 Interdependent change of primary and secondary institutions 
When actors argue about changes in organizational rules and procedures, they 
invoke and reinterpret existing norms as well as promote new ones. They are thus able 
to transform the primary institutional context, making it malleable rather than static. 
The episodical case studies demonstrate this interdependence of change in primary and 
secondary institutions. Chapter 5 asks how the emergence of regional organizations was 
shaped by, and reinforced, the legacy of colonial primary institutions after the Second 
World War. It focuses on how regional actors institutionalized relations with external 
actors, arguing that these processes were a necessary – though not sufficient – condition 
for the emergence of regional organizations. Thus, the analysis showed that the genesis 
of the EC and ASEAN was accompanied by a redefinition of relations with the 
respective Other of the colonial era. 
In Europe, the question of how to deal with the overseas territories of France and 
other countries in a potential regional organization was the main source of friction. 
Underlying the debate was a tension between the primary institutions of national 
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imperialism and pooled sovereignty. The secondary institution of the Association 
framework, which maintained relations with the overseas territories but communitarized 
them, was an attempt at resolving these issues. Subsequently, this secondary institution-
building contributed to the demise of national imperialism: it changed the preference 
structures of the declining empires by redirecting their foreign policy focus towards 
Europe. The emergent primary institution of developmentalism can be seen as a 
functional substitute of imperialism, as it also governs asymmetrical relations with 
external actors. These observations connect to emerging scholarship on the imperial 
origins of European integration but provide a more fine-grained view: while scholars 
such as Peo and Hansen (2014) argue that the European integration project was 
essentially a way of perpetuating colonialism by tying dependencies into the EC, my 
analysis finds that secondary institutional choices did not simply peg hierarchies but 
also contributed to their transformation by supporting the institutionalization of new 
ideas about the ECʼs relations with the external world, as is evidenced by the 
recognition of sovereign equality in the Yaoundé Convention of 1963. 
The section on Southeast Asia echoes post-colonial literature on the Third World 
and regionalism in the Global South in that it emphasizes local agency in early 
regionalism. Like in Europe, external relations were an important focal point of the 
discussions. One of the central questions among regional political elites was whether a 
new regional organization should prescribe certain rules with respect to the newly 
independent states’ foreign policy ties to external powers. The notion of anti-
hegemonism had emerged as a primary institution out of pan-Asian regionalist 
discourse in the aftermath of the Second World War. However, it was in tension with a 
set of primary institutions renouncing the interference in domestic affairs of states, 
including foreign policy. This conflict impacted on the ultimate shape of ASEAN, 
where the provisions regarding external relations were limited and vague, while the 
relation between anti-hegemonism and non-interference remained unresolved.  
In Chapter 6, I use the example of legal integration to show how actors used 
existing regional institutions to push for regionalization. In both regions, the locus of 
legal decision-making was gradually shifted to the regional level. Only in Europe did 
this also include the partial recognition of individuals as legal subjects with certain 
rights with regard to the EU. This development occurred against the background of a 
tension between the primary institutions of pooled sovereignty and national self-
Regional Organizations in International Society 
236 
 
determination. The analysis confirms findings by legal and institutionalist writers that 
decisive momentum for the establishment of citizenship rules came from the ECJ, itself 
a body based on regional secondary institutions. However, it also looks at other pro-
integration actors such as the EP, as well as opponents, and how their different positions 
were legitimized by drawing on existing or promoting new regional norms. The study 
finds that functional arguments, which are emphasized by many integration and EU 
Studies scholars, were in fact important but not sufficient conditions for regionalization. 
Rather, different primary institutions constituting different logics – functional, 
transnational-democratic and national-sovereign – informed the discursive positions in 
the debate. Overall, the decisive development was the institutionalization of two new 
primary institutions: liberal democracy and Community law. These provided a powerful 
normative reference point for the ultimate inclusion of a citizenship chapter in the 
Maastricht Treaty.  
In Southeast Asia, a counterpart to the ECJ was missing, as was an equivalent to 
the primary institution of pooled sovereignty. Nevertheless, a vibrant discourse over 
legal integration developed from the 1990s onwards. Proponents drew mainly on 
functional arguments based on the economic logic. However, market liberalism was not 
a firmly anchored primary institution in Southeast Asia, which robbed the functionalist 
logic of an important normative fundament. Meanwhile, opponents of integration 
invoked the principles and norms of non-interference and a specific interpretation of the 
primary institution of peaceful dispute settlement, which rejected intrusion into national 
sovereignty. This discourse resulted in the creation of new but not particularly authori-
tative dispute settlement mechanisms within the ASEAN framework. 
Chapter 7 illustrates that the redefinition of the two regionsʼ boundaries was 
pursued in reference to specific normative ‘standards’ in the respective regional 
international societies. In contrast to the liberal community hypothesis (Schimmelfennig 
2005a), however, it emphasizes that the normative frames of reference can be malleable, 
ambiguous and differentiated. In both Europe and Southeast Asia, the standard – 
consisting of a set of primary institutions that defined legitimate membership – was 
constructed in response to concrete accession inquiries by neighbouring states. In 
parallel, secondary institutions pertaining to the regions’ boundaries – accession 
processes as well as membership statuses – were created to apply the respective 
standard. In Europe, the Copenhagen European Council provided a clear definition of 
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criteria, which consolidated the standard of membership but also begged the question of 
how to operationalize it, and how to deal with applicants that only partially fulfilled it. 
The establishment of differentiated membership statuses – evidenced in the 
development of a pre-accession strategy and the association agreements of the ENP – 
was the main secondary institutional outcome of these ambiguities in the context of 
primary institutions. 
In Southeast Asia, the redrawing of boundaries was informed by two core 
problems in the standard of membership. First, changes in the primary institution of 
peaceful dispute settlement, which was reinterpreted in the spirit of cooperative security 
after the end of the Cold War, brought it into tension with the primary institution of 
anti-hegemonism, as the former suggested more inclusive and the latter more exclusive 
organizational frameworks of security cooperation. As in Europe, the result was a 
differentiation of membership statuses, which materialized in the creation of the ARF. 
This narrative builds on existing constructivist accounts but also goes beyond their 
rather simplistic narrative of ASEAN simply exporting its normative framework to the 
broader Asia-Pacific region. The second core question was whether, in light of the 
pending incorporation of the CLMV states, the standard of membership should be 
revised. While liberal democratic principles were rejected as membership conditions, 
ASEAN member state representatives invoked an anti-coup norm to justify the delay of 
Cambodia’s entry into the organization. However, the absence of a clear formalization 
of this norm in ASEAN’s secondary institutions and the organization’s indifference 
over the subsequent coup in Thailand suggest that the institutionalization of this primary 
institution remains contested. 
8.2 Path dependence 
Previous institutional choices are a main factor for the further development of 
the institutional configuration of a regional international society. I highlighted in 
Chapter 5 that Comparative Regionalism cannot properly understand some of the 
distinct institutional characteristics of Asian and European regional organizations unless 
it accounts for the way in which processes of decolonization were discursively 
negotiated at their inception. The EU’s Cotonou framework for development 
cooperation is in part a colonial heritage, as are the provisions in the ARF’s documents 
to secure ASEAN’s centrality in the forum. 
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Path dependence is one of the reasons – alongside the synchronic factors 
emphasized by conventional Comparative Regionalism – why typical processes in the 
development of regional international societies such as decolonization, regionalization 
and enlargement can materialize in different organizational forms. However, the term 
should not be equated with institutional stasis, as Comparative Regionalism researchers 
sometimes do (see Section 2.3.1). Through such a theoretical lens, researchers are 
tempted to overstate continuity, as I have shown for the case of the ARF. While it is true 
that ASEAN’s institutional outreach resulted in the adoption of some of its norms and 
organizational features in the wider Asia-Pacific region, the creation of the ARF was in 
fact only possible through abandoning the primary institution of anti-hegemonism and a 
reinterpretation of the primary institution of peaceful dispute settlement. 
Change becomes possible when the feedback effects surrounding the 
reproduction of institutional configurations – power effects, reification, vested interests 
and institutional linkages – are disturbed. Such opportunities present themselves when 
regional actors manage to capitalize on the occurrence of external shocks such as the 
end of the Cold War before the enlargement of ASEAN and the EU or on endogenous 
sources such as the institutional tensions summed up in the preceding section. They can 
then influence the path along which the secondary institutions of a regional organization 
develop. However, there are limits to change because actors have to take into account 
the specific normative context which defines the parameters of what can legitimately be 
demanded. 
Seen in such a way, difference between regional organizations presents itself not 
exclusively as a consequence of different contemporary conditions such as regime types 
or economic structures, but importantly also as a result of historical conditions and 
processes. This is not to say that the former do not matter. The more illiberal 
governments in ASEAN, for example, might still have argued against legal integration 
out of the desire to maintain domestic political control and guarantee regime security 
even if non-interference and the traditional non-judicial interpretation of dispute 
settlement had not been long-standing regional primary institutions. But the fact that 
they did exist provided them with strong legitimacy, which significantly increased their 
positional power in the in the discursive struggle against the more pro-integration 
governments. 
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8.3 Different types of secondary institutionalization  
Despite these path dependencies, institutional development is at no point 
predetermined. Rather, the analysis in the empirical chapters has illuminated that in all 
cases under study, different positions on how to reform, abandon or replace existing 
secondary institutions can be found. As such, the study fleshes out, and transfers to the 
Southeast Asian and Europe case, the argument by Foot (2014) that secondary 
institutions are informed by contestation about primary institutions. The way in which 
these struggles unfold is an important factor for institutional development, and one that 
always involves an element of contingency. By consequence, the secondary institutions 
of a regional organization are related to, but not a direct effluence or epiphenomenon of 
the respective region’s primary institutions, as simplistic ‘embeddedness’ arguments 
prevalent in Comparative Regionalist arguments about the role of norms would have it.  
In all the episodes observed, the primary institutional contexts provided difficult 
conditions for the creation and reform of regional organizations because rather than 
being clear-cut and consistent, they provided malleable, competing and ambiguous 
standards of legitimacy. They empowered different types of actors and constituted 
divergent hierarchies of authority, as was the case in Europe, where national 
imperialism and the idea of pooled sovereignty coexisted in the period immediately 
following the Second World War. They also called for competing policies, as evidenced 
by the parallel emphasis in Southeast Asia on non-interference and national sovereignty, 
on the one hand, and anti-hegemonism on the other. Finally, they were usually too 
vague to prescribe concrete ways of action in a day-to-day application, as the 
Copenhagen criteria of the EU demonstrate. The case studies reveal that there are 
basically three ideal-typical strategies in institution-building to deal with such 
ambiguities, which differ in the political logic applied:  
 Politics of deliberation: in this type of secondary institution-building, the rules 
and procedures are changed in a way that creates a framework for deliberation 
and impromptu negotiation by the concerned actors. A good example are the 
security implications of the Bangkok Declaration, which provided a framework 
for regular consultation and remained consciously vague with respect to the role 
of external security actors in the region, thus leaving the resolution of tensions 
between the primary institutions of anti-hegemonism and non-
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interference/national sovereignty to political considerations in concrete cases.95 
For example, ASEAN would decide ad hoc in official meetings of government 
representatives such as the Ministerial Meetings, whether the conflict with 
Vietnam over its invasion of Cambodia called for the involvement of the U.S. or 
should be resolved internally. If this type of secondary institution building 
dominates, subsequent change hinges on the successful introduction of new 
normative claims in the deliberative arenas. The reinterpretation of the norms of 
dispute settlement in Southeast Asia preceding the establishment of the ARF are 
a case in point. 
 Politics of administration: a regional organization can also provide formal 
prescriptions for action as concretely as possible. Rather than specifying rules 
and procedures which open up discursive space for deliberation, the goal is to 
minimize uncertainty about how to translate principles and norms into legitimate 
action. This attempt is visible in the enlargement rules and procedures of the EU 
developed after the Copenhagen Council in 1993, which tried to specify and 
operationalize criteria for membership eligibility as well as the details of the 
accession process. If secondary institutionalization relies primarily on this logic, 
subsequent change will mainly be driven by functional spillover or unintended 
consequences of rule-making. For example, the establishment of concrete 
criteria for EU membership raised the question how to deal with candidates 
which only partially fulfilled the criteria, and resulted in the differentiation of 
membership statuses, ranging from full formal accession to association with or 
without a clear membership perspective. 
 Politics of adjudication: finally, an impartial authority can be established with 
the task of evaluating the legitimacy of conduct in debated cases. If uncertainty 
over concrete obligations in specific cases arises, this body clarifies ambiguities 
by interrogating the meaning of the primary institutions, judging their relative 
importance and issuing more or less binding interpretations. Subsequent change 
on this institutional basis is possible either when the authority demands that 
                                                 
95  The term deliberation as I use it here diverges from its use in some works of political theory (see for 
example Fishkin 1991). In my understanding, deliberation merely describes a process of decision-
making based on normative arguing among actors with potentially different beliefs and interests. As 
such, it does not necessarily take place in inclusive, public settings involving all stakeholders. I thank 
Michael Giesen for bringing this to my attention. 
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existing secondary institutions be adapted because they are illegitimate in their 
current form, or when its case law drives change in the primary institutions. The 
ECJ’s role in driving the constitutionalization of EC law is an instance of the 
latter.96 
In the instances observed, European actors tended to choose secondary 
institutions that emphasized the politics of administration and adjudication to a greater 
extent than their Southeast Asian counterparts, who relied more heavily on frameworks 
for politics of deliberation, as is evident from the more informal, non-confrontational 
and consensus-oriented rules and procedures of most of the ASEAN bodies. This 
finding resonates to some extent with the numerous characterizations of regionalism in 
Europe and Southeast Asia as legalistic versus informal or network-oriented (Eliassen 
and Árnadóttir 2014; Higgott 2014; Jetschke 2009; Jetschke and Katada 2016; Jones 
and Smith 2007; Katzenstein 2005; Mattli 1999; Yeo 2010). However, the analysis also 
reveals that a simple dualism overlooks important nuances. Secondary institutions in 
both regions usually contain elements of all three different institutional logics. For 
example, dispute settlement in Southeast Asia is largely characterized by political 
deliberation but it also contains certain judicial elements, as is evidenced by the High 
Council of the TAC, and it is increasingly being formalized. Even if Southeast Asian 
actors prefer to settle disputes in bilateral, informal settings, they increasingly have to 
take the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008), i.e. the possibility of 
eventual referral to an independent judiciary, into account. 
Still, the observation of different approaches to secondary institutionalization is 
important in terms of difference between regional organizations because, as pointed out, 
they affect possibilities for further change. More administratively and legally informed 
secondary institutions tend to have a more subversive impact on the feedback effects 
surrounding the reproduction of institutional configurations. In other words, they 
provide more endogenous pressure for change than deliberative secondary institutions. 
The creation of new bodies with some kind of judicial authority is probably the most 
effective strategy in this respect because it can alter power configurations and impinge 
on the positional power of national governments. The judicial body itself can directly 
                                                 
96  In his essay on the three types of political rule, Weber (2010) has subsumed the latter two types under 
the ideal-type of rational-legal authority. However, for the purpose of obtaining a more fine-grained 
picture of institutional design and its effects, it seems expedient to keep the logics of administrative 
and adjudicative secondary institutions separate. 
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promote changes in primary institutions or demand adaption in secondary institutions. 
As seen in the case of legal integration in Europe, it can also alter the preference 
structures of domestic actors. Interests can also be realigned through politics of 
administration because specific administrative rules and procedures distribute privileges 
in an unprecedented way. This was the case with the EECʼs Association framework, 
which directed the collapsing European empiresʼ foreign policy orientation away from 
its former overseas territories. If secondary institutions rather provide an arena for 
deliberation and ad hoc negotiation, on the other hand, power effects – meaning the 
closure of the discursive arena against potential challenges – are strengthened because 
existing power configurations are formalized and perpetuated, which makes institutional 
innovation harder. 
As a consequence of the reliance on judicial and administrative types of 
institution-building, ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in Europe promoting change in primary 
institutions were often in a favourable position because endogenous dynamics in the 
context of secondary institutions improved their discursive position. Changes in 
European organizations therefore often catalyzed further institutional dynamics – 
endogenous sources for institutional change could thus coincide with exogenous 
influences such as the end of the Cold War. The dynamics of change in Europe often 
approximated a template where the discourse surrounding regional organizations 
translated a certain normative context into corresponding secondary institutions, which 
subsequently transformed the discursive spaces and positions for the reproduction of 
primary institutions. Subsequent change on the primary level then in turn led to renewed 
efforts to reform secondary institutions. In this way, change oscillated between the two 
institutional levels of the international societies: the creation of the ECJ catalyzed the 
emergence of Community constitutionalism and democracy as primary institutions, 
which subsequently provided a conducive context for the institutionalization of 
citizenship rules in the EU. 
While changes in primary institutions were also possible in Southeast Asia, the 
more deliberative nature of secondary institutions did not disturb the feedback effects in 
the same manner and therefore mostly served to consolidate, rather than undermine, the 
normative framework of the regionʼs international society. By consequence, exogenous 
shocks did not coincide with endogenous institutional dynamics to the same extent as in 
Europe. This made it harder for progressive actors in Southeast Asia to promote 
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institutional reforms. These institutionalization practices, in conjunction with the logic 
of path dependence, help explain why similar external influences could materialize in 
divergent institutional forms in Europe and Southeast Asia. 
8.4 Limitations of institution-building 
Despite these findings, I am hesitant to claim that Europe hosts more advanced 
secondary institutions than Southeast Asia. This position, evidenced by 
characterizations of (South-)East Asian regionalism as ‘belated’ (Beeson 2005: 978) or 
‘lagging’ behind its European counterpart (Breslin et al. 2002: 11), is questionable for at 
least two reasons. First, while the empirical findings show that regional international 
societies may display common macro-phenomena of change like decolonization, 
regionalization and enlargement, there is no evidence to support the idea of a 
teleological tendency towards a common template of regional primary and secondary 
institutions. To the contrary, my study highlights that institutional pathways are 
contingent and divergent. Absent a common end-point, a gradual measurement of 
advance is problematic and differences should be understood more in qualitative terms. 
Second, it could be argued that Europeʼs own record of building regional 
organizations displays too many inconsistencies and ambivalences to be regarded as a 
particularly advanced model of institutionalization. In fact, in no case under study did 
secondary institution-building resolve the ambiguities or end contestation on the 
primary level definitely: 
 Decolonization: in Southeast Asia, ASEAN and its predecessors buttressed 
newly independent states, but differences persisted over their external relations 
and the exact meaning of the primary institution of non-alignment or anti-
hegemonism and its translation into organizational rules. Meanwhile, in Europe, 
the communitarization of the ECʼs relations with its former colonies through the 
Association framework helped abandon national imperialist ideas, but the 
arrangement continued to face criticism for maintaining neo-colonial centre-
periphery structures. 
 Regionalization: in Southeast Asia, mechanisms for interstate dispute settlement 
have proliferated but remain scarcely used, as regional actors prefer to resolve 
issues bilaterally or refer them to global bodies. In Europe, an independent legal 
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order and citizenship rights were established, but the latter remain rather 
circumscribed and fell short of the expectations of many supporters. 
 Enlargement: in both Europe and Southeast Asia, regional boundaries have been 
redrawn. ASEAN has admitted new members and also expanded its normative 
framework to the broader Asia-Pacific region, but the organization’s uneven 
reactions to the coups in Cambodia and Thailand as well as East Timorʼs unclear 
future raise the question whether all member states are judged against the same 
standard. Meanwhile, within the ARF, those pushing for active conflict 
prevention face opposition by more sovereignty-minded participants who would 
like to see it as a mere discussion group. In Europe, the EUʼs enlargement and 
the creation of the ENP have fundamentally reshaped the continent but questions 
as to the finality of the EUʼs borders and its relations to the more peripheral 
European countries persist. 
Against the background of my analytical framework, these mixed records do not appear 
as failures in institution-building but as a necessary corollary of reproducing institutions 
in a dynamic and inconsistent normative context. 
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9 Conclusion 
This thesis set out to explain differences between regional organizations by 
analyzing how regional actors draw on a dynamic regional context of norms when 
arguing about institutional change. The following chapter critically reflects the strengths 
and limitations of the analytical approach and points out some lessons for the field of 
Comparative Regionalism. It then briefly touches upon normative and practical 
implications before concluding with some suggestions for future research.  
9.1 Theoretical reflexion 
My study builds upon existing Comparative Regionalism literature, which 
provides some important cues as to the sources of differences between regional 
organizations. For example, the existing literature rightly points out that regional 
organizations are conscious constructions by state representatives, who can draw on 
differential power resources in their attempts to gear the organizations’ rules and 
procedures towards forms which are consistent with their preferences (Beeson 2005; 
Webber 2006). Despite the fact that institutions are supposed to fulfil certain functions 
(Goltermann et al. 2012) and respond to crises (Gillespie 2015), they often seem to be 
less than optimal solutions to given problems (Jetschke 2009) and develop a ‘life of 
their own’ (Moxon-Browne 2015: 69).  
While appreciating these insights, I also identify certain weak spots in 
Comparative Regionalism, especially its a-historicity and the unclear status of norms. 
Scholars hardly ever acknowledge that the reproduction of organizational structures is 
interdependent with dynamics in the ‘deep structure’ of regional international societies. 
Those approaches that do take fundamental norms into account usually treat them as 
unmalleable and consistent. In this perspective, regional organizations are ‘embedded’ 
in a more or less exogenously given normative context. They are thus ignorant to the 
way in which the norms themselves are subject to discursive struggles and, as a 
consequence, may be contingent, dynamic and ambiguous.  
In order to fill this gap, I developed an analytical framework that makes it 
possible to analyze the social mechanisms surrounding the reproduction of institutional 
configurations in regional international societies. The theoretical apparatus builds upon 
the English School concepts of primary and secondary institutions. However, I also 
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undertook some fundamental refinements of the Schoolʼs established theoretical 
framework. Drawing on concepts and ideas from social constructivism and historical 
institutionalism, my study focused on clarifying the relation between primary and 
secondary institutions by mapping the mechanisms of institutionalization and 
constitution that reproduce institutional configurations of international societies. The 
general theoretical argument is that these mechanisms create path-dependent dynamics 
of institutional stability and change. The concrete manifestation of change in regional 
organizations depends on regionally specific and dynamic normative contexts, previous 
choices in secondary institutions and discursive processes. Because of these path 
dependencies, forces such as global shocks, globalization and diffusion (Börzel and 
Risse 2012; Börzel and van Hüllen 2015a) can stimulate changes that are similar in 
form – decolonization, regionalization and enlargement are cases in point – but different 
in substance.  
9.1.1 Contributions to Comparative Regionalism 
In all the case studies, this approach provided insights that linked up to existing 
research but also went beyond existing findings. The empirical chapters highlight that, 
contrary to common assumptions of Comparative Regionalism researchers, the 
normative context of regional organizations is hardly ever static. Instead, it can be 
changed in the very process of arguing about the creation or reform of regional 
organizations. This is especially evident in the section on the enlargement of the 
EC/EU, where I show that the standard of membership – the set of primary institutions 
defining necessary qualities of an eligible member – was not the logical by-product of a 
community-building project of democratic states (Schimmelfennig 2005a) but actively 
constructed in the process of enlargement. 
Comparative research on Southeast Asian regionalism often takes the normative 
underpinnings of ASEAN for granted and uses them to explain the region’s 
idiosyncrasies subsumed under the buzzword of the ‘ASEAN Way’ (Narine 2002; 
Nesadurai and Khong 2007). Although the criticism of such approaches as essentialist 
(Börzel 2016: 50; Lenz and Marks 2016: 521) is sometimes overstated, I agree that the 
question of normative continuity or change should be an empirical one. For example, 
the chapter on legal integration provides some support for the thesis that normative 
inertia is obstructing change in ASEAN. Without strong pro-regionalization actors, the 
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primary institutional context remained constant and could not provide a strong 
legitimizing background to arguments for stronger legalization. On the other hand, 
when it comes to enlargement, normative change, not stasis, serves to explain the 
specific secondary institutions which redrew the region’s boundaries. Only by 
dismantling the primary institution of anti-hegemonism and reinterpreting existing 
notions of peaceful dispute settlement did the institutionalization of the ARF and by 
consequence the expansion of the Southeast Asian international society into the wider 
Asia-Pacific realm become possible. 
In a further difference from conventional Comparative Regionalism, my study 
shows that normative ambiguity is the rule rather than the exception in regional 
institution-building. The long struggles over the meaning of non-alignment in Southeast 
Asia and the constitutional character of EC law in Europe highlight that primary 
institutions are essentially contested concepts (cf. Costa Buranelli 2015a). The form of 
regional organizations is not simply the ‘reflection’ of a regional normative consensus, 
as the narrative of the ‘ASEAN Way’ pervading many of the Comparative Regionalist 
accounts of Southeast Asia suggests, but a result of an attempt to reconcile divergent 
interpretations in a single organizational framework. 
Primary institutions can also be in tension with each other. Emphasizing 
inconsistencies is more than nitpicking because such tensions can be mobilized to 
construct pressure for change. One reason why processes of legalization were more 
dynamic in Europe than in Southeast Asia was because of a strong initial tension 
between the primary institutions of national self-determination and pooled sovereignty 
in the former regional international society, as compared to a relatively consistent 
primary institutional context in Southeast Asia. This sensibility for ambiguities, and the 
role they have for the reproduction of differences between regional organizations, 
contrasts with the assumption that organizations directly reflect underlying norms, 
which dominates existing explanations in Comparative Regionalism. 
My study thus holds added value for Comparative Regionalism and makes a 
case for using English School concepts in this strand of research. Apart from drawing 
attention to the role of fundamental regional norms in general, the focus on primary and 
secondary institutions may also help to explain some open questions in the current 
literature, such as why functionalist explanations seem to work well in some cases but 
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less so in others (Jetschke and Katada 2016; Korte 2012; Lenz and Marks 2016: 518–
519). As the study of legal integration in Chapter 6 revealed, some primary institutional 
contexts are more conducive to a functional logic of regional organization-building than 
others. Absent a firmly institutionalized primary institution of market liberalism, 
functionalist arguments for stronger dispute settlement did not resonate strongly in the 
Southeast Asian discourse. 
The approach also provides an explanation why there is continued resistance to 
the diffusion of institutional models, be it from the EU towards ASEAN (Jetschke 2009; 
Wong 2012) or in the form of ‘downloading’ from a global script (Börzel and van 
Hüllen 2015a). Diffusion theories claim that regional actors tend to ‘localize’ norms 
(Acharya 2009), but they do not usually provide an account for how local 
predispositions come into being in the first place. Here, a focus on the relation between 
primary and secondary institutions can disclose how fundamental normative structures 
limit the adaptability of regional organizations to external influences such as the R2P 
norm. To be sure, the normative context can be changed, but such change is usually 
slow and depends on the discursive support of a regional diplomatic community. 
Apart from making the case for a fruitful engagement of Comparative 
Regionalism with English School concepts, my study also provides some evidence that 
the theorization and analysis of the social mechanisms surrounding the reproduction of 
international institutions will be of value for the theoretical advancement of the English 
School itself. Other scholars have also identified this potential and begun to employ it 
successfully in different research contexts (Friedner Parrat 2015; Knudsen 2013; 
2015a). An emphasis on how different actors attempt to assert and maintain definitional 
power by engaging in normative arguing serves as a reminder that order is not given in 
international relations but instead international society is an inherently political 
phenomenon (Spandler 2015). 
9.1.2 Potential criticism 
Despite this positive evaluation of the approach’s viability, I would like to 
highlight three caveats. First, as indicated already in Chapter 4, producing 
generalizations is only in a very limited sense possible with this approach. It can 
uncover differences in historical pathways of institutional development but, because of 
the reliance on constitutive explanation and contingencies, it is unsuitable for 
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hypothesis testing or uncovering scope conditions for the development of particular 
secondary institutions. The comparative summary has aggregated the empirical 
observations to some more general claims about how the institutionalization of regional 
organizations in Europe and Southeast Asia accorded primacy to certain political logics. 
This being said, theoretical generalization was not a goal of the study in the first place. 
In fact, the very idea of regional organizations following pathways that are connected to 
a dynamic normative context suggests that general claims are only of a very limited use. 
Contingencies, not general laws, are the main determinants in the development of 
regional organizations. 
Second, it might be argued that the framework supports certain Eurocentric 
assumptions about regional governance, a charge frequently launched at regionalist 
literature (Hurrell 2007b: 133; Sbragia 2008). While my framework is applicable to 
different spatial contexts, and it can explain differences between regional organizations, 
the procedural notion of secondary institutionalization could be taken to suggest that 
cross-regional differences are of a gradual nature. If this perspective is assumed without 
care, Southeast Asiaʼs regional organizations in general, and ASEAN in particular, may 
simply appear as underdeveloped versions or imperfect replications of its European 
counterparts. I tried to sidestep this pitfall by emphasizing the qualitative rather than 
gradual character of institutional differences. In this view, the merits of specific 
secondary institutions can only be judged against the rationality constituted by its 
primary institutional context. Judged against the tenets of a purist Westphalian 
international society, for example, the seemingly progressive secondary institutions of 
present-day Europe may inspire fears of a dangerous neo-medievalism and ever-
contested authority (Zielonka 2006).  
As a third caveat, some might argue that the framework is overly complex. This 
critique has two aspects. First, could not equivalent results have been produced using a 
simpler analytical framework? Second, does not the multi-layered and process-oriented 
character of the approach make its empirical application difficult? In response to the 
first question, I would argue that a mere descriptive re-narration of the development of 
normative references in arguments about rules and procedures in regional organizations 
would have missed out on a lot of explanatory potential: without an analysis of the 
interlinking mechanisms, it would have been considerably harder to disclose why the 
development of certain secondary institutions drove normative change, and vice versa. 
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The analysis would have disclosed that actors arguing for legal integration gained the 
upper hand in Europe while those in Southeast Asia failed to do so, but it would have 
been largely blind to the way in which existing normative frames favoured some actors 
and some arguments over others. By analyzing the effects of endogenous and 
exogenous influences on the discursive positions of the involved actors, a mechanism-
based inquiry offers answers that connect the macro-perspective of institutional patterns 
with a micro-perspective of agency in discourses (cf. Bennett and Checkel 2015a: 3–4). 
The second part of the critique concerns its practicability. Examining the parallel 
development of primary and secondary institutions over time but also about the social 
mechanisms of their reproduction is already an arduous task. Translating the findings 
into a coherent narrative is at least equally as challenging, in particular because there is 
a certain trade-off between providing detailed accounts of discursive processes and 
keeping the big picture in view. This dilemma is common to approaches transcending 
the micro-macro divide and cannot be entirely resolved. It may, however, be mediated 
by narrowing down the empirical scope of the study to certain key aspects of 
institutional change, as I did in my case studies. Focusing on specific institutions rather 
than the institutional configuration of the regional international societies as a whole 
allowed me to keep the complexity and extent of the analysis at a manageable level. 
9.2 Normative and practical implications 
The findings of this study gain relevance in light of the increasing importance of 
regional organizations in international relations, which are both complementary and in 
competition to national and global forms of international governance. An analysis of the 
historical development of organizational differences is important not least because it 
informs our normative assessment of them and may prevent ‘integration snobbery’ 
(Murray 2010). It does so, first of all, by contextualizing their genesis and directing our 
expectations of change. Seeing how an ambiguous normative framework and previous 
institutional choices influence options for change makes it clear that regional 
organizations will not perfectly respond to economic or security demands because 
functional considerations are hardly ever the only rationality at play in discourses 
surrounding regional organizations. Certain rules and expectations may appear as 
suboptimal in terms of input responsiveness or output performance but are nevertheless 
rational if you trace the dynamic normative background and the institutional history in 
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which they developed. If the context of primary institutions displays fundamental 
tensions, there is no silver bullet for the makers of regional organizations, no 
institutional choice that will simply resolve all contradictions.  
Going a step further, the study reminds us that the very criteria of a normative 
assessment are malleable and subject to political argumentation. Non-intrusive 
secondary institutions may be desirable for a regional international society which sees 
national and regional resilience as deeply intertwined aspects of regional order, but 
unsatisfactory for one in which the pooling of sovereignty is a central principle. This 
relativism does not imply that any criticism of institutional configurations is ruled out. 
On the contrary, the focus on the social mechanisms of reproducing institutional 
configurations prevents a reification of regional governance configurations as sui 
generis in an essentialist sense. By paying attention to structural hierarchies in 
institutional configurations, the role of power effects in their reproduction and different 
positions within the discourses on institutional change, the analytical framework may 
point to the role of norms in reproducing institutional inequalities, silenced voices and 
possible alternative institutional pathways.  
Turning to practical implications, an acknowledgement of the relation between 
primary and secondary institutions is especially important from the vantage point of the 
EU with its ambitions to act as a normative power abroad (Ahrens and Diez 2015; 
Manners 2002) and to diffuse its institutional model to other regional organizations 
(Börzel and Risse 2012; Jetschke and Murray 2011; Wong 2012). There is some well-
founded scepticism as to the desirability of these ambitions (Diez 2013), but if one 
accepts the transformative potential of an instrumental approach to international 
institutions, two lessons can be drawn. For one, organizational and normative diffusion 
both need to go hand in hand. Wherever an EU institution is adopted without normative 
transformation, as in the adoption of an ASEAN Charter modelled on the EUʼs legal 
foundations, this may result in hollow organizational forms that are disregarded in 
practice (Jetschke 2009; Jetschke and Rüland 2009).  
While the EU is not in a position to impose the necessary normative adaptations 
on other regions (Lenz 2013), new secondary institutions may eventually result in 
corresponding normative change. However, the study highlights the importance of 
discursive agency by local actors in this process. The second lesson is thus that the EU 
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will promote sustainable change abroad best if it helps to create an institutional context 
in which such local agents are empowered to promote further institutional change 
themselves. In this view, it is not important that reforms bring other regional 
organizations as close to the EU model as possible, but that they give a voice to regional 
agents who may act as norm entrepreneurs. Further adaption of organizational rules and 
procedures – and policies – in accordance with the EUʼs goals is then possible in the 
long run. 
9.3 Future research 
Like institutional choices may open up possibilities for further change, this study 
creates pathways for further research. I would like to conclude this study by 
highlighting and briefly discussing four of them. First, possibly the most obvious option 
would be to apply the theoretical framework to other regions than those covered in this 
study. Besides broadening our ideographical knowledge about the development of 
regional organizations around the world, this could also support theory-building – in 
spite of the scepticism expressed above regarding the generalizability of processes of 
change in regional organizations. 
For example, it seems plausible to assume that certain aspects of Southeast 
Asiaʼs institutional trajectory – the tension between Westphalian notions of 
international society and prescriptions about foreign policy relations with external 
hegemonic powers, as well as a certain preference for politics of deliberation in regional 
organizations – are common traits of post-colonial regional international societies of the 
Global South (cf. Fawcett 2015: 41). If an analysis of regional international societies in 
Africa, Latin America or elsewhere reveals similar processes, it might be justified to 
create ideal-types or taxonomies in the development of regional organizations. Knowing 
more about primary and secondary institutions in other parts of the world may also help 
designing more rigid comparative research designs than the looser, more illustrative 
case studies employed in my thesis. 
A second avenue is the question – left largely unaddressed in my study – how 
differences in regional organizations relate to dynamics on the global level of 
international society. At least since the advent of the New Regionalism wave, the nexus 
between regionalism and global governance has become an important point of attention 
in the field. Scholars have discussed the relation between the two levels from both 
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normative and empirical vantage points. Two aspects of this research have obvious 
contact points with my study. From a top-down point of view, regional institution-
building may be, at least partly, a reaction to developments on the global level. Building 
regional organizations, in this view, can take the form of a political intervention to the 
‘defence of society’ (Hettne 2003; see also Falk 2003; Gamble and Payne 2003; Hay 
and Rosamond 2002), i.e. a dialectical response to the contested forces of globalization. 
Alternatively, however, regional organizations can also be seen as an expression of the 
desire of regional actors to participate in, rather than shut out, the global economy 
(Bowles 2002; Higgott 2014; Hurrell 2007a: 244–245). 
In either case, discourses on regional institution-building will have to integrate 
different normative underpinnings and their regional organizations will have to satisfy 
competing standards of legitimacy. An example is the reconciliation of the globally 
promoted institution of market liberalism with the strong emphasis on national 
sovereignty in the organizational framework of ‘regulatory regionalism’, the idea of 
“closer integration through the development of common national ‘regulation’ rather than 
regional institutions building” (Higgott 2014: 101, emphasis in original), in East Asia. 
However, the logic applies not just in the economic realm. Future research could 
analyze how these tensions are translated into particular organizational forms, and 
whether regional organizations may also help transforming primary institutions on the 
global level. 
A further interesting strand of research on the regional-global nexus takes the 
reverse point of view, asking about the implications of the continuing pluralism in 
regional norms and policies for global governance. Again, much of this literature 
focuses on economic issues (Bhagwati 2008; Breslin et al. 2002: 6–8; Melo and 
Panagariya 1992), but the central questions also apply to other realms (Buzan 2004: 
213–214; Hettne 2003; Hurrell 2007a: 239–261): can regional differences be reconciled 
because they embody a general trend towards a post-Westphalian international order? 
Are they building blocs of a regionalized world? Or are they symptoms of 
fragmentation, containing essentially competing visions of international cooperation and 
potentially leading to a Huntingtonian ‘Clash of Civilizations’ (1993) undermining 
global international society? 
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Adapting the analytical framework of this study, one can say that much depends 
on whether and how global secondary institutions manage to accommodate a variety of 
regionally specific primary institutional contexts. This concerns not only instances 
where primary institutions are in obvious contradiction to each other, as is the case with 
pooled sovereignty à la Europe and non-interference à la Southeast Asia. These are 
fundamental differences but they are also easily recognizable and may therefore be 
addressed in a straightforward way. In a different vein, Costa Buranelli (2015a) has 
pointed to the problem of ‘polysemy’, i.e. the mutual endorsement but diverging 
interpretation of the same primary institution by actors from different regions. For 
example, the R2P norm may be endorsed by EU and ASEAN representatives but filled 
with different meanings. These subtler differences may actually be more difficult to 
mediate in secondary institution-building on the global level because the involved actors 
appear to be on the same page nominally, while there are actually momentous inter-
regional differences at play.  
Third, I have already briefly pointed to some normative implications of the 
principally empirical exercise of this analysis. This agenda could be expanded upon by 
more specific normative theorizing. For example, future research could judge the 
legitimacy of regional organizations against the background of the inclusiveness of the 
discursive processes or by discussing whether some ways of dealing with institutional 
tensions on the primary level by means of secondary institution-building are more 
desirable than others. Diez and Whitman (2002a: 51–55) have pointed out that tensions 
in regional international societies may have implications for the legitimacy of regional 
organizations. It could be instructive to discuss whether certain primary institutions 
should be considered more important than others97 and therefore accorded primacy in 
the shaping of regional organizations, and whether administrative and judicial strategies 
of mediating primary institutional ambiguities are to be preferred over deliberative ones. 
Based on such an exchange, scholars could then turn to identifying the conditions under 
which discourses will lead to institutional forms that satisfy central criteria of 
legitimacy. 
                                                 
97  Ideas about a normative hierarchy between primary institutions can be found classically in Bullʼs 
(1977) preference for order over justice and more recently in Schmidtʼs (forthc.) discussion of the role 
of jus cogens as a primordial norm in international society. 
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Finally, any further research in the pathway of this study would benefit from a 
refinement of the methodological toolbox of analyzing the social mechanisms of 
surrounding the reproduction of primary and secondary institutions. A number of 
scholars working in the field of IR methodology have recently tried to raise the validity 
standards in the analysis of social mechanisms also for those working within an 
interpretive methodological paradigm and to provide them with the appropriate tools 
(Bennett and Checkel 2015b). For example, it could be explored whether a more rigid 
adoption of process-tracing methods is possible (Costa Buranelli 2015b). Inspiration 
from these methodological forays could help reduce the dependence of the analysis of 
feedback effects on secondary sources, i.e. existing academic literature, and allow for a 
more empirically grounded reconstruction of events as they unfolded. 
This roughly sketched research agenda can go a long way in equipping 
researchers with the theoretical and normative sensorium necessary to face the 
challenges that lie ahead. For it is fair to assume that normative divergence and 
contestation in world politics will not magically disappear, and that regionalism will 
remain an important way in which these differences manifest for the foreseeable future. 
As Bull (1977) famously noted, pluralism in international society can be both a 
desirable model of international order and a source for conflict or injustice. IR scholars 
thus need to continue studying how normative change on the regional and global levels 
may contribute to or be driven by frictions between political actors which claim to 
represent different constituencies, and theorize how this affects chances of achieving a 
more just world order. 
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